Grau, Lester W.

Gress, Michael A.

Hauner, Milan

English

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Naval War College ReviewVolume 55Number 2 Spring Article 132002The Soviet-Afghan War: How a SuperpowerFought and LostMilan HaunerLester W. GrauMichael A. GressFollow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationHauner, Milan; Grau, Lester W.; and Gress, Michael A. (2002) "The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost," NavalWar College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 2 , Article 13.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss2/13the American defenses, one must antici-pate a devastating nuclear reply. Thisstrategic fact is bound to affect anyonewho is not merely suicidal. Therefore, onthe prospect that the defense might workwell enough, and given the certainty of apowerful response, a nonsuicidal enemywill have considerable hesitation aboutattacking. That hesitation is increased—itis in no way decreased—by an in-placeballistic-missile defense. As a conse-quence, strategically speaking, the issueof “perfect” defense is a phony one.Moreover, the author shows no under-standing whatsoever of the power of sep-arate layers of defense. The fact that athree-tiered defense in which each tierhas 80 percent effectiveness has an over-all system effectiveness in excess of 99percent goes completely unremarked.Also, much is made here of the notionthat the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)sought to make nuclear weapons “impo-tent and obsolete.” This is closely relatedin the book to the ridiculous notion of“perfect” defenses. In his speech of 23March 1983, however, President Reagancalled upon the scientific community to“give us the means of rendering thosenuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”The strategic argument—that it is whenone is convinced that an attack could notsucceed that those weapons become “im-potent and obsolete”—has totally escapedFitzGerald.Most serious, however, is the failure ofFitzGerald to understand that the Reaganadministration set out deliberately to re-turn, after the debacle of the Carter ad-ministration, to an active containment ofSoviet imperialism and to accelerate theerosion of the Soviet system from within.The SDI was part of this overall strategy,which was set forth in National SecurityDecision Directive 75, dated 17 January1983, entitled “U.S. Relations with theUSSR.” Although this document—origi-nally classified “Secret Sensitive”—wasdeclassified and released in 1994, thebook makes no mention of it. Clearly thisinformation was available to FitzGerald,and one is left to speculate as to reasonsfor its absence. Perhaps it is becauseNSDD-75 says clearly that the UnitedStates “should continue to resist Sovietefforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agendafocused primarily on arms control.”That, of course, offends the very essenceof Way Out There in the Blue.ROGER W. BARNETTProfessor EmeritusNaval War CollegeRussian General Staff. The Soviet-Afghan War:How a Superpower Fought and Lost. Edited by LesterW. Grau, translated by Michael A. Gress. Lawrence:Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 364pp. $45This book, edited by Lester Grau of theU.S. Army Combined Arms Center atFort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the last of atrilogy that covers the Soviet-Afghan Warof 1979–89. His translator, MichaelGress, served in the Soviet Army in Af-ghanistan. Volume 1, The Bear Went overthe Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics inAfghanistan, was an early translation oforiginal Russian documents prepared bystudent-officers—who had direct combatexperience in Afghanistan—at the FrunzeMilitary Academy in Moscow. It was firstpublished in Russian in 1991, then re-published in English in 1996 by the Na-tional Defense University. For the secondvolume, The Other Side of the Mountain:Mujahedeen Tactics in the Soviet-AfghanWar (1996, U.S. Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command, Quantico, Va.),Grau had the valuable assistance of AliB O O K R E V I E W S 1 0 91Hauner et al.: The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and LostPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002Jalali, a former colonel in the Afghanarmy.The third volume was written by a teamof Russian military academicians led byColonel Professor Valentin Runov, withcontributions from officers who hadserved during the war. It is a systematiccritical analysis from the perspective of theRussian General Staff, providing a signif-icant amount of information regardingthe type of conflict the Soviets faced inChechnya and Central Asia. It describeshow the relatively high-technology Soviettroops fought in a protracted war of attri-tion with a low-technology, ill-disciplined,but highly motivated guerrilla force untilthe Soviets were forced to withdraw. Incontrast to volume 1, on Soviet combattactics in Afghanistan, this volume pro-vides an in-depth analysis of how differ-ent branches of the Red Army interactedand fought in specific raids and ambushes.When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistanin 1979, they applied textbook techniquesfor launching a mass linear blitzkrieg at-tack against Nato forces in Europe. How-ever, they found these techniques of littleuse against the Afghans and switched tononlinear tactics, increasing their use ofhigh-precision weapons, which are bettersuited to the treacherous mountainousterrain. Grau describes well the three visi-ble tactical improvements that the Sovietsapplied in the field: the combined-armsbrigade; the materiel support battalion;and the smallest units, bronegruppy, con-sisting of three to five tracked or wheeledarmored vehicles. There are also discus-sions on the role of the Spetsnaz, the spe-cial reconnaissance and commando units,and air assault techniques using helicop-ters, which were widely employed untilthe Afghans began effectively usingStinger missiles.Although the Soviet-Afghan war has of-ten been compared with the U.S. war inVietnam, it was very different. WhileAmerican strength rose to over 500,000troops, who were employed in sizable op-erations, the Soviet “Limited Contingent”(its official title) varied from 90,000 to120,000 troops, packed into the FortiethArmy’s four divisions, five separate bri-gades, three separate regiments, andsmaller support units, which werestretched to the limit to provide protec-tion to more than thirty provincial cen-ters and industrial installations. Moreover,up to 20 percent of its strength went toman over 860 picket posts throughoutthe country, and much combat strengthwas further drained by convoy duties.In spite of valuable critical commentsprovided by the American editors at theend of each chapter, some important as-pects of the war are hardly discussed.Only four pages are devoted to the role ofloyal Afghan (Democratic Republic ofAfghanistan) forces, which were about thesame size as the Soviet Fortieth Army. Welearn almost nothing about the specialDRA Ministry of the Interior troops(Sarandoy), the military units of KHAD,the dreaded Afghan secret police, or thepanoply of tribal militias intermittentlycooperating with the Soviets against theguerrillas.However, one should appreciate the reve-lations found in this book, such as thecorrect number of Soviet casualties sincethe 1979 invasion. Despite MikhailGorbachev’s trumpeted glasnost, his offi-cial number of 13,833 dead was appar-ently about half the actual number. Thethird volume also confirms earlier find-ings that, in spite of the systematic pene-tration of the military and administrativeinfrastructure of Afghanistan prior to theinvasion, Soviet intelligence—especially1 1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W2Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 2, Art. 13https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss2/13when trying to penetrate theMujahedeen—was very poor.Even with the shortcomings mentioned,this volume must be rated as one of thebest in providing a systematic analysis ofthe Soviet armed forces on the tacticallevel. In addition to twenty photographsof soldiers and their weapons, there areabout thirty maps illustrating varioustactical operations. The translation fromRussian to English is excellent. The bookwill be indispensable to students of mili-tary tactics, as well as area specialists, asits lessons continue to be pertinent toconflict in Central Asia.MILAN HAUNERUniversity of Wisconsin–MadisonConnaughton, Richard. MacArthur and Defeat inthe Philippines. New York: Overlook Press, 2001.394pp. $35In the dark days following the onset ofthe Pacific War, American military suc-cesses were few and far between. The gal-lant, albeit unsuccessful, defense of thePhilippines, however, captured the na-tional spirit and made General DouglasA. MacArthur a national hero. His trium-phant return to Manila three years laterseemed to confirm his status as a com-mander of extraordinary military ge-nius. Largely forgotten was his abortivedefense of the archipelago in 1941 thatultimately led to the surrender of thelargest number of American troops inhistory. In his prequel to The Battle forManila, British author RichardConnaughton examines MacArthur’searly campaigns and concludes that hissubject was a courageous general but adeeply flawed man.Connaughton begins his story with abrief narrative outlining America’s in-volvement in the Philippines since the1880s, the same decade that witnessedMacArthur’s birth. Switching gears, hethen follows MacArthur’s career from hisgraduation from West Point in 1903through his multiple tours in the Philip-pines. Connaughton pays special atten-tion to his subject’s activities in the yearsimmediately preceding World War II,when MacArthur held the rank of fieldmarshal of the Philippine Common-wealth. The MacArthur who emergesduring this period was the kind of mili-tary planner whose strategic vision wasbased on the enemy’s presumed inten-tions rather than the foe’s capabilities.When the Japanese attacked in December1941, MacArthur’s defensive plans provedhollow. Connaughton severely criticizesMacArthur for allowing the destructionof his air force on the ground at ClarkField and speculates that MacArthur,alone of the other senior Allied com-manders who suffered defeat in the firstdays of the war, was not sacked but pro-moted to the temporary rank of generalbecause he was “untouchable both politi-cally and militarily.” In his assessment ofMacArthur, Connaughton joins a grow-ing number of historians who find faultwith the “Far Eastern General.”Nor is Connaughton laudatory aboutMacArthur’s static defense of LingayenGulf, which he characterizes as “amongthe most lackluster, uninspiring defensesconducted throughout the duration ofWorld War II.” Within a week of theJapanese amphibious assault at LingayenGulf, MacArthur declared Manila anopen city and withdrew the majority ofhis forces to the Bataan Peninsula andthe island fortress of Corregidor. Unfor-tunately the garrison was ill equipped,B O O K R E V I E W S 1 1 13Hauner et al.: The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and LostPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002

The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost

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The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost

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