This article discusses the changes that are the result of entry the new personal ID card issued in Poland. The new document contains less information about the owner, i.e. height, eye color or signature, so that the risk of identity theft is significantly greater

Owoc, Mirosław

Biblioteka Cyfrowa Instytutu Łączności / National Institute of Telecomunications: Digital Library

Paper Polish Personal Identity Cardas a Tool for Identity TheftMirosław OwocChair of Criminalistics, Adam Mickiewicz University (UAM), Poznań, PolandAbstract—This article discusses the changes that are the re-sult of entry the new personal ID card issued in Poland.The new document contains less information about the owner,i.e. height, eye color or signature, so that the risk of identitytheft is significantly greater.Keywords—biometrics, identity theft, personal identity card.1. IntroductionReducing the number of safety features that could be usedfor simple authentication of a person in new personal iden-tity card (PIC) is another step that diminishes the protectionof the public against crime. Today, being equipped withsomebody else’s personal identity card, a thief can causesubstantial losses to the rightful owner. With the new per-sonal identity card, a criminal will be able to ruin themutterly.2. The New Personal Identity CardThe term “identity theft” refers to an instance of activelyimpersonating another person, while at the same time usingtheir image or other personal details in order to cause themfinancial or personal damage [1].Among the various tools that make impersonating anotherperson possible or easier, the personal identity card (PIC)and the passport feature prominently. Most commonly, it isthe PIC that is used fraudulently, the document being theeasiest one to use in fraud, also because it lacks a finger-print. Now, further weaknesses are to be introduced: therewill not be a signature nor information on the owner’sheight or eye color. An additional drawback is the “new”idea for a front view photograph. The requirement fora front view photograph introduced under the new regu-lation is in fact a retrograde step that brings us back to the19th century. This type of view came into common usein France back in 1888 when creating a register of recidi-vists. The front view has always been considered to beunappealing and not to do justice to the wealth of people’sfacial features, but this simplified and flat representationof the human face was introduced to facilitate a few sim-ple measurements: the distance between the pupils and thewidth of the nose, the mouth and the entire neurocranium.Further measurements of the length of the nose, the heightof the forehead and the length of the ear were taken froma profile-view photograph taken alongside the front viewphotograph.3. Safety FeaturesWhen in the previous two decades all reasons were cited todiscredit fingerprinting as an authentication measure, onemajor argument against it were protests by so-called “law-abiding citizens”. For them, being fingerprinted would betantamount to being treated as common criminals and aninsult. I am wondering whether these indignant defendersof civic dignity will speak out again when they see their ex-pressionless photographs on their new PICs and how muchoutrage they will cause once they find out that as early as inthe 19th century front view photographs became the stan-dard way of portraying recidivists, and later all criminals.I need to add that a front view image of a face is the easiestone to be identified by a facial recognition system. In theabsence of more effective facial recognition software, themugshot-type photograph is today’s choice. Note that thereis also no effective human recognition software based onthe shape of the auricle, visible in three quarter angle (half-profile) photographs, although experts can identify a personon that basis [2], [3].Coming back to the peculiar idea of removing the owner’ssignature from the PIC, the argument to do away with itwas not the lack of a method for the automated authenti-cation of a signature, but the fact that a signature changesover time. Well, a signature is a reflection of a record in thebrain. And the brain naturally changes: it learns, matures,stabilizes, fatigues, suffers from diseases, and grows old.However, a signature written by a literate adult is so richin graphic features that, despite changes, it can be used forauthentication for decades. Moreover, differences betweenan actual signature and its original sample can help deter-mine the age and the physical and mental condition of theundersigned person.Why such a sudden departure from the graphic signature?Has the percentage of illiterate people grown so signifi-cantly? Two years ago, a scandal erupted when it turnedout that the newly-appointed U.S. Treasury Secretary,Jacob J. Lew, could not write a normal signature, producinginstead a sequence of loops resembling a telephone hand-set cord. This, however, was more of a social scandal thana symptom of a global trend. The signature, an apparentsign of the official’s functional illiteracy, was not acceptedand had to be changed.Until now, the identity thief has had to memorize the per-sonal details shown on a PIC, take a while to practice thesignature based on the miniature facsimile, and he couldeasily take out a loan to purchase expensive and easily mar-23Mirosław Owocketable goods. Before a notice of the theft of a PIC reachesthe lost PIC database, the thief may engage in several suchtransactions. The Japanese proverb “no naked man everlost anything” still holds, but the latest version of the PICwill be a tool for crooks to drive their victims into debtthey will not be able to repay in a lifetime.A fingerprint depicted on a PIC would prevent such crimes.However, the proposal to include a fingerprint on the PICfaces opposition on many fronts. For example, several yearsago, sensational news was publicized that somewhere inAsia cases had been reported of fingers being cut off toobtain access to the victims’ money using an ATM. Al-though a number of methods were promptly developed forthe examination of the vital processes of the finger as wellas a number of methods using other biometric features ofliving people, the circles interested in eliminating dacty-loscopy from authentication methods managed to obviatethe danger facing their interests [4], [5].The latest version of the PIC precludes such bloody scenar-ios, but this is the only good news. The bad news is that thenew PIC does not include a sample signature, allowing theidentity thief to write any signature under any document,including signing the disadvantageous disposal of a PIC’srightful owner’s property.4. The FutureThe irrational process of minimizing the number of fea-tures allowing to authenticate a PIC is snowballing. In thenext version of the document, and it is going to be thepenultimate one, further details will probably be scrapped:• date of birth – this piece of information is redundantas it is already included in the first six digits of thePESEL identification number used in Poland,• sex – a feature that can be changed at will, sex iseven less permanent than eye color, height and sig-nature, which have already been removed from thePIC as being impermanent. In addition, the penul-timate digit of the PESEL number indicates sex asdisclosed in the entry of birth,• place of birth – this information can be the basis ofdiscrimination,• parents’ given names – they can also be the basis ofdiscrimination.In the last version, the given names and the surname mayalso be removed as an appropriately extended PESEL num-ber will contain all the information necessary to identifythe owner (not the holder!) of a PIC, and in particular toidentify his bank account. The photograph will probablystay. It may even be a color photograph of a slightly largersize, allowing the PIC to be used as a public transport passor a gym membership card.References[1] Kodeks Karny, art. 190a §2 (in Polish).[2] J. Kasprzak, Otoskopia kryminalistyczna: system identyfikacji, zagad-nienia dowodowe. Olsztyn: UWM, 2003 (in Polish).[3] M. Choraś, “Perspective methods of human identification: Ear bio-metrics”, Opto-Electr. Rev., vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 85–96, 2007.[4] M. Owoc, “Konstytucyjne prawo do wizerunku palca”, ProblemyKryminalistyki, no. 253, pp. 5–8, 2006 (in Polish).[5] M. Owoc, “Social Resistance to Biometry”, in Biometrics 2010,A. W. Mitas, Ed. Gliwice: Centrum Inżynierii Biomedycznej, 2011,pp. 27–34.Mirosław Owoc became a FullProfessor in 1992 (D.Sc. in1975, Ph.D. in 1966). He iscurrently the professor emeri-tus at Adam Mickiewicz Uni-versity (UAM) in Poznań. Hewas Chair of Criminalistics atUAM Faculty of Law and Ad-ministration (1990–2007), pro-fessor of Faculty of Admin-istration and Social Sciencesat Kazimierz Wielki University (UKW) in Bydgoszcz(2010–2013), professor at Police Academy in Szczytno(1990–2003), Head of Identification Methods Institute atPolice Academy in Szczytno (1990–1993). Mr. Owoc isan author and co-author of seven books and monographs(including co-editor of Vocabulary of Forensic Handwrit-ing Identification, 19th ed. 2014), over 120 of research andconference papers, four patents, and around of four hundredof forensic examinations (evidence opinions). His researchinterests focus on chemical analysis of forged documents,information theory aspects of analysis of forensic photogra-phy, using computers in forensic handwriting identification,and biometrics.E-mail: Owoc@amu.edu.plChair of CriminalisticsAdam Mickiewicz Universityul. Św. Marcin 9061-809 Poznań, Poland24

Polish Personal Identity Card as a Tool for Identity Theft, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2015, nr 2

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Polish Personal Identity Card as a Tool for Identity Theft, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2015, nr 2

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