Stephen Roskill’s two-volume Naval Policy between the Wars (London: Collins, 1968 and 1976) has dominated the history of Britain’s interwar navy. Roskill—author of the official British naval history of World War II—had a vast store of knowledge, as well as personal experience and contacts with many of the individuals about whom he wrote

Halpern, Paul G.

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Naval War College ReviewVolume 55Number 1 Winter Article 122002Another Look at HistoryPaul G. HalpernFollow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Additional Writing is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationHalpern, Paul G. (2002) "Another Look at History," Naval War College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 1 , Article 12.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss1/12ANOTHER LOOK AT HISTORYPaul G. HalpernBell, Christopher M., The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategybetween the Wars. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000.232pp. $51Stephen Roskill’s two-volume Naval Policy between the Wars (London: Collins,1968 and 1976) has dominated the history of Britain’s interwar navy.Roskill—author of the official British naval history of World War II—had a vaststore of knowledge, as well as personal experience and contacts with many of theindividuals about whom he wrote. However, it is now well over a generationsince his volumes were published, and it was inevitable that over time more anddifferent questions would be asked, new material would be uncovered, and exist-ing material would be reconsidered, until even the finest scholarly work wouldbecome subject to modification. Consequently, Christopher M. Bell’s new his-tory of the Royal Navy between the First and Second World Wars is of consider-able interest, though Roskill’s work remains the basic reference.The “silent service” emerged from World War I with great, though aging, ma-teriel strength and in certain fields, such as naval aviation, a significant techno-logical lead. That preeminent position quickly eroded (the lead in naval aviationdisappeared, never to be regained), and by the late 1930s the Royal Navy had todetermine how to address the difficult problems of a resurgent Germany, an ex-pansionist Japan, and responsibilities in both European and Far Eastern wa-ters—problems compounded especially after 1935, when the Mediterraneancould no longer be considered secure.Bell is currently a research analyst for the Center for Naval Warfare Studies atthe Naval War College. He establishes his aims in a clearly written introduction:“This book identifies and analyzes the central body ofideas which guided navy policy-makers during theinterwar period, and explores how these ideas influ-enced Britain’s naval and strategic policies. Here it willbe applied principally to the naval profession, a groupwhich is often thought to have held no importantideas of its own, but which did in fact possess distinctviews about the nature and application of seapower.”Paul Halpern has been a professor of history at FloridaState University since 1965. His books include: TheMediterranean Naval Situation, 1908–1914 (HarvardUniv. Press, 1971); The Naval War in the Mediterra-nean, 1914–1918 (Naval Institute Press, 1987); and ANaval History of World War I (Naval Institute Press,1995). He is currently working on a study of the Medi-terranean naval situation in the interwar period, as wellas on a shorter work on the action in the Otranto Straitsin May 1917.Naval War College Review, Winter 2002, Vol. LV, No. 11Halpern: Another Look at HistoryPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002In his first chapter, “The Politics of Seapower: The ‘One-Power Standard’ andBritish Maritime Security,” Bell examines the question of “naval standards,”which were subject to change and which he considers “little more than a bar-gaining tool.” “Only by viewing them from this perspective is it possible to un-derstand how the navy attempted to secure the resources it needed.”Bell relies heavily on Admiralty war plans and strategic appreciations to showwhat British naval leaders thought seapower might accomplish in future con-flicts. The titles of the relevant chapters give a good indication of their content:“‘Main Fleet to Bermuda’: Naval Strategy for an Anglo-American War,” “FarEastern War Plans and the Myth of the Singapore Strategy,” “‘The Ultimate Po-tential Enemy’: Nazi Germany and British Defense Dilemmas,” and “The Searchfor the ‘Knockout Blow’: War Plans against Italy.”The idea of potential war with the United States makes odd reading now, butBell draws an interesting link between this contingency and the possibility ofwar with Japan. The Admiralty realized that “if British seapower alone could nothope to defeat decisively a major non-European naval power, then war with thatpower would have to be avoided at almost any cost. This proved to be a soundappreciation, and one which was based on a clear understanding of the limita-tions of seapower.” As for the “Singapore strategy,” Bell derides haphazard use ofthe term. He points out that there were actually several “Singapore strategies,”and that the dispatch of a fleet to Singapore was not an end in itself but ratheronly the opening move in “a prolonged war of attrition.” Bell concludes that theFar Eastern plans were not based on obsolete thinking but that the navy plannershad to struggle with inadequate means to preserve British interests. “In the end,they failed to preserve all of these interests, but the explanation lies in the magni-tude of the threat facing Britain in 1941 rather than in any fundamental errors inthe navy’s strategic planning.”Bell also gives credit to the Admiralty’s planning for a war against Germany.He believes insufficient attention was given to the problem of antisubmarinewarfare but considers the British strategic defensive strategy—similar to thatwhich it had adopted in World War I—sound during the first eight months ofthe war, until the fall of France undermined existing assumptions and created anew and grave situation.Bell has an interesting chapter on the navy’s effort to help British industry. Itis appropriately titled “‘Showing the Flag’: Deterrence and the Naval Arma-ments Industry.” Even though the results of the program were not up to expecta-tions, Bell argues, they were not misguided and cost little. He is more critical inhis chapter on naval propaganda. The title is most expressive: “‘Something VerySordid’: Naval Propaganda and the British Public.” The navy’s aversion to“self-promotion” may have diminished during the course of the interwar period,1 4 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W2Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 1, Art. 12https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss1/12but it was still strong enough nearly to cause the loss of what Bell calls the battlefor the “hearts and minds” of the British public. He concludes that given “theservice’s declining popularity, . . . if the Second World War had not broken outwhen it did, the navy would have been in a difficult position to withstand Trea-sury attacks when the debate over naval expansion was resumed.”Bell’s overall conclusions, however, remain positive. While not understatingflaws and mistakes, which are fully analyzed in the text, Bell believes that the Ad-miralty was “largely powerless to prevent the government undermining thefoundations of British seapower after the First World War.” But this was not dueto bad advice from the Admiralty. Had the government in the period between1921 and 1934 listened more carefully to the navy’s pleadings, it could haveaverted the decline and greatly strengthened Britain’s strategic and diplomaticposition in the following decade. Bell’s final assessment is well put: “The navydid make many mistakes of its own, both before and during the Second WorldWar, but few of its failures were the result of a fundamental misunderstanding ofthe nature and application of seapower.”To appreciate fully the quality and sophistication of Bell’s analysis, one mustread the book. The text is solidly based on Admiralty records in the Public Re-cord Office, Kew. It is clearly written, and even those who are primarily inter-ested in the U.S. Navy will find it accessible and useful for comparison with theAmerican experience during this era. Those interested in the Royal Navy willfind Bell’s study indispensable.R E V I E W E S S A Y S 1 4 33Halpern: Another Look at HistoryPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002Luce Hall, c. 1938. Recruits of the Naval Training Station (housed in what is now Sims Hall)are pitching tents on Dewey Field.4Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 1, Art. 12https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss1/12

Another Look at History

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