Pierson, Allen B., Jr.

English

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Louisiana Law ReviewVolume 19 | Number 2The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the1957-1958 TermFebruary 1959Criminal Law - Intoxication and Specific Intent inHomicide ProsecutionAllen B. Pierson Jr.This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusionin Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.Repository CitationAllen B. Pierson Jr., Criminal Law - Intoxication and Specific Intent in Homicide Prosecution, 19 La. L. Rev. (1959)Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol19/iss2/36LOUISIANA LAW REVIEWequally as innocent in nature as are hypodermic syringes, and iteases the burden of prosecution by placing the burden of provinginnocent intention on the possessor.Lamar E. Ozley, Jr.CRIMINAL LAW - INTOXICATION AND SPECIFIC INTENTIN HOMICIDE PROSECUTIONIn a prosecution for murder' there was evidence that the de-fendants had been drinking intoxicants shortly before the shoot-ing. The trial judge charged the jury that voluntary intoxica-tion could never be a defense to a crime2 and refused to instructthe jury that they could consider the voluntary intoxication ofthose defendants who had not actually fired the gun insofar asintoxication might bear on whether or not they are principals. 3On appeal of the conviction, held, reversed. Although the chargerequested by the defendants was improper, the charge given bythe judge was incomplete and constituted reversible error, for itdenied the defendants "the right to have the jury pass on thefactual question of whether they were in such an intoxicated con-dition as to preclude the presence of a specific criminal intent. ' '4State v. Youngblood, 106 So.2d 689 (La. 1958).The Louisiana Criminal Code provides that criminal intentmay be either general or specific and defines specific criminalintent as "that state of mind which exists when the circum-stances indicate that the offender actively desired the proscribedcriminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." 5 Thecotics sufficient to support a presumption of knowledge, unless defendant couldexplain or rebut such presumption, was constitutional).1. LA. R.S. 14:30(1) (1950) : "Murder is the killing of a human being, (1)When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."Felony murder defined in clause (2) of this article is not applicable to this situa-tion.2. State v. Youngblood, 106 So.2d 689, 690 (La. 1958) : "I charge you furtherthat voluntary intoxication is no defense under the law for having committed acrime while so intoxicated."3. Ibid. Trial judge refused the following charge requested by defendants:"However, a partial or total intoxication may be considered by you in weighingthe behavior and conduct of the defendants as you may find were not guilty ofactually triggering the weapon that killed [the deceased], insofar as such behavioror conduct may bear on whether or not they were aiders, abetters, counsellors, orprocurers."4. Id. at 691.5. LA. R.S. 14:10(1) (1950). Clause (2) of this article defines general intentas being present "whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circum-stances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience,[Vol. XIX1959] NOTEScrime of murder requires "a specific intent to kill or to inflictgreat bodily harm."6 Thus, drunkenness, 7 if it exists to such anextent as to preclude the existence of a specific intent to kill orseriously injure, will constitute a defense8 To state broadly thatextreme voluntary intoxication is a defense as the statute im-plies, however, is inaccurate, for the person who has become vol-untarily intoxicated is generally held to the same criminal re-sponsibility as the sober man.9 Rather it should be said that anextreme degree of intoxication may be found to preclude the ex-istence of an element of the crime, i.e., the specific intent whichmust accompany the proscribed act. Even then, intoxication istreated as a special defense and must be established by the de-fendant. 10 Certain specific situations must, however, be dis-tinguished from the case where voluntary drunkenness may pre-vent the existence of the necessary specific intent. If the defend-ant drinks for the purpose of securing the courage necessary forthe perpetration of the crime, or, if having the courage and thespecific intent, he incidentally becomes intoxicated, this intoxi-cation will not constitute a defense." In most instances, a per-son, though intoxicated, is still capable of forming the specificmust have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certainto result."Id. 14:11: "The definitions of some crimes require a specific criminal intent,while in others no intent is required. Some crimes consist merely of criminal neg-ligence that produces criminal consequences. However, in the absence of qualify-ing provisions, the terms 'intent' and "intentional' have reference to 'general crim-inal intent'."See State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 91(1955), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 955 (1956) (aggravated rape requires no spe-cific intent, hence intoxication could not be a defense thereto) ; State v. Johnston,207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945) (aggravated assault requires only a generalcriminal intent, hence intoxication could not be a defense).6. See note 7 supra.7. LA. R.S. 14:15 (1950) provides that intoxication may be a defense whetherit results from the voluntary use of alcoholic beverages or the voluntary use ofnarcotics.8. Ibid.: "The fact of an intoxicated or drugged condition of the offender atthe time of the commission of the crime is immaterial, except as follows: (1)[involuntary intoxication], (2) Where the circumstances indicate that an intoxi-cated or drugged condition has precluded the presence of a specific criminal intentor of special knowledge required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a de-fense to a prosecution for that crime." (Emphasis added.) See also State v.Alexander, 215 La. 245, 40 So.2d 232 (1949) ; State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30So.2d 830 (1947) ; State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945).9. CLARK & MAsirALL, LAW OF CRIMES 385 (6th ed. 1958).10. State v. Hill, 46 La. Ann. 27, 14 So. 294 (1894) (intoxication is a specialdefense and, if relied on, must be proven by the defendant beyond a reasonabledoubt. It is not for the state, once evidence of intoxication is introduced, to provea negative, i.e., that the accused was not so drunk as to preclude the presence ofthe requisite specific intent, but for the accused to prove that he was intoxicatedto that extent).11. See State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 22 So. 254, 62 Am. St. Rep. 664(1897) ; State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 (1880).LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIXintent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. In fact, this partic-ular mental state seems to be encouraged by the consumption ofintoxicants. 12The instant case is in accord with a number of early Louisi-ana cases" decided prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Crim-inal Code of 1942, and with cases decided subsequent to 1942.These cases clearly establish the principle that voluntary intoxi-cation to a degree sufficient to preclude the presence of a specificintent will constitute a defense to those crimes requiring a spe-cific criminal intent. 4 However, as pointed out above, the de-fendant's burden of proof will be extremely difficult to meet.There is, also, the practical consideration that a jury may behesitant to allow voluntary intoxication to relieve the accusedof criminal responsibility. Some juries may well feel, especiallyin crimes of force and violence, that drunkenness aggravates thecrime, though this is not the law.'5In a prosecution for murder where the jury finds that the12. See State v. Newman, 157 La. 564, 102 So. 671 (1925) (drunkenness isoften the cause of a crime).13. State v. Hogan, 117 La. 863, 42 So. 352 (1906) (in absence of evidence ofpremeditation, intoxication may be invoked to negative malice or deliberate intent,but it must be of such a character as to create a state of mental confusion, pre-cluding a specific intent to take life). See also State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086(1880), which was relied on in the Hogan case.State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 771, 22 So. 254, 256, 62 Am. St. Rep. 664,668 (1897), where the court relied on Bishop's theory that the wrongful intent tobecome intoxicated will supply the criminal intent needed to convict for a crimecommitted as a direct result of the intoxication, but also recognized that this fic-tion could not supply the element of specific intent. See generally Bisnop, CRim-INAL LAW c. 27, paras. 397-410 (6th ed. 1877). When a man "not meaning tocommit a homicide, becomes so drunk as to become incapable of intending to doit, and then, in this condition, kills a man [it cannot be murder in the first degreebecause there is no specific intent to take life].". State v. Willis, 43 La. Ann. 407, 9 So. 11 (1891) (judge properly charged toeffect that if accused was so drunk as to be incapable of having the specific intentcharged he could not be found guilty, but if he had mind enough to comprehendhis actions and to know right from wrong, drunkenness is not an excuse).14. State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 91(1955), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 955 (1956) (objection to statement made bydefense that drunkenness was a defense to crime of aggravated rape properly sus-tained on the theory that aggravated rape was not such crime as required a spe-cific intent); State v. Alexander, 215 La. 245, 254, 40 So.2d 232, 234 (1949)(drunkenness "is a defense when there is mania and in certain cases provided itcan be used to negative an intent where a specific intent is required") ; State v.Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947) (murder conviction affirmed, though trialjudge simply read R.S. 14:15 to jury and refused to give a charge which was notincorrect) ; State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945) (conviction ofaggravated assault affirmed on grounds that assault requires only a general crim-inal intent, hence accused was not entitled to invoke R.S. 14:15 (intoxication) asa defense).15. State v. Newman, 157 La. 564, 102 So. 671 (1925) (murder conviction setaside because judge charged jury to effect that drunkenness, when voluntary, ag-gravates the crime in the sense of making it a worse crime).NOTESdefendant was so intoxicated as to preclude the presence of aspecific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, the appro-priate verdict might well be manslaughter. Manslaughter is de-fined a's "a homicide without any intent to cause death or greatbodily harm when the offender is engaged in the perpetration orattempted perpetration . . .of any intentional misdemeanor di-rectly affecting the person."' 6 Thus, if death results from a bat-tery, either aggravated or simple, the elements of the crime ofmanslaughter are present. Intoxication could not be used as adefense to the battery which would be the basis of the man-slaughter charge because battery requires only a general crim-inal intent, which under the law is not precluded by intoxication.Therefore, any charge to the jury on intoxication would be mis-leading if it did not include an explanation of its application tothis responsive verdict. The Louisiana Supreme Court has ap-proved the practice of simply reading R.S. 14:15 to the jury inorder to instruct them on the law relative to intoxication as adefense.'7 However, this is an area where a bare statement ofthe law is likely to confuse a jury. It will greatly facilitate aproper jury understanding of the issues involved if the judgeelaborates upon the application of the intoxication article to thecrime charged and to the crimes which may be responsiveverdicts.Allen B. Pierson, Jr.EVIDENCE- GENERAL HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGEIN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALSDefendant was convicted, under the Mann Act,' for trans-porting the prosecutrix from Arkansas into Oklahoma for im-moral purposes. During the trial defendant's wife was allowed,over his objection, to testify that she was a prostitute and thatthe prosecutrix was coming to Oklahoma to go into business withher. Defendant claimed the husband-wife privilege and the gov-ernment contended that the wife's testimony was allowable be-cause it was given voluntarily. The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-peals upheld the district court in allowing the wife to testifyvoluntarily. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, held, reversed.In the interests of fostering peace in the family, a spouse willnot be permitted to testify against the other, even voluntarily,16. LA. R.S. 14:31(2a) (1950). Clauses (1) and (2b) defining manslaughterin other ways are not applicable here.17. State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947).1. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1949).1959]

Criminal Law - Intoxication and Specific Intent in Homicide Prosecution

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Criminal Law - Intoxication and Specific Intent in Homicide Prosecution

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