Reynolds, Nicholas E.

Robbins, James S.

English

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Naval War College ReviewVolume 59Number 2 Spring Article 112006Contemporary Operational-Level WarFighting—Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S.Marine Corps in the Second Iraq WarJames S. RobbinsNicholas E. ReynoldsFollow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion inNaval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationRobbins, James S. and Reynolds, Nicholas E. (2006) "Contemporary Operational-Level War Fighting—Basrah, Baghdad, andBeyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 59 : No. 2 , Article 11.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/11REVIEW ESSAYSCONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL WAR FIGHTINGJames S. RobbinsReynolds, Nicholas E. Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S.Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War. Annapolis, Md.: NavalInstitute Press, 2005. 276pp. $32.95Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond is one of the first broad, theater-level accounts ofthe Marine Corps’s most recent conventional conflict. It is not an official historybut, in the author’s words, “a framework for understanding Marine participationin the Iraq war.” The book opens with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM andswiftly moves to the preparation, planning, and execution of IRAQI FREEDOM(OIF). It is an operational-level account, focused primarily on campaign planningand execution from the point of view of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF),operating as part of the Coalition Forces Land Com-ponent Command. The book is based generally onsuch primary sources as interviews, official docu-ments, contemporary reports, and firsthand observa-tions. The author, retired Marine Corps Reservecolonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, served as Marine CorpsOfficer in Charge of Field History from 1999 to 2004and supervised Marine history operations duringIRAQI FREEDOM. His work has benefited from the factthat this campaign was one of the best documented inhistory, particularly on the Marine side; the Corps hadembedded numerous historians and “lessons learned”analysts at every level in the MEF. As hostilities wounddown, a “kind of historical wolf pack” was deployed toconduct a week’s worth of interviews with MarinesJames S. Robbins is a professor of international relationsat the National Defense University in Washington,D.C., and a senior fellow in National Security Affairs atthe American Foreign Policy Council. Dr. Robbins re-ceived his PhD in international relations from theFletcher School of Diplomacy. His research interests in-clude terrorism and national security strategy, politicaltheory, and military history. He is a widely publishedauthor in the national security field and a contributingeditor for National Review Online. His work has ap-peared in the Wall Street Journal and the WashingtonTimes, as well as other publications. Dr. Robbins is afrequent commentator on international television andradio including the BBC, Voice of America, FNC,MSNBC, CNBC, and CNN/FN. He is the author ofLast in Their Class: Custer, Pickett, and the Goats ofWest Point (Encounter Books, 2006).Naval War College Review, Spring 2006, Vol. 59, No. 2T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vpMonday, April 17, 2006 8:47:32 AMColor profile: Generic CMYK printer profileComposite  Default screen1Robbins and Reynolds: Contemporary Operational-Level War Fighting—Basrah, Baghdad, andPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006from the MEF commander on down. Add to these materials journalists’ ac-counts, “mil-blogs,” and participant memoirs, and one is left with an unequaleddocumentary record from which to draw.The book naturally focuses on the relationship between campaign planningand execution, and one can see from the beginning in Afghanistan that the mostimportant elements in the process are relationships, communication, and trust.Reynolds highlights the importance of human factors in command; eventhough technology makes it possible for a commander to lead “virtually” from adistant networked headquarters, warfare is still a human undertaking, and thepersonal touch is important. Personalities play a central role. MEF commanderLieutenant General James T. Conway is as ubiquitous throughout the book as hewas in the theater, leading his men from the front to the extent practicable. “Al-most like a commander in the U.S. Civil War,” Reynolds writes, “he wanted tosee, and be seen by, his Marines before the battle.” Brigadier General James N.Mattis, 1st Marine Division commander, followed this example as well, and “insearch of a purer form of war fighting, set off on the battlefield with a tiny reti-nue and a cell phone.” By staying close to the front and interacting personallywith their field officers, the generals were better able to adapt to the fluidity ofthe battle space. This ties into another theme developed throughout the book,namely that “the plan itself was nothing but the planning was everything.” Thatis, planning processes that encumber themselves with too much detail at thefront end waste time by emphasizing form over function. A good plan is one thatallows the war fighter to prepare to adapt as conditions on the ground inevitablychange. If good processes are in place, it does not matter whether the plan iscomplete to the last bullet, bean, and Band-Aid.The evolution of the planned air phase of the offensive is one example. The origi-nal plan followed the Operation DESERT STORM model, with a month-long aerialpreparation to induce “shock and awe” among the Iraqis. The long duration of theplanned air campaign was of special concern to the MEF because it affected how theMarine air wing could be utilized—if the air and ground campaigns were asyn-chronous, as was originally planned, it would be more difficult to commit airframesto ground-support missions. But as the start of the war neared, the air campaignwas shortened, first to around two weeks, then to five days, and ultimately to aplanned fifteen hours. Ironically, the attempted decapitation strike on the Iraqileadership on the night of 19–20 March forced the ground phase into action prema-turely to secure the southern oil fields, and the air “preparation”followed a day later.This had the benefit of achieving a measure of surprise on the Iraqi ground forces,who had expected to face a period of aerial bombing before fighting on the ground,and resulted in a completely synchronous battle space for the Marine air-ground el-ements, which was what the Marine commanders had wanted from the beginning.1 5 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E WT:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vpMonday, April 17, 2006 8:47:32 AMColor profile: Generic CMYK printer profileComposite  Default screen2Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 2, Art. 11https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/11The ground campaign plan itself underwent significant revisions as the battleunfolded. It was originally planned for 125 days, which overestimated the resis-tance potential of the regime. Saddam Hussein had no well-thought-out defen-sive plan, no evident strategic concept. Thus as Iraqi forces collapsed beforethem, the Marines had to adapt to the greatly accelerated timeline. Likewise,coalition forces found that the planned-for opposition from elite RepublicanGuard and Special Republican Guard units was not as deadly as that from FedayeenSaddam and other irregular forces, particularly in built-up areas. These fighters—General Mattis called them “as worthless an example of men as we’ve everfought”—lacked the firepower to engage decisively, but as was shown in battlessuch as An Nasiriyah, they were flexible, opportunistic, and oblivious of the lawsof war, and they could do heavy damage to isolated groups of Marines.At An Nasiriyah—which the author describes as “an uninviting Third World‘sprawl of slums and industrial compounds,’ with two- to-three-story concretebuildings set on a grind of bad roads and alleyways, many strewn with garbageand raw sewage”— the narrative dips into the tactical level to give a sense of thebattlefield environment, though the focus of the book is on the operational level.There is a gripping account of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines be-ing engaged by A-10s that had mistaken them for Iraqis. There are illustrativetactical anecdotes scattered throughout, such as the account of First LieutenantBrian R. Chontosh, whose combined anti-armor team platoon was caught in anambush on the highway to Baghdad. Lieutenant Chontosh directed his driverthrough a gap in the berm by the side of the road directly into the enemy posi-tions, then dismounted and personally engaged the enemy with a succession ofweapons (M-16, 9mm pistol, AK-47, RPG), ending the ambush with a burst ofsudden violence and physical bravery. Chontosh was awarded the Navy Cross.Baghdad represented another planning evolution. Most planners believedthat Saddam would make his stand in the capital and that Baghdad would be thescene of punishing urban warfare. The Marines faced some tough fighting alongthe approaches to the city from irregular troops and foreign fighters. Originally,Baghdad was assigned wholly to Army V Corps, to avoid boundary conflicts be-tween two corps-level elements. The MEF was assigned cordoning and supportresponsibilities, though the land component commander, Lieutenant GeneralDavid D. McKiernan, had felt that should circumstances arise in which the MEFwould be more directly involved, the natural split would be the Tigris River. Whenit became clear by 3 April that the regime was “going down fast, going down final,”the Marines were assigned half the city and shifted plans several times in a fewdays from cordoning to conducting raids, and then to moving decisively into thecity center, where they were greeted by enthusiastic crowds of Iraqis.R E V I E W E S S A Y S 1 5 9T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vpMonday, April 17, 2006 8:47:32 AMColor profile: Generic CMYK printer profileComposite  Default screen3Robbins and Reynolds: Contemporary Operational-Level War Fighting—Basrah, Baghdad, andPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006“Phase IV” planning, which is discussed throughout the book, is particularlynoteworthy given that it has yet to terminate. Reynolds notes early in the narra-tive, “there was very little guidance from higher headquarters on Phase IV, noteven a basic policy decree.” Marine planners tried to get ahead of the questioneven without guidance, knowing that they would have to handle at least some PhaseIV duties. Questions sent to higher authorities on basic planning guidelines—whether the Iraqi electrical grid, the economy, or the human infrastructure (e.g.,the bureaucracy and police) would be intact—were met with “hazy assump-tions” or no answers at all. As it turned out, the men on the ground adapted tothe situations as they encountered them, and they generally did well. Stopgap so-lutions provided the basics for the Iraqis and kept order, at least for a few monthsafter the brief initial “looting” phase. The author notes well the significance ofthe “surprise move” by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambas-sador L. Paul Bremer, who on 23 May 2003 disbanded the Iraqi army and, per-haps more significantly, canceled their pensions. The “predictable result” of thisshort-sighted move was to destabilize the country and give birth to the insur-gency, but the long-term effects go beyond the scope of the work under review.The author periodically discusses the use of contemporary networked plan-ning tools and makes some good observations on the “near obsession” withPowerPoint in the military. Some such briefings are the result of the distillationof hours of staff work, carefully reduced to a few key concepts, artfully con-structed and carefully worded to fit on a slide. However, after being sent up thechain a few levels, other hands (not necessarily commanders) might begin edit-ing, changing, rewording, or rearranging slides based on personal preferences orrandom inputs, without the benefit of the depth of knowledge that was behindthe original briefing. “The result could be a course of action that looked good ona PowerPoint slide but had not been thoroughly staffed,” Reynolds writes. “Thatpart of the plan would be ‘one PowerPoint brief ’ deep, and would either collapseof its own weight or have to be rescued by planners scrambling to do the staffwork to back up the change.” The Marines generally resisted putting too muchdetail into early planning, since the plans were certain to change later on. In ad-dition, their experience in Afghanistan taught them that large planning staffsand detailed plans hundreds of pages long were unnecessary, even counter-productive. It was better to rely on “common sense, good liaison officers, and‘hand con’” (i.e., relationships based on a handshake). Reynolds also gives a fa-vorable account of the British planning system, which is highly informal whilestill professional and abjures PowerPoint completely.Sometimes higher commands received too much information, from officialchannels and otherwise. It was “literally impossible to get away from TV imagesof the war.” Media accounts of actions on the battlefield would occasionally have1 6 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E WT:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vpMonday, April 17, 2006 8:47:33 AMColor profile: Generic CMYK printer profileComposite  Default screen4Naval War College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 2, Art. 11https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss2/11a negative impact on information management; press reports were generallyseen at higher headquarters more quickly than official reports, and in some caseswhen the situation was hot, headquarters would be pressing down the chain toget more information right away. This tended to make the information jam evenworse; as one staff officer observed memorably, “If you want information bad, youwill get bad information.” Reynolds also occasionally mentions the negative role ofpundits, “the experts on television with their nonstop stream of commentary andfree advice, usually from thousands of miles away.” This stands in contrast to the at-titude toward the embedded reporters, who were held in high repute by the men onthe ground and were generally seen as providing accurate reportage.Reynolds’s tone is sometimes colloquial, which keeps the book accessible, es-pecially given the subject matter. The book is inevitably acronym heavy, so ithelps if the reader is comfortable in that environment. A useful glossary is pro-vided. The author notes that the reader who had a hard time keeping track of thespecialized terminology would not be alone: “In this war, there was an often-confusing mix of civilian and military acronyms whose meanings were not en-tirely clear to everyone.” One shortcoming is the lack of adequate maps; the fewthat are included are reference maps that do not show force dispositions, plans,or movements. That being said, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond is an excellentbook for officers or other professionals seeking to improve their understandingof contemporary operational-level war fighting and could profitably be studiedat intermediate-level professional military education schools for seminars onoperational art. There is clearly much more to be written about this campaign,but this book provides a good framework to launch the process.R E V I E W E S S A Y S 1 6 1T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Spring 2006\Web\NWCRSP06web.vpMonday, April 17, 2006 8:47:33 AMColor profile: Generic CMYK printer profileComposite  Default screen5Robbins and Reynolds: Contemporary Operational-Level War Fighting—Basrah, Baghdad, andPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006

Contemporary Operational-Level War Fighting—Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War

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Contemporary Operational-Level War Fighting—Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War

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