Dodd, William J.

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Louisiana Law ReviewVolume 15 | Number 1Survey of 1954 Louisiana LegislationDecember 1954The Case Against the So-Called Right to Work ActWilliam J. DoddThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.Repository CitationWilliam J. Dodd, The Case Against the So-Called Right to Work Act, 15 La. L. Rev. (1954)Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol15/iss1/18The Case Against the So-CalledRight to Work ActWilliam J. Dodd*Act 252 of 1954, referred to as "Louisiana's Right to WorkLaw," was without question the most controversial legislativeproblem considered during the 1954 legislative session. The actis class legislation and may well result in a disruption of theotherwise harmonious labor relations that have existed in Lou-isiana up to the present time. Without attempting to go intothe reasons why the sponsors and backers of this legislationpromoted its passage, let us look at the harm the enforcementof this act can bring to labor relations in Louisiana. Briefly,the following indictments can be brought against this so-called"Right to Work" act:'It will disrupt the harmonious relations presently existingbetween labor and management and unreasonably restrict em-ployees in the exercise of freedom of speech and communicationby forbidding picketing or other lawful means of communi-cating the facts regarding labor disputes.It will compel union members to work side by side withnon-union employees, contrary to the established traditions andpolicies of organized labor and will raise a serious question ofinvoluntary servitude, prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendmentto the Federal Constitution.It will restrict employers and subject them to penaltieswhen they, in the course of bona fide attempts to recruit quali-*Member, Dodd, Hirsch & Barker, Baton Rouge, La.1. Space limitations have prevented giving more than a summary of thesubject in a symposium of this type. No attempt has been made to referto the already growing legal literature on the subject of right to work legis-lation. For more detailed analyses of the issue the reader is referred to thefollowing: Rose, The Right to Work: It Must Be Supreme over UnionSecurity, 35 A.B.A.J. 110 (1949); Gilbert, The Right to Work: A Reply toGeorge Rose, 35 A.B.A.J. 465 (1949); Cox, Federalism in the Law of LaborRelations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1333 (1954) (advocating the repeal of Section14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the provision which impliedly authorizes thestates to enact such laws); Clawson, Union Security Clauses and the Rightto Work, 30 CAN. B. REV. 137 (1952); Note, Union Security Agreements underthe "Right to Work" Statutes, 36 VA. L. REV. 477 (1950).The Louisiana act is discussed in detail in Keenan & Lang, The LouisianaRight to Work Law-Some Comments as to its Scope and Effect, 2 LA. B.J.,No. 1, p. 3 (1954), and the Alabama act is discussed in 6 ALA. L. REV. 129 (1953).1954] CASE AGAINST RIGHT TO WORK ACT 75fled personnel, find themselves trying to hire union men of knownqualifications, to the exclusion of non-union personnel whosequalifications are doubtful.It will outlaw the use of the union label and expose employ-ers to liability under the act, in the fulfillment of contracts call-ing for the production of union-made goods.It will invalidate collective bargaining agreements and,thereby, disrupt the harmonious industrial relations which havebeen fostered by such agreements.It will place a union-busting weapon in the hands of em-ployers who desire to depart from the national policy of pro-moting industrial peace through collective bargaining.In discussing the above indictments in more detail, I wouldsay that the adoption of this law will seriously encroach uponthe contractual practices of employers and unions and will pro-hibit their arriving at agreements through the peaceful pro-cesses of collective bargaining in their mutual self-interest. Itseems that in this period of our history, when so many informedpersons decry the encroachment of government upon the affairs ofbusiness and individuals, our legislature has gone out of its way toimpose restrictions upon both the employer and the employee.This act unduly restricts the rights of employees to bargain col-lectively through their unions on the false premise that the rightto work is an inherent and inalienable right.2 The proponentsof the act did not or would not consider the fact that the rightor privilege of a man to work is a restricted right or privilegeand that dozens of conditions are placed upon this right or privi-lege by the employers. Age, education, health, experience, sexand, in some instances, race and even religion are conditionsplaced upon employment by the employer. Comparisons andexamples tending to show that the right to work is similar tothe political right to vote are absurd when one understands andnotes the numerous conditions an employer places upon the em-ployment he offers to his employees. There was no inherentright to work before the passage of Act 252 of 1954, and thereis no such right to work since its passage.While some employers charge that the union shop createsa labor monopoly, destroys discipline and efficiency and leads todictatorial or arbitrary practices, many employers take the posi-2. For a scholarly analysis and comparative law treatment of the rightto work as a substantive guarantee of employment, see Lenhoff, The Rightto Work: Here and Abroad, 46 ILL. L. REv. 669 (1951).LOUISIANA LAW REVIEWtion that the union shop has definite advantages. They point outthat it eliminates factual strife by giving the exclusive bargain-ing agent an assured status and thereby places responsibility forthe conduct of rank and file employees squarely on the shouldersof the one union in the plant. It seems very shortsighted forthe legislature to deny, through this act, representatives of laborand management the privilege of continuing to enjoy the advan-tages which many of them have discovered and are discoveringin the device of a union shop.A review of the cases decided under the similar Virginiaact indicates that our Louisiana act poses a serious threat tothe exercise of free speech and press through the method ofpicketing. The Supreme Court of the United States in the caseof Plumbers Union v. Graham8 recognized this clear threat toconstitutional liberties and, by a divided opinion, sustained theapplication of the Virginia statute over the free speech objectiononly when a majority of the Court was able to conclude that"[p]etitioners here [the union and its members] engaged inmore than the mere publication of the fact that the job was not100% union."' 4 In this instance, union pickets carried a signwhich read simply "This Is Not a Union Job. Richmond TradesCouncil."5 Yet, the Court held that the union, by the mere useof this sign, had made an alleged request of the employer thathe discharge non-union workers and on that ground sustainedthe injunction granted under the statute.The Louisiana statute, Section 9, goes so far as to makeit a violation of the law even to threaten to violate any provi-sion of this act and gives to the threatened party injunctiverelief.Employers, particularly those who employ skilled craftsmen,are naturally interested in recruiting competent and qualifiedpersonnel. For this reason, it has been the established practicein Louisiana for many years for employers to recruit personnelthrough the labor unions in the locality where they operate.Employers know from experience that they may call upon andreceive from the labor unions competent, trained and qualifiedpersonnel and thus avoid the risk of loss, which usually attendsthe hiring of inexperienced and unqualified personnel. That thenew act may result in loss to Louisiana employers is illustrated3. 345 U.S. 192 (1953).4. Id. at 200.5. Id. at 195.[VOL. XV1954] CASE AGAINST RIGHT TO WORK ACT 77by Finney v. Hawkins.6 In that case, Finney, who operated aprint shop, entered into a contract to print a labor law journalfor the Newport News Building and Construction Trades Coun-cil. The contract stipulated the employment of union labor inthe printing of the journal. Finney, who wanted the job, sug-gested that his one non-union employee join the union and,when the employee refused, Finney fired him. Finney receivedthe contract, completed it and, thereafter, the discharged non-union employee brought an action under the Virginia statuteagainst his employer and the Building Construction TradesCouncil for damages resulting from his dismissal. Under theVirginia statute, he was awarded damages. The same couldhappen in a similar situation here in Louisiana and could depriveLouisiana businessmen of jobs which require the union label.In many instances, goods manufactured in Louisiana mustbe sold in other states. In every instance in which jobbers andsales outlets require the union label on the goods delivered tothem, Louisiana industries will, if this act is enforced, be pre-vented from manufacturing and selling products that require aunion label.Probably the worst feature of the Louisiana act is the harmit can bring through the enforcement of its union-busting pro-visions. If the provisions of this act are strictly enforced, thewage scales, working conditions and lack of employee benefitsfound in the plants and on the jobs of our worst employers inany given competitive industry will, in time, become standardfor that industry. This cannot fail to bring about a graduallowering of wages and working conditions under the so-called"Right to Work" act.This act disregards the will of the majority of the workersin a given industry or plant on the false assumption that theminority is thus being protected. Actually, it is and alwayshas been standard American practice for the majority to ruleso long as no inalienable or inherent rights of the minority arejeopardized. No one, including the sponsors of the so-called"Right to Work" act, has offered a reasonable explanation forits protection of free riders who are willing to accept all thebenefits, including good wages and working conditions, that arebargained for by the union, without the free riders' paying anydues or assisting in the efforts to obtain such benefits and con-ditions.6. 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949).78 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIn conclusion it can be said that there was no reason forthe passage of this drastic and restrictive piece of legislation.Its potentialities for harm are as great for the employer whowants to compete in the national markets as they are for theemployees. This type of legislation seems to be confined almostwholly to the agricultural states of the union-an attempt bythe employers of farm labor to kill any unionization of farmlabor or personnel who work in agricultural pursuits. In attempt-ing to legislate a wage ceiling and status quo, and to set up work-ing conditions for agricultural personnel, the sponsors of thisact have crippled and, in my opinion, disrupted labor relationsin our fast growing industrial state. This may very well costLouisiana many hundred millions of dollars in the coming years.

The Case Against the So-Called Right to Work Act

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The Case Against the So-Called Right to Work Act

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