Strachan, Hew

Wawro, Geoffrey

English

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Naval War College ReviewVolume 55Number 4 Autumn Article 242002The First World War: To ArmsGeoffrey WawroHew StrachanFollow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationWawro, Geoffrey and Strachan, Hew (2002) "The First World War: To Arms," Naval War College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 4 , Article 24.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/24impact of Germany’s failure to integrateits intelligence. However, Rhys-Jones allbut ignores America’s involvement andfails to include much of the German ma-terials that detail the political factorsdriving Admiral Raeder and explain thenaval staff’s objections to executing Op-eration RHINE in May 1941. Neitherbook tells the story completely; but ifone must choose, The Loss of the Bis-marck provides a better naval story,while The Destruction of the Bismarckprovides the better strategic treatment.CARL O. SCHUSTERCaptain, U.S. Navy, RetiredKailua, HawaiiStrachan, Hew. The First World War: To Arms.New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001. 1,127pp.$39.95What began as a single-volume replace-ment of Oxford University Press’slong-running World War I survey (AHistory of the Great War, by C. R. M. F.Cruttwell [1934]) has, in Hew Strachan’shands, burgeoned into three mammothvolumes, of which this is the first. Thesecond, we are told, will cover the years1915 and 1916 and will be called NoQuarter. The third and final volume, en-titled Fall Out (reader be warned that thefirst volume has been in the makingsince 1989), will pick up in the winter of1916 and push through to the end of thewar.Since this first volume alone runs to1,127 pages, readers will want to knowhow this book differs from an alreadycrowded field. The answer is that it looksat topics—origins, war planning, tactics,munitions crises, morale—in a broadcomparative context. No blunderinggreat power is unfairly singled out.As is obvious from the subtitle, thebook is about the origins of the war,mobilization, and opening campaigns.To rephrase what has already been writ-ten many times over by battalions ofhistorians is no easy task, but Strachanrises to the challenge. Better yet, heworks through all the latest literaturein English, French, and German to pro-vide the most up-to-date interpretationof the war’s outbreak. In common withmost historians, Strachan points to theshakiness of the German Empire and itsnervous quest for status and security asthe main causes of the war. A chiefabettor was Austria-Hungary, whoseown military had become so enfeebledby the continuous Vienna-Budapestbudget skirmishes that war in 1914 ap-peared the only way to rally the monar-chy behind a much-needed program ofrearmament. Similar calculations pre-vailed in Russia, where the tsar hopedthat mobilization in defense of Serbiawould heal political wounds and stop apolitico-economic strike wave that hadescalated from 222 strikes in 1910 to3,534 in the first half of 1914. Franceand Great Britain appear more benign;Strachan concludes from the most re-cent French scholarship that there wasno real war fever in France—révanchewas a slogan of certain pressure groups.Britain was hamstrung between its fleetand “continentalists” clustered aroundGeneral Henry Wilson.Strachan’s analysis of the competing warplans is excellent. Regarding theSchlieffen Plan, he describes Moltke theYounger’s growing unease with theseven-to-one ratio set by Albert vonSchlieffen to overweight the “righthook” through Belgium and Holland1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W1Wawro and Strachan: The First World War: To ArmsPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002that would envelop a French thrust intoLorraine. Although Wilhelm Groenerand B. H. Liddell Hart later blastedMoltke for his timidity—he reduced theratio of troops on the right wing to thoseon the left to three to one—Strachanpoints out that “an army would [not]behave as a united mass, gaining impe-tus on its right specifically from theweakness of its left,” for an army “is acombination of individuals and not aweight obeying the laws of physics.”That is precisely the point: the SchlieffenPlan was undone not by its relativeweighting but by inadequate transportand insoluble problems of supply. EachGerman corps required twenty-four kilo-meters of road space, and there was justnot enough of that on the right wingonce the Belgians tore up their railwaysand Holland was foreclosed as a corri-dor. Add to this the fact that no fewerthan 60 percent of German trucks hadbroken down by late August 1914, and itis easier to explain the German flounder-ing at the Marne. There was also thesmall problem of French resistance.Having begun the war with tactics thatwere notoriously “perplexed by theproblems of firepower,” the Germanarmy faced French forces, commandedby Field Marshal J. J. C. Joffre, thathacked five entire German corps topieces in the last week of August and thefirst week of September 1914. Strachan’slarger analysis of this Battle of the Marneis interesting. The German high com-mand’s initial response to the defeat—Moltke and thirty-two other generalswere dismissed—was to blame individu-als, “to make the debate about opera-tional ideas, not about grand strategy.”In fact, the Marne was a strategic failingthat should have discredited the kaiserand his army, which “had failed to suc-ceed in its prime role.” Yet there was nohealthy introspection or self-assessment;the imperial army would simply hammeraway for another four years.In contrast to the western front, ham-mering seemed to work in the East,where the Germans shattered the Rus-sians at Tannenberg and the Austro-Hungarians achieved some early suc-cesses in Galicia. However, there toothe war stagnated for logistical reasons;with Germany committed on the west-ern front and Russia’s strength dividedby French demands for an attack onEast Prussia, it was difficult to masstroops and artillery anywhere on theeastern front, and yet more difficult tomove them, given the poverty ofcommunications.Although the production of thisthree-volume history of World War Iwill take far longer than the Great Waritself took to fight, readers willing to en-ter the trenches with this first volumewill be rewarded with a kaleidoscopicand elegantly written presentation of thegreat issues and problems raised by thewar’s origins, campaigns, and homefronts.GEOFFREY WAWRONaval War CollegeUhrowczik, Peter. The Burning of Monterey: The1818 Attack on California by the PrivateerBouchard. Los Gatos, Calif.: Cyril Books, 2001.170pp. $12.95I am a resident of Monterey. Everyonehere knows about the Carmel Missionand Father Junipero Serra. Colton Hall,where the California ConstitutionalConvention was held, still stands, as apreserved historic landmark. CanneryRow likewise remains, though JohnB O O K R E V I E W S 1 3 12Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 24https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/24

The First World War: To Arms

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The First World War: To Arms

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