Myerberg, Andrew

English

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law

American University Criminal Law Brief Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 8 2007 Supreme Court Watch: Recent Decisions And Upcoming CriminalCases For The 2006-2007 Docket Andrew Myerberg Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb  Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Myerberg, Andrew. "Supreme Court Watch: Recent Decisions And Upcoming Criminal Cases For The 2006-2007 Docket." Criminal Law Brief 2, no. 2 (2007): 47-49. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. Supreme Court Watch: Recent Decisions And Upcoming CriminalCases For The 2006-2007 Docket Erratum article This article is available in American University Criminal Law Brief: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb/vol2/iss2/8 DECIDED CASESDecided January 22, 2007Question Presented:Whether a sentencing judge is allowed to considerfacts not determined by the jury or admitted by the defendant,as allowed by the California Determinate Sentencing Law, orwhether this law is unconstitutional?Facts:John Cunningham was convicted of child sexual abusein the California state courts.  During his sentencing hearing,the judge made an upward departure from the sentencing guide-lines based on facts not determined by the jury to be truebeyond a reasonable doubt.  This decision was within the pow-ers of the judge as defined by California’s DeterminateSentencing Law.The petitioner appealed the sentence citing Sixth andFourteenth Amendment violations.  The state court of appealsupheld the sentence and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-rari to resolve the question of whether the California statute wasin direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision in Blakelyv. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).Decision:Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsburg wrote the majority opin-ion for this 6-3 decision.  The court held that California’s deter-minate sentencing rule violated the petitioner’s constitutionalright to a jury trial by placing “sentence-elevating fact-finding”within the province of the trial judge.  The Majority argued that“[t]his court has repeatedly held that, under the SixthAmendment, any fact that exposes the defendant to a greaterpotential sentence must be found by the jury, not a judge, andestablished beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a prepon-derance of the evidence.”  The judgment was reversed in partand remanded.  Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito dissented.Decided December 11, 2006Question Presented:Did the appearance of the deceased’s family in courtwith photographic buttons of the deceased violate the constitu-tional rights of the defendant in a murder trial in which thedefendant claimed self-defense?Facts:Petitioner Musladin appealed his conviction for firstdegree murder, among other crimes, citing the trial court’s deci-sion to deny his motion to prevent family members of thedeceased sitting in the courtroom from wearing buttons with thelikeness of the deceased imprinted on them.  PetitionerMusladin argued that these buttons were inherently prejudicialto the jury and deprived him of his constitutional right to a fairtrial.  The California Court of Appeals held that Musladin hadto show actual or inherent prejudice to succeed on his claim, cit-ing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986), and ruled that hehad not met this test.  The Ninth Circuit overruled, holding that the decision of thestate court of appeals “was contrary to or involved an unreason-able application of, clearly established federal law,” citing 28U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) as interpreted by the United StatesSupreme Court in Holbrook and Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.521 (1976).Decision:The Supreme Court held, in a 9-0 decision (JusticesStevens, Kennedy, and Souter concurring), that because bothEstelle and Holbrook dealt with “state-sponsored courtroompractices,” in contrast to the spectator conduct in this case, andbecause of the dearth of decisions on the issue at bar, it couldnot be said that the California Court of Appeals’ decision “wascontrary to” or “unreasonably applied” established federal law.The Ninth Circuit, therefore, was wrong to reverse Musladin’sconviction.  The ruling of the Ninth Circuit was vacated andremanded.Decided January 9, 2007Questions Presented:1. Is the holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296(2004), a new rule or was it dictated by Apprendi v. New Jersey,530 U.S. 466 (2006)?2.  If Blakely is a new rule, does its requirement that thefacts resulting in an enhanced statutory maximum be provedbeyond a reasonable doubt apply retroactively?Facts:Petitioner Burton was convicted of raping a minor,among other crimes, and was sentenced to forty-seven years inprison.  The petitioner’s sentence was twenty-one years longerthat the maximum recommended under the sentencing guide-lines.  The petitioner appealed his sentence in the Ninth Circuit,arguing that Blakely v. Washington, which requires that evi-dence used by the judge during sentencing be found by the juryto be true beyond a reasonable doubt, should be applied retroac-tively to his sentence.  Further, the petitioner argued that hissentence violated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey that factorsutilized by the judge to increase a sentence beyond the maxi-mum term in the sentencing guidelines must be proved to thejury beyond a reasonable doubt.The Ninth Circuit held that Blakely was a new rule thatcould not be applied retroactively to the petitioner’s sentenceand that Apprendi did not apply because the sentence imposeddid not exceed the statutory maximum in the sentenc-47 Criminal Law BriefSUPREME COURT WATCH: RECENT DECISIONS AND UPCOMING CRIMINALCASES FOR THE 2006-2007 DOCKETAndrew Myerberg*Cunningham v. CaliforniaCarey v. MusladiinBurton v. Waddingtoning guidelines.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.Decision:In a procedural ruling, the United States SupremeCourt held that petitioner Burton’s habeas petition was to bedismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Because the court held thatthe petitioner’s appeal was a “second or successive petition,”the petitioner was required to obtain the proper authorizationbefore filing.  The petitioner failed to do so in this case.  TheSupreme Court in a 9-0 per curiam opinion dismissed the casebecause of an invalid petition and declined to rule on the ques-tions presented. Decided November 13, 2006Questions Presented:1. Is the “unadorned factor (k)” instruction constitution-ally deficient under Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990),because it would confuse a reasonable juror into thinking thatpost-conviction behavior of the defendant could not be consid-ered as a mitigating factor during sentencing?2. If the instruction is found to be deficient, may that rul-ing be applied retroactively? Facts:Petitioner Belmontes was tried and convicted of firstdegree murder in California state court and sentenced to death.During his sentencing hearing the petitioner offered mitigatingevidence.  During the jury instruction, the judge gave the jurythe “unadorned factor (k)” instruction, informing the jury thatthey may consider the mitigating evidence presented and “anyother circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crimeeven though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”  The jurysummarily sentenced the petitioner to death.The California Supreme Court upheld the sentence,rejecting the petitioner’s argument that the “unadorned factor(k)” instruction’s ambiguity caused confusion in the jury aboutwhether they could evaluate post-conviction behavior as a mit-igating circumstance.  The court held that under the U.S.Supreme Court’s holding in Boyde v. California, the instructionwas constitutional unless the petitioner could show “reasonablelikelihood” of confusion.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit over-turned the sentence holding that a reasonable juror could beconfused by the instruction.Decision:In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held thatCalifornia’s “unadorned factor (k)” instruction was constitu-tional.  The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, rea-soned that under Boyde, a reasonable juror would not be con-fused by the instruction.  The court found that the instructionwas a sufficiently clear “catchall” under which the jury couldsufficiently evaluate mitigating evidence of both past and futureconduct.  Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion.Decided February 21, 2007Question Presented:When does the statute of limitations for an 18 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for damages emanating from a false arrest beginto toll? Facts:In 1994, the petitioner was arrested for and chargedwith murder.  He was convicted of the crime in 1996 and beganserving his sentence.  During his trial the petitioner asserted thathe has been coerced into confessing to the crime and that therewas no probable cause for his arrest.  In 1998, an appeals courtreversed his sentence and in 2002 all charges relating to themurder were dropped.The next year, the petitioner filed suit in federal dis-trict court alleging that the false arrest performed by the policewas a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  The districtcourt ruled that the petitioner could not bring the suit, statingthat, because of Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations, the casewas barred.  The petitioner appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals arguing that the statute of limitations did not applyuntil the charges against him were dropped.  The SeventhCircuit affirmed the ruling of the district court, noting a circuitsplit, but holding that the statute of limitations began to toll atthe time of arrest. Decision:In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Scalia, theSupreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuitand held that the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983claim for damages resulting from a false arrest “begins to run atthe time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legalprocess.”UPCOMING CASESDocket # 06-313Eighth Circuit Court of AppealsQuestion Presented:Did the Eighth Circuit exceed the scope of its authori-ty under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996 by overturning a state death penalty conviction by holdingthat the inflammatory nature of the prosecutor’s closing argu-ment during the penalty phase of the trial deprived the defen-dant of Due Process of law?Facts:William Weaver was tried in Missouri state court forthe murder of a prospective witness during a drug trial.  He wasconvicted of the crime and during the penalty phase ofWeaver’s trial, the prosecutor made closing arguments to thejury perceived by the defendant to be inflammatory and preju-dicial.  Weaver was convicted of first degree murder and sen-tenced to death.  Weaver appealed his conviction in theFall 2006 48Ayers v. BelmontesWallace v. KatoRoper v. WeaverMissouri state courts and was denied relief.  District Court in the Eighth Circuit granted habeasreview.  The District Court held that the inflammatory nature ofthe prosecutor’s closing argument deprived the defendant of afair trial and was a Due Process violation.  The Eighth CircuitCourt of Appeals affirmed.  The state of Missouri appealed thejudgment to the United States Supreme Court.Docket No. 05-1631Eleventh Circuit Court of AppealsQuestion Presented:1. Does a police officer who ends a high speed chase bycrashing his car into that of the suspect violate the FourthAmendment protection against unreasonable seizures?2.  Is it “clearly established” under federal law that apolice officer commits a Fourth Amendment violation whenthat officer uses deadly force in a high-speed chase?Facts:During a high speed chase, Officer Timothy Scottrammed his vehicle into that of a 19 year old fleeing speeder,Victor Harris.  The impact caused Harris’ car to crash.  As aresult of the crash Harris was paralyzed from the neck down.Harris filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District ofGeorgia, alleging that Scott violated his Fourth Amendmentrights against unreasonable seizure by using excessive force.The District Court ruled for Harris, holding that his FourthAmendment rights were violated.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed thejudgment against Officer Scott, citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471U.S. 1, for the proposition that deadly force could not be usedto perform a seizure unless the suspect’s actions presented a“significant threat of death” to the public.  The court held thatspeeding and traffic violations on mostly empty roads did notmeet that threshold.  Docket # 05-1575Eleventh Circuit Court of AppealsQuestion Presented:Can a conviction for attempted burglary qualify as a“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act?Facts:The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) imposes amandatory fifteen (15) year sentence on defendants who arearrested for possession of a firearm and have been previouslyconvicted of three “serious drug crimes” or “violent offenses.”In 2003, Alphonso James, Jr. was arrested and tried in federaldistrict court in Florida for possession of a firearm.  On hisrecord, James had a previous conviction for attempted burglaryand two previous convictions for drug trafficking.  The govern-ment moved for enhanced sentencing because the convictionsfor trafficking and attempted burglary fell under the scope ofACCA as “serious drug crimes” and “violent felonies.”James objected, arguing that attempted burglary wasnot a “violent felony” and that one of his drug trafficking con-victions could not be classified as a “serious drug crime.”  Thedistrict court ruled in favor of James, holding that because thechallenged drug trafficking conviction was not a “serious drugcrime,” James only had two convictions for the purposes of theACCA and, thus, the government could not move for enhancedsentencing under the statute.The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals overturned thejudgment of the district court.  The Eleventh Circuit held thatthe challenged drug trafficking conviction was, in fact, a “seri-ous drug crime.”  Further, the court agreed with the districtcourt that attempted burglary was a “violent crime” underACCA, resulting in a circuit split between the Eleventh and theFifth and Ninth Circuits.   Consequently, James was deemed toqualify under the statute for enhanced punishment.  Docket # 06-5618Eighth Circuit Court of AppealsQuestion Presented:1. Is a sentence below the minimum of the range withinthe Federal Sentence Guidelines reasonable?2. Is it permissible for the court to require that a sentencethat significantly departs from the Sentencing Guidelines bejustified by “extraordinary circumstances” in light of the U.S.Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Booker?Facts:Mario Claiborne was arrested and charged with twofelony drug crimes.  Claiborne was tried in United StatesDistrict Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and pleadguilty to both crimes.  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines sug-gested a sentencing range of thirty-seven to forty-six months forthe crimes in question.  However, during sentencing, the judgeused her discretion to impose a term of fifteen months (15) inprison on Claiborne.  In making her decision, the judge statedthat the range set by the guidelines was merely a recommenda-tion that did not bind her.  The judge cited the defendants youth,lack of a criminal record, and the relatively small amount ofnarcotics in question as circumstances influencing her decision.The government appealed the sentencing decision tothe Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the actual termimposed was unreasonable.  The Eighth Circuit reasoned that asentence, such as that in this case, that was substantially outsideof the bounds of the Sentencing Guidelines had to be justifiedby “extraordinary circumstances.”  Further, the court held thatsuch circumstances had not been put forward by the districtcourt judge.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari toresolve a circuit split on these issues.49 Criminal Law Brief* Andrew Myerberg is a 2L at Washington College of Law.He graduated from Hamilton College in 2002. Extremelyhelpful to this compliation was Northerwestern’s MedillSchool of Journalism’s U.S. Supreme Court News section,“On The Docket,” which can be found athttp://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/.  Additional sourcesused include:  The ABA Division for Public Education“Supreme Court Preview,” available athttp://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/home.htm.Scott v.  HarrisJames v.  United StatesClaiborne v.  United States

Supreme Court Watch: Recent Decisions And Upcoming CriminalCases For The 2006-2007 Docket

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&amp;context=clb

Supreme Court Watch: Recent Decisions And Upcoming CriminalCases For The 2006-2007 Docket

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law