Miller, Garner R.

English

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Louisiana Law ReviewVolume 14 | Number 1The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the1952-1953 TermDecember 1953Louisiana Practice - Declaratory Judgment ActionAs Substitute for Bill In Nature of Interpleader andAs Alternative RemedyGarner R. MillerThis Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusionin Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.Repository CitationGarner R. Miller, Louisiana Practice - Declaratory Judgment Action As Substitute for Bill In Nature of Interpleader and As AlternativeRemedy, 14 La. L. Rev. (1953)Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol14/iss1/46NOTESLOUISIANA PRACTICE-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION ASSUBSTITUTE FOR BILL IN NATURE OF INTERPLEADERAND AS ALTERNATIVE REMEDYPlaintiff employer, invoking the Uniform Declaratory Judg-merits Act,' insituted an action for the purpose of determiningisjability under the Louisiana Employers' Liability Ac-t2 forthe death of an employee who had died as a result of an accidentduring the course and within the scope of his employment. Defen-dants were the deceased employee's legal widow, and his threeillegitimate minor children by another woman. Plaintiff prayedprimarily for a declaratory judgment decreeing that plaintiffwas not indebted to any of defendants for compensation. In thealternative, should the court find that some or all of the defen-dants were entitled to receive compensation, plaintiff prayed fora declaratory judgment determining the compensation due, andthe persons entitled thereto.3 In effect, the plaintiff sought to.limit compensation to the widow alone, contending that underR.S. 23:1232 the, existence of the dependent widow precludedany award to the illegitimate children. Caddo Contracting Co. v.Johnson, 222 La. 796, 64 So. 2d 177 (1953).The workmen's compensation aspect of this case has alreadybeen discussed.4 The purpose of this casenote is to discuss thereal effect of the procedure employed and to consider an impor-tant procedural question which, though not raised under thefacts of this case, is nevertheless suggested thereby.The procedure employed by plaintiff in this case actuallyprovides an effective suhajitute for the bill inthe nature oftrpleader-a remedy not available under present Louisianaprocedure. In 1922, Louisiana adopted an interpleader statute,51. La. R.S. 1950, 13:4231 et seq.2. La. R.S. 1950, 23:1021 et seq.3. See Caddo Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 54 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 1951).4. See infra p. 301.5. La. R.S. 1950, 13:4811 et seq. The interpleader statute is available onlyif plaintiff is a stakeholder who admits liability. Placid Oil Co. v. George,221 La. 200, 59 So. 2d 120 (1952); Transo Investment Corporation v. Oakley,37 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 1948). See also American Surety Co. of New York v.Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727 (1932).This point was not raised nor discussed in the very recent case ofHumble Oil & Refining Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 46, 64 So. 2d 839(1953), but in view of plaintiff's prayer there Is some doubt as to plaintiff'sright to have invoked the statute. Plaintiff prayed that, in the event one ofthe defendants, Salt Domes, Incorporated, was declared to be the successfulclaimant, the excess of the deposit over its claim be returned to plaintiff.If the interpleader statute can be Invoked only where plaintiff is a mere1953]LOUISIANA LAW REVIEWunder which a stakeholder who asserts no interest in a debt orfund may deposit it into the registry of the court, and may im-plead the rival claimants thereto and force them to assert theirclaims contradictorily against each other. The essentials of thebill in the nature of interpleaderj however, provide a broaderand more effective remedy. Thus it permits a party, who deniesliability in whole or in part on a claim asserted against himiidae-pendently by two or more claimants, to protect himself againstthe harassment of double or multiple suits, by allowing him toimplead the rival claimants and to require them to assert theirclaims contradictorily against him as well as against each other.( Under the bill in the nature of interpleader, the prosecution orcontinued prosecution of separate suits by the rival claimantsmay be enjoined. This latter possibility represents really theonly difference between the bill in the nature of interpleaderand the substitute provided by the procedure in the Johnson case.In the instant case, neither the defendants nor the courtsquestioned the plaintiff's right to invoke the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act. Under the facts -presented, there appeared tobe no valid objection thereto, as the plaintiff had no other ade-quate remedy, and otherwise might possibly have been subjectedto the harassment of separate suits by the rival claimants. A moredifficult problem would have been presented to the court hadanother adequate remedy been available to the plaintiff. Suchproblem- could have -been solved-ohl-y" by a determination ofwhether or not the declaratory action is an alternative remedy.The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act does not provide inexpress terms, as does the federal rule,7 that the existence ofother adequate remedies shall not bar declaratory relief. Theact does, however, contain certain provisions which would sus-tain the position that a court has jurisdiction of declaratoryrelief provisions, notwithstanding the availability of other ade-quate remedies. tThus, R.S. 13:4231 provides in part that "Courtsof record within their respective jurisdictions shall have powerto declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or notstakeholder, and as such asserts no interest in the debt or fund which heplaces at the disposal of the court, there is some doubt that the test of thisrequirement was met in this case.6. For an excellent discussion of the differences between the strict billof interpleader and the bill in the nature of interpleader, see the opinion ofMr.,Justice Stone in Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S..398 (1939).7. Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:"The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgmentfor declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."[VOL. XIVfurther relief is or could be claimed,'/' and R.S. 13:4242 declaresthat the act "is to be liberally construed and administered." Inview of the express declaration in the Federal Rules, R.S. 13:4245further supports the position that declaratory relief shall not be"barred by the existence of other adequate remedies. R.S. 13:4245provides that the act "shall be interpreted and construed ... toharmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws and regulationson the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees."Professor Edwin M. Borchard, a co-draftsman of the act, inhis book on declaratory judgments, states that there are twogeneral types of action in which declaratory relief is invoked: 8(1) where the plaintiff seeks a declaration that he is privilegedto act, or that he is not indebted to, or is immune from a liabilityasserted by, the defendant, or where he requests the construc-tion of a disputed contract before breach, and actions in whichno coercive decree is sought or even possible; and (2) where theplaintiff, though capable of suing for an executory or coercivedecree, contents himself with the milder declaration of rights asadequate to his needs and purpose. The predicate for his inclu-sion of the second type of action in which declaratory relief maybe invoked is Professor Borchard's position that the declaratoryaction is an alternative remedy. This conclusion is clearly sub-stantiated by the fact that, in the great majority of cases in whichdeclaratory judgments have been rendered, it would have beenperfectly possible to obtain relief by invoking another remedy."' There is, of course, as Professor Borchard points out, a distinctionbetween the problem of whether the declaratory judgment isavailable, where another adequate remedy exists and the casewhere a special statutory proceeding has been provided as anexclusive remedy for the particular type of case in hand.) But8. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 315 (2 ed. 1941).9. The following are examples of cases where declaratory judgmentswere issued even though another adequate remedy existed: suit for adeclaration of the right to money or other property, where it would have beenpossible to sue for damages or the property or money itself; action to estab-lish one's interest in a gift, legacy, or real property, where it would havebeen possible to sue for the property or its equivalent or for possession orejectment; taxpayer's suit for a declaration of the invalidity of public action,where he could usually have obtained either a mandamus or an injunction;suit to establish the existence of a lien on chattels, where either replevinor an action for conversion were available; suit to obtain a declaration ofrights under a will, where it might have been possible to bring a statutorybill for the construction of the will or coercive decree; suit to establish theinvalidity of a divorce, where annulment of the second marriage might havebeen sought. For supporting citations see Borchard, Declaratory Judgments327-329.1953] NOTESLOUISIANA LAW REVIEWthis quite evidently does not mean that whenever there is statu-tory relief provided that it is necessarily exclusive. That should,in all cases, depend on the presumed intent of the Legislature.If further evidence is needed to support Professor Borchard'sview that the declaratory action is an alternative remedy, itmay be observed that long before the enactment of any of themodern declaratory judgment acts, the courts were accustomedto render what amounted to declaratory judgments in certainlimited classes of cases.'10 The declaratory judgment statutes,therefore, permit only a more general use of a device which hasheretofore existed in many fields.One recent survey of the decided cases in the various Ameri-can jurisdictions indicates "that courts are becoming progres-sively more liberal in assuming jurisdiction of action for declara-tory judgments where other remedies are available.""' Thissurvey indicates, however, that, by the weight of authority, theright to use the declaratory action is not absolute in all caseswhere other remedies are available, but rests in the discretionof the court. 2 Thus, where a coercive or executory remedy is notonly presently available and adequate, but is better, more effec-tive and more convenient, the court will decline jurisdiction ofthe declaratory action. However, even though another remedyis adequate, if the proceedings for declaratory relief will servesome useful purpose, the court will entertain jurisdiction of theaction for a declaratory judgment. 8In view of the increasing use of the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act in Louisiana, a determination of whether thedeclaratory judgment can be invoked when another remedy isavailable is of considerable procedural importance. While thisquestion was neither answered nor presented in the Johnsoncase, this case does demonstrate quite convincingly the utilityand flexibility of the declaratory action. The use here of thedeclaratory judgment as a workable substitute for the badlyneeded bill in the nature of interpleader serves to improvelisepresent Louisiana procedure.Garner R. Miller10. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 137-149.11. See Note, Right to declaratory relief as affected by existence of otherremedy, 172 A.L.R. 847-848 (1948). See also 14 A.L.R. 2d 836, § 13 (1950).12. Ibid.13. Ibid.[VOL. XIV

Louisiana Practice - Declaratory Judgment Action As Substitute for Bill In Nature of Interpleader and As Alternative Remedy

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Louisiana Practice - Declaratory Judgment Action As Substitute for Bill In Nature of Interpleader and As Alternative Remedy

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