Hamilton, Charles V.

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New DirectionsVolume 8 | Issue 3 Article 54-1-1981The Status of Black LeadershipCharles V. HamiltonFollow this and additional works at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirectionsThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Howard @ Howard University. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Directions byan authorized administrator of Digital Howard @ Howard University. For more information, please contact lopez.matthews@howard.edu.Recommended CitationHamilton, Charles V. (1981) "The Status of Black Leadership," New Directions: Vol. 8: Iss. 3, Article 5.Available at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol8/iss3/5the past, shifted toward the RepublicanParty. This was true of Mexican-Ameri-can, Jewish and labor groups. The out-come of the election is understandablydisappointing to Blacks and it poses sev-eral profound and perplexing questionsabout Black political participation in theyears ahead.One potential benefit of the outcomeof the election is that it may have freedBlack voters to think more independent-ly, creatively, and pragmatically aboutthe pattern of their political participa-tion in the future. The Republican Party,led by Reagan, is in a good position toreach out to Blacks, to demonstrate theparty's capacity to respond to their in-terests, and to incorporate them to asignificant degree into the structure ofthe party.The election results also provide anunprecedented opportunity for Blacksto play a leading part in restructuringthe Democratic Party as it seeks to re-cover from the serious defeat ofNovember.Another potential benefit of the out-come of the 1980 election is that it chal-lenges Blacks to a new and perhaps moresophisticated style of politics. Undoubt-edly, a Reagan Administration will seekdifferent approaches to some of thechronic national problems that Blackshave sought to address for the past sev-eral decades. Blacks will need to formu-late some of their specific objectives andmodify some of the strategies they haveadvocated in seeking to protect theirinterests.Still another likely benefit for Blacksmight derive from the need to reempha-me self-help. The tendency to focus onthe government for solutions to many ofthe pressing problems Blacks face, some-times overshadows the clear and urgentneed for a more vigorous effort by Blacksto achieve social and economic advance-ment for themselves in spite of continu-ing obstacles to their advancement.There are many areas in which govem-rnent can only be a partner-and forBlacks a reluctan t partner - indevelopment.To emphasize the likely benefits of aReagan presidency is not to ignore orunderestimate the actual and potentialproblems it poses for Blacks and otherdisadvantaged minorities. Many com-mentators have hastened to interpretthe outcome of the election as represent-ing a fundamental ideological shift bythe electorate, one conferring a mandatefor sweeping retrenchment and retreatfrom much of the social progress of re-cent years. However, the available dataon the attitudes and perceptions of theelectorate provide no conclusive evi-dence for such an interpretation. On thecontrary, those data suggest that theelectorate sought mainly a change inleadership and improvement in thecountry's economy, military strength,and international standing. An assump-tion by the Administration that it ismandated to implement sweeping con-servative reforms could indeed be deva-stating for Blacks, other minorities, andall the poor and disadvantaged in the'society.The history of racial discrimination inthis society and efforts to combat it in-dicate that the federal government hasbeen vital to the survival of Blacks. Fur-thermore, while they are not the only,or even the principal beneficiaries of themajor social programs of the past twodecades geared to assist the low-incomeand the otherwise disadvantaged, alarge proportion of the Black populationis especially dependent on them andthus highly vulnerable to any major cut-backs. Anything but the most cautionsmoves toward reforming social pro-grams, or further sharing resources andpower with state and local governments,could be extremely detrimental toBlacks and require them to strugglerelentlessly for their survival. If eternalvigilance is the price of liberty for allAmericans, it is considerably more sofor Black Americans as they approachthe new Administration. 03The Status ofBlackLeadershipBy Charles V. HamiltonHistorically and currently, Black leader-ship in this country has had to submit toat least one crucial test of legitimacy. Ithas had to withstand almost constantattacks from those who would questionboth its judgments and its motives.And in the process, it has been strength-ened and made viable. Historically, forthe most part, it has not been an electedleadership, in the sense of a representedconstituency choosing it at the polls-that has only occurred substantially inthe last decade or so- but its claim tospeak for a designated group has notbeen taken for granted, inasmuch as ithas not always (some might suggest,ever)been simply taken at its word.If vast numbers of people continue topay dues and otherwise support the or-ganization, it is reasonable to concludethat the leadership and its programs andprocesses are consented to in largemeas-ure. This might not be entirely satisfac-tory to one who requires a more directperiodic electoral mechanism for sanc-tioning leaders. But neither does it jus-tify the conclusion that "there is noinstitutional mechanism" to assess aclaim of leadership.Without question, there is a clear ideo-logical preference on the part of most(certainly not all) Black leaders for whatcan be characterized as a "liberal" ap-proach to public policy. Even where thisliberalism is not associated with theDemocratic Party or with a politicalparty more liberal (or socialist) in orien-tation, it usually comes down on theNEW DIlECTlONS APRIL 1981 I1Hamilton: The Status of Black LeadershipPublished by Digital Howard @ Howard University,-8 side of a more forceful and activist roleby the government, especially the fed-eral government. In this sense, much ofthe national Black leadership, then, ad-mittedly is at variance with the ideolog-ical stances of its conservative critics(such as Walter Williams and ThomasSowell).When one uses the term "Black lead-er," the reference is to two things."Black" refers to racial identity; "lead-er" refers to a role. When used together,the words take on an additional mean-ing: one who is racially Black in a lead-ership role and who speaks and acts onmatters of specific (but not, necessarily,exclusive) concern to Black people as adirect purpose of occupying that role.Thus, "Black leader" refers to racial androle characteristics, but also to issueorientation. Therefore, if one were ra-cially Black and, say, a mayor of an all-white town who never spoke or acted onissues of specific concern to Blacks assuch, it would not be proper to desig-nate such a mayor as a "Black leader."That person would be a leader (mayor)who was Black. In this example, the factthat the town was all-white was not theimportant factor alone, but rather thatin the leadership role, the person did notspeak or act on specific racial issues.This does not imply a lack of interest incertain issues, but rather that such aperson should not be defined as a "lead-er" of Blacks simply because he or she isBlack and occupies a particular leader-ship role. All too often, we find thatprominent Black people (whom I willcall "leading Blacks") are confused with"Black leaders."The tendency to ascribe the "Blackleader" role to prominent Black ath-letes, entertainers and educators simplybecause they are prominent and perhapsoccasionally address themselves to is-sues of concern to Blacks should beresisted. This is not to deny them theright or opportunity to speak out, butmerely to suggest that when they do so,they should be understood as represent-NEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 1981ing their own views in their individualcapacities as concerned citizens. Theyshould not be burdened with the mantleof being "Black leaders."When some Black leaders discusseconomic issues such as full employ-ment and inflation, they are admonishedto stay within the confines of a narrowlyunderstood definition of "civil rights"and racial discrimination. This severelyrestricts the role, range, and ultimateeffectiveness of such people.Other ethnic leaders have not had the"policy expansion" problem becausetheir constituents' economic and otherneeds have not remained so identifiedwith their ethnic identity. This is notthe case with Black Americans. If Blackleaders, therefore, wish to be relevant tothe needs of their Black constituents, ofnecessity, they will be required to ad-dress a range of issues affecting the so-ciety as a whole. Their legitimacy withtheir constituents demands it, and thelarger society ought to be prepared forsuch extension of involvement.The more influential, powerful, andresourceful the group, the more its lead-ership is stable and accorded higher rec-ognition, internally and externally. Inaddition, the more powerful the group,the more likely its leadership is able todeliver benefits to the constituents.The weaker the group, the more itneeds many things, and the more de-mands it will make on its leaders to pro-duce. But the capacity to produce is con-strained precisely by the group's relativeweakness-almost a Catch-22 situation.This means that the followers tend tokeep their leaders on a "short string."That is, they tend to distrust them morethan other groups (usually stronger) dis-trust their leaders.Some Black leaders have always beensubject to the charge of being "out oftouch" with their lower-class Black con-stituents. Basically, such charges stemfrom ideological differences-from theLeft and the Right. Such leaders havebeen accused of being more interestedin "status" goals than in "weliare"-goals, and more concerned about achiev-ing benefits for a Blackmiddle-class thana Black under-class. If one returns tojust the turn of the century, it would bedifficult to document this allegationwith any degree of definitivenes .With-out question, one could discern, for in-stance, a difference of emphasis betweenleadership groups. But these differencesreflected more variance of notions abouthow to affect change for the massesrather than anything else. It would be 2New Directions, Vol. 8 [], Iss. 3, Art. 5http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol8/iss3/5difficult to document a belief that anymajor Black leadership group purpose-fully sought to retard the advance of therace as a whole.If current Black leadership (here thereference is to the more visible and inmany ways more organizationally soundleadership) is to be faulted, I would sus-pect it could be in the area of erring onthe side of superficial unity. There hasbeen a tendency in recent years to playdown, to minimize the obvious differ-ences that exist among the leadershipgroups.There should be more overt recogni-tion on the part of the Black leadershipof fundamental differences betweenthem. There should be much more opendiscussion of those differences, pin-pointing precisely the issues of disagree-ment. This is done more often privatelythan publicly, and it should be surfaced.This will not likely hurt the Black strug-gle. On the contrary, it will likely helpit and give it a leadership credibility itnow seeks to sustain.Like most of their Black constituents,they (Black leaders) are not too far to theleft or right in American politics. To besure, they are liberal, but they are alsopolitical pragmatists. They have everyintention of challenging racism in thecountry, of pushing for more equitableeconomic policies, and of trying to forgeviable coalitions with other groups thatshare those goals. Some are more com-fortable with their corporate connec-tions than others would like them to beor want to be themselves. They have ar-rived at this 'place and time with a recordof action and achievement about whichthey need not apologize. They remainvulnerable to attacks from within andwithout but they need not feel especiallyapologetic about their failures. Theirfailure to deliver certain benefits to theirconstituents has been, as DorothyHeight indicated, a function largely oftheir circumstantial inabilities-nottheir leadership ineptness. 04EconomicStatus ofBlack AmericaBy Robert B.HillWith prime interest rates in December,1980 surpassing the previous 20 percentrecord of April, 1980, the economicgrowth lagging, it is almost a certaintythat this nation will be sliding into an-otherrecession in 1981.Over the years, repeated cycles of re-cessions have consistently eroded manyof the economic advances of Blacks.During the past 26 years, this nationhas experienced a succession of at leastsix recessions (1953-54, 1957-58, 1960-61, 1969-71, 1974-75 and 1980). BeforeBlacks had a chance to recover from onerecession, they were subjected to an-other. Thus, the Black community isstill reeling from the cumulative effectsof a quarter century of recessions.The peak unemployment rate of 7.8percent during the 1980 recession wassignificantly higher than the 7.3 percentaverage jobless rate for the peak of thepreceding six recessions. In fact, basedon the level of unemployment, Blackswere more severely impacted by theseven-month 1980 slump than they wereby the 17-month 1974-75 recession-which all analysts agree was the mostdevastating decline since the Great De-pression of the 1930s.While the numberof unemployed white workers declinedby 562,000 between 1975 and 1980,there were 200,000 more Blacks unem-ployed in 1980 (at 1.7million) than therewere at the peak of the 1974-75 reces-sion (at l.5 million).The official jobless rate forBlack teen-agers was 36 percent, while the official 9number of unemployed Black teenagerswas about 364,000. But the NationalUrban League Hidden Unemployed In-dex placed the actual jobless rate forBlack teenagers at 59 percent in 1980and the actual number of unemployedBlack teenagers at more than double(about 800,(00) the official level. It isalso important to point out that while 59percent of Black teenagers may be un-employed as a national average, in spe-cific inner-city areas the actual joblessrates for Black youth may be closer to80-90percent.In every work category, Black youthswere more willing to work at lower pay-ing jobs than either Hispanic or whiteyouths. For example, one-third (34 per-cent) of Black youth were willing towash dishes at $2.50 an hour, comparedto 24 percent of Hispanic and 19 percentof white youth. Similarly, almost half(44 percent) of Black youth were willingto work at a hamburger place at $2.50 anhour, compared to 33 percent ofHispanicand 28 percent of white youth. Thesefindings indicate that it is white, notBlack youth who are least willing toaccept lower paying jobs.A more recent analysis of employ-.ment pattems by the National UrbanLeague revealed that Blacks, Hispanicsand Asians were less likely than whitesto secure their proportionate share ofnew jobs. For example, while Blacksaccounted for 15 percent of the increasein the total U. S.working-age populationbetween 1975-80, they obtained only10 percent of the 12.5 million new jobsover that period. Similarly, while His-panics made up 15percent of the growthin the total working-age population be-tween 1975-80, they got only 11 percentof the new jobs. On the other hand,whites obtained three-fourths (74 per-cent) of the new jobs over the last fiveyears, although they accounted for only64 percent of the growth in the working-age population. And white women se-cured over half of the new jobs, whileNEW DIRECTIONS APRIL 19813Hamilton: The Status of Black LeadershipPublished by Digital Howard @ Howard University,

The Status of Black Leadership

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The Status of Black Leadership

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