Cressman, Robert

Peattie, Mark R.

English

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Naval War College ReviewVolume 56Number 2 Spring Article 182003Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power,1909–1941Robert CressmanMark R. PeattieFollow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationCressman, Robert and Peattie, Mark R. (2003) "Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941," Naval War CollegeReview: Vol. 56 : No. 2 , Article 18.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/18essay, Jeffrey Record points out that thosewho emphasize the failures of civilianpolicy makers in Washington ignore boththe achievements of Vietnamese revolu-tionaries and “the defective professionalU.S. military performance in Vietnamwithin the political limitations imposedon the use of force.” If politicians werestabbing the military in the back, “themilitary also was shooting itself in thefoot.” He concludes that it is unlikelythat the United States could have donemore than increase the price of an en-emy victory. John Prados analyzes theuses of intelligence by both sides, em-phasizing the difficulties of the Ameri-cans and South Vietnamese incollecting accurate information, andthe extent of North Vietnamese andVietcong penetration of the Saigongovernment and army. Gilbert chal-lenges the views of Harry Summers,Jr., and William E. Colby, both ofwhom, he believes, fail to understandthat America in Vietnam was betrayed“by its own collective limited vision ofthe nature of the war and the require-ments of victory.” Andrew Rotter ex-amines the respective economiccultures of America and North Vietnamthat shaped each side’s response to thewar, while Marilyn Young explores theimpact of the American peace movement,suggesting that whatever its effect on thelength of the conflict, widespread protests“increased the price to the government ofcontinued prosecution of the war.”In a thoughtful reflection on these es-says, Lloyd Gardner writes that “the re-ality of Vietnam was as elusive toAmerican policymakers as the enemyforces were to the men they sent to thishall of mirrors. They saw only theirown reflections, multiplied over andover.” Like policy makers at the time,many historians have also been in a hallof mirrors, preoccupied with the Amer-ican side of the struggle. It is the greatstrength of this volume that, at least inpart, it suggests the insights that can begained by moving beyond the Americanperspective.CHARLES E. NEUBrown UniversityPeattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of JapaneseNaval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, Md.: Na-val Institute Press, 2002. 392pp. $36.95This work compellingly describes howJapanese naval aviation, both land andcarrier based—like that of its principaladversary in the Pacific War, the UnitedStates—grew to maturity through trialand error. Its maturation period ex-tended from the earliest days of pow-ered flight through the bloody crucibleof war with China. The story of U.S. na-val aviation during this time is a famil-iar one, but that of the Japanese is lessso, due to the formidable barrier posedby language. As more scholars equipthemselves with the tools necessary tomine riches from the sources and publi-cations of a former enemy, however,the other side of the story is becomingknown. One such diligent student ofJapanese naval history is Mark R.Peattie, familiar as the coauthor (withDavid C. Evans) of the highly praisedKaigun: Tactics and Technology in theImperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941(Naval Institute Press, 1997). Holder ofa doctorate in modern Japanese historyfrom Princeton University and author,coauthor, or editor of seven otherworks, Peattie brings unique qualifica-tions to the daunting task.B O O K R E V I E W S 1 5 71Cressman and Peattie: Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003Sunburst’s meat lies in seven chaptersthat discuss the early development ofJapanese naval aviation (1909–21), Jap-anese naval aircraft and the tactics de-veloped for their employment (1920–36), the design and construction of Jap-anese aircraft carriers and formulationof doctrine for their employment(1920–41), the Japanese aircraft indus-try and the design and construction ofaircraft (1937–41), and Japanese navalaviation, both land and carrier basedduring the undeclared war with China(1937–41). Paralleling the wartime ex-perience is a chapter on the develop-ment of Japanese naval air power inprojecting the empire’s power as it pre-pared for the Pacific conflict. The finalchapter, “Descending the Flame,” be-gins with the attack on Pearl Harborand with the destruction, at sea and un-der way, of the British battleship HMSPrince of Wales and battle cruiser HMSRepulse. It ends with the battle of thePhilippine Sea in June 1944, after which“the Japanese Navy never again launcheda significant effort to contest the hege-mony of the skies over the Pacific.”Augmenting the text are nine appendi-ces: biographical sketches of those men-tioned in the text; a glossary of navalaviation terms; the generic organizationof Japanese naval aviation; naval aviationships (carriers, seaplane carriers, and thelike); naval air bases and air groups; prin-cipal naval aircraft; aircraft designationsystems; principal engines; and a descrip-tion of the “turning-in” maneuver. Acommon thread found in the graphicsthat appears throughout the text is thesuperb work of Jon Parschall, who ren-ders tactical maneuvers, ordnance, air-craft, and ships with equal facility.Sunburst, which Peattie affectionatelydedicates to his former coauthor,concludes that the “catastrophic col-lapse” of Japanese naval air power lay inthe Imperial Navy’s failure “to antici-pate the kind of air combat it would beobliged to wage,” its failure “to makethe right kinds of decisions” to copewith the realities of a “new kind of airwar,” and, importantly, “the inability ofJapanese industry and technology tosupport Japanese naval aviation againstthe emerging numerical and qualitativesuperiority of American air power.” Inthat connection, this reviewer was par-ticularly pleased with how Peattie dis-poses of the most common of persistentMidway myths, that the battle resultedin the catastrophic loss of aircrew.While heavy, the loss of pilots and ob-servers by no means equaled the loss ofthe “trained maintenance personnel,”invaluable to maintain modern navalaircraft, who went down with theirships. “Similarly,” he contends, “theloss of skilled ground crews, oftenabandoned to their fates when the navyevacuated remaining aircrews from is-lands under siege, substantially weak-ened the land-based air groups.”“In the end,” Peattie concludes, “theJapanese naval air service was outpro-duced, outorganized, outmanned, andoutfought.” Yet in the ashes of defeat,however, “the precision, skill, and . . .technical mastery” with which the Japa-nese crafted the Zero fighter “gave wingsto the phoenix of postwar Japanese tech-nology.” Students of the Pacific War willfind Sunburst (based on an impressivearray of Japanese sources, including theofficial war history volumes and a varietyof book or article-length studies) invalu-able for its insights on an importantsubject.ROBERT CRESSMANNaval Historical Center1 5 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W2Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 18https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/18

Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941

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Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941

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