Trivium is a bit-based stream cipher in the final portfolio of the eSTREAM project. In this paper, we apply the algebraic attack approach of Berbain et al. to Trivium-like ciphers and perform new analyses on them. We demonstrate a new algebraic attack on Bivium-A. This attack requires less time and memory than previous techniques to recover Bivium-A's initial state. Though our attacks on Bivium-B, Trivium and Trivium-N are worse than exhaustive keysearch, the systems of equations which are constructed are smaller and less complex compared to previous algebraic analyses. We also answer an open question posed by Berbain et al. on the feasibility of applying their technique on Trivium-like ciphers. Factors which can affect the complexity of our attack on Trivium-like ciphers are discussed in detail. Analysis of Bivium-B and Trivium-N are omitted from this manuscript. The full paper is available on the IACR ePrint Archive
