Buckley Roger

Roger Buckley

Buckley, Roger

4646

International Christian University Repository / 国際基督教大学リポジトリ

『社会科学ン’ャ ナルJ44 (2COO〕The Joumal of Sodca/ Sdeoc・e 44〔2凶OJ 73 同一一一…elJapan, Asia, and the Crash : The Region and Realities, 1997-2000 Roger Buckley Books reviewed : Remhard Drifte, Japan’S F01四g1Policy in !he 1990s (Basingstoke, UK, 1996) Pekka Korhonen, lap山田idAsia Pacific lnlegraiion (L叩 don,1998). Walter Hatch and Kozo Yamamura, Asia in Japan's Embrace (Cambridge, 1996). La町yDiamond & Marc F.Plattner (eds) Democracy 11 East Asia (Balllmore, 1998). David A. Lake & Patrick M. Marg叩（eds)Regional Orders (University Park, PA, 1997). Ross H McLeod & Ross Gamaut (eds) East Asw in C1is1s (London, 1998). P W. Preston, Pacific Asia in the G/ohal Syste刑（Oxford,1998) Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) As回nSecurity Practice (Stanford, 1998). “In the Asia-Pacific region whe問 welive, political and social conditions are generally stable, despite some ongoing disputes and conflicts. Economically, the region continue to enjoy dynamic growth, tummg to its advantage us characteristically rich diversity and high level of openness. . tins ASla-Pacific region may indeed be acqmring a E問 atpotential to contribute pohncally and economically to the peace and prosperity of the world.”＇＂ Wuh these叩enmgremarks Prime Minister M1yazawa began hIS optimistic tow d’horizon in Bangkok on January 16th 1993 Miyazawa was eager both to salute 'the“ASEANway’”of constructive diplomatic dialogue and to draw attention to hIS own nation’S commitment to further regionahsm. Prime Minister Miyazawa stated that, given 74 the disappomting co『1ditionof the world economy，‘i is essential that the economy of the Asia Pacific region, in particular that of the ASEAN countries, continue its dynamic development’山 Itwas not to be. By August 1997 the region found itself in a m句oreconomic and financial cnsis that would begin in Thailand and engulf each and every state in the region山P目sentedwith what is stil in the autumn of 1999 an ongomg series of domestic and external challenges to the Asia-Pacific region, the historian has two duties. He must first describe and then explain how the crash severely dented a thousand policy statements and left the region uncertain as to its future goals. Given the scale of the political, economic and human damage caused by recent events it would be surprising indeed if the region’s self-confidence had not been shaken. It was outsiders, as might well have been anticipated, who found 1t easier to pomt the finger at the sins of the region that we日 painfullyexhibited in the two y回目 followingthe imtial thunder in Bangkok. It was, claims economist Paul Krugman, an unprecedented crisis.“Never in the course of economic events not even in the early years of the Depression has so large a part of the world economy experienced so devastating a fal from grace.”Even m October 1999 when Asian governments we問boasting that the region was well on the road to recovery, the first deputy managing director of the IMF warned of the prospect of further disruptions unless substantial financial and corporate reform was carried out nnmediately. 山 Thefear that‘the strengthening recovery will reduce the urgency of reform, and allow a business-as-usual attitude to set in, is very real', cautioned the IMF at the World Economic Forum’s meeting m Singapnre.＇剣The details of the・ 1997 Asian financial crisis are clearer than the doubts over where responsibility for the debacle lies The immediate difficulties started in Thailand on the eve incidentally of the問ーoccupationof Hong Kong by the People’s Republic of China - before spreading m the form that the world’s media aptly termed “Asian Jopon, A,io, ond the Crn'h o The Reg;o' ond Reo1;1;., 75 contagion”It app回目thatintemattonal investors began to make massive withdrawals of funds from Southeast Asia m the wake of currency日uctuations.山 Theease and inexpense of capttal mobility guaranteed that once the region’s economies were felt to be vulnerable then international fund manage目 wouldwithdraw their highly liquid assets The Mcleod & Gamaut collection of essays provides a most helpful examination of what wentwroog and what lessons might be learned from the rapid and large scale disaster."' The financial mishaps are stressed to the extent that 'the shock of 1997’is described as‘a defining event io the economic history of East Asia’山 Itconcludes that‘Ltke the Great Depression in the West, it has the capacity to change thought about economic development and economic policy io fundamental ways’同iWhether the 1997 cnsts has substanti叫lyaltered the region's policy behaviour is far from clear. In the winter of 1999 it is doubtful if Japan, for example, has accepted either its share of respoostbility for what weot wrong in the Asia Pacific zone or yet altered its long-standing admimstrative and political practices. Japan gives litle evidence of much shifl in its thinking and contioues to hope against hope that both the recovery of the region and its own long-delayed economic rehabilitation will occur wtthout pain or cost to the stability of the state and its own society "'" The suggestion that Tokyo was involved io the begioning of the crisis and has done relatively litle to assist m the solutions to the region’s problems needs to be underlined. The view that it was merely the lapses of a small number of financial institutions that has held back Japan is implicit in Aktyosht Horiuchi’s chapter in East Asia in Crisis.＂＇』While a necessary part of the whole picture, it has nothing to say on the disappointing state of the wider Japanese economy in the 1990s Others, fortunately, have been less reticent. Marcus Noland in his address to the Keidanren in September 1999 saw Japanese institutions as being partly to blame for the extraordinary inflows and outflows of funds from southeast Asia in the late 1980s and mid 1990s. It was not only Western speculators that invested and quにklydisinvested as the bubble b ult up and then burst."" 76 The question of where contemporary Japan stands in its dealings with the Asia-Pacific region remains somewhat unclear, particularly as al nations have had to concentrate their ene弔問son recovering, as best they can, from the downturns of the late 1990s山 Thetopic though is obviously of m吋orscholarly mterest. All the works under review a陀obliged to consider this issue. The more ambitious student would attempt a synthesis that could boldly mco中orateinternational田lations,and current history with the newer discipline of political economy but that will only be possible after the more specialized monographs have been assimilated. Pleas for clarity m this (and other) contexts are almost by definition un-Japanese Indeed, as Drifte argues, there may be excellent political motives for such deliberate obfuscation "" Yet the almost unanimous acceptance that Japan’s economic and 日nancialstrengths are the key to its foreign policies can not be hidden Japan is either a m旬oreconomic power or it is nothmg How itdeals with maintaining and expanding such a pos1t1on in the Asia-Pacific region exercises al our authors There is general agreement among them that the recent Asian crisis is unlikely to alter the somewhat narrow focus of Japanese international relations山 Moreover,it is suggested that the current crisis has greatly impaired the foreign policy debate on ‘Whither Japan？’ and further delayed the long hoped for precision and clarity that must eventually be realized 1f Tokyo JS senous about its claims to global influence. The 1990s have seen relatively litle change in the mtemational status of Japan; indeed, it is possible that Japan has regr田sedthrough narrowmg its focus to long-standing but stil only partly solved domestic issues. The d1f自cultiesthat observe四 expenencein attempting to reach definite conclusions are bluntly seen in Drifte’s subtitle ‘From Economic Superpower to What Power？’－ and the somewhat amo中housconclusions that he reaches州 Othershave encountered similar problems The hopes expressed earlier in the 1990s on Japan’S willingness to coope国民onvital global issues of secunty, poverty and the environment are no longer fapon, A•io句 ondthe c~，h ' T" Region ond Reolitie• 7同pres回tlynear the top of the agenda."" We are left with a sense of disappomtment at Japan’S irresolution. The vtew that Japan’s primary interest is economic and that It will at best alter its behaviours only slowly is a frequent comment in the literature 山 Theclaim that Japan is a‘regional supe中ower'(Drifte) and that its economic dominance in the ASta-Pacific regton is such that, m Hatch and Yamaura’s subtitle to their study, there is‘a regional production alliance’in the process of being born"'" ch町acterizescommentary at least up to the eve of the 1997 crisis. Since then the relative failure of Japan to asist the region, primanly by improving its own economy and thereby enabling its neighbours to export mo日 toJapan, has問ducedthe at四ctivenessof any Japan田emodel to othe問。山Suggestions on Japan’s international ambitions a問 mostunlikely to reemerge until the economy improves and the financial posttton is clearer What is apparent at the turn of the century is the uncertainty of both economic and secunty related issues for Japan and the wider region. The economic and financial difficulties of the 1990s ensure, at the ve『yleast, that the“Pacific Century" rhetoric and the implicit assumption of Japanese leadership in such economic and (perhaps) cultu四lareas is now open to question. It is no longer possible for autho四 toboldly begin their essays on Asian regional security by stating unequivocably that the ‘Asia Pacific enjoys a peace and prosperity that is the envy of the rest of the world' "" Such optimism was always dubious and ts now dangerous All states and entities in the region a肥 havingpresently to rethink their positions in the light of their own particular failings, both economic and often political，凸as well as the weaknesses of attempts at regionalism. Most commentators appear to hold the view that the present balance of power structure, dependent on the United States and premised by essentially Cold War thinking, ought to be modified by the addition of cooperative, open structures that would encourage wider discussion and greater transparency among al parties in the region. The frequency with which such suggesttons are made with regard to virtually each and every 78 relationship is not, however, necessarily reassuring山 Itmay simply be a substitute for more detailed and mo日 difficultthought, it is highly improbable that constant reference to‘confidence building’can solve such myriad issues山 Gettingthe USA, Japan, the PRC and the Russian Federation to form multilateral bodies may take decades of work. In a competitive and unstable regional environment it would appear unlikely that Japan 1s about to shift its basic strategy. The anxieties shared by its neighbours and portions of the Japanese public on any far－悶achingmove to alter its long-established security policies would seem to be unfounded "" The severe economic disruptions of the 1990s have reinforced the prevalent minimalism within the nation’s foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. Its options for the arly 21st century are likely to be restricted by economic realities at home that will work agamst a more activist approach to Asia and the wider world. For the present it might be wise to echo the remarks of the日rstpostwar British ambassador to Tokyo. When preparing his annual目viewon Japan in 1954, Sir Esler Dening adopted a suitably sceptical posture in the face of the unknown. He wrote to the Foreign Office that Japan‘was in the process of moving from defeat and occupation to the attainment of her new position in the world-whatever that may prove to be' Notes (I）‘The new era of the Asia-Pacific and Japan-ASEAN cooperation’，policy speech by Prime Minister Miyazawa, 16 January 1993, ASEAN Economic 811ffeti11, (March 1993). (2) ibid. (3) The literature on the su切ectis only now surfacing. Throughout the summer of 1999, a succession of post mortems we肥 heldin Tokyo under the auspices of the UN University, Japanese newspapers, the International House of Japan and industrial organizations. fapan, A,;, ond the Cra'h : The Region and Realiti" 79 (4) Stanley FtScher's comments in report by Michael Richardson, l11ternatio110/ Herold Tribu11e, 19 October 1999. (5) ibid cf. Reginald Dale，ιAsian economies could be dnfting into part 2 of crisis', !HT, 15 October 1999 (6) For a detailed account see Ross Garnaut's introductory chapter m McLeod & Gamaut, op. cit. For warning signs that predate the crisis see F川a1ciαlTimes, 5 December 1996, (survey). (7) The authors are decidedly wary of assuming that long-term structural reforms wil necessarily take place in the region. The prospect of repeated crises is posed in remarks such as‘even if reforms are carried out, the question then is whether they will be discredited as arrangements imposed from outside when the East Asian developing economies were m a position of weakness’ (8) op. cit., p.21 (9) ibid. ( 10) This perspective has been reinforced by repeated statements by Japanese officialdom that the recession of the 1990s is over. The fact that this has been demonstrated on numerous occasions to be false appears to have done litle to p問ventyet more bromides from successive bureaucrats and their nominal polttical masters This approach is highly counter productive and merely adds to the already massive cynicism among the Japanese public. (11) Akiyoshi Horiuchi，‘Japan’in McLeod & Gamaut, op. cit. (12) Marcus Noland, speech to the Keidanren, 22 September 1999. (13) Japan’s efforts to rethink ts postwar policy goals predate the present Asian turmoil but unfortunately the imprecision has been permitted to continue as the nation concentrates only on tackling domestic economic crises (14) Drifte, op. cit., pp.6-9. Drifte suggests that‘recognitton of Japan’s power is sometimes unwanted because it may be politic叫lyinopportune, t may harm so relations with other countries or it may provoke demands for more Japanese international burden shanng’ (15) See also Buckley，‘Declinism and Contemporary Japan・Historyversus Masochism, 1945 2000', The Jo山川lof Socio/ Science 42 (1999). (16) Drifte speaks of a bid for greater stature through ‘stealth and networking’but suggests that this risks failing through the lack of public debate at home on Japan’s goals and the impatience of outsiders at the slowness of change. (17) See Haruo Shimada，‘Parting ways with a Passive Foreign Pohcy’，Eι01011ic Eye (Winter 1993), trans. from Chno Koron (18) See, for example, Preston, op. cit., pp. 156 160. He suggests that a larger political role ought to be possible but this will日qui阻 otherm可orpowers to make‘some fonn of accommodation m the not too distant future’ (19) Hatch & Yamamura, op cit. They warn that Asia-Pacific states nsk becoming ‘captive economies’of Japan by overreliance on Japanese investment, aid and technology This begs the question, however, of alternative donorship (20) On the conjectural attractiveness, however, of a Japan-led Pacific Community in the 21st century to those living beyond Asia, see the conclusion to Pekka Korhonen’s work, op cit., pp. 200 202. (2 l) Susan L. Shirk in Lake & Morgan, op. cit , p.245. (22) The cases of Indonesia and Thailand are the most glaring but the faults in the Japanese political bureaucratic arrangements should not go unrecognized. See Makoto Iokibe in Diamond & Plattner, op. cit .for a look at the ‘closed mentahty' behind party pnlitics (23) If it were al so simple, then presumably much mo日 progresswould already have been made towards peaceful coexistence (24) Brian Bridges, for example, employs the analogy in his recommendations for better European ties with the region; see Brian Bridges, Europe and the Challenge Jap,n, A,b, and the Cm'h ' The Region nnd Realiti" SI of the Asia Pacific (Cheltenham, UK, 1999) Simtlar prescriptions can be田enm Muthiah Alagappa’s edited volume, op. ct See, for example, Yoshihide Soeya, 'Japan: Normative Constrain臼 versusStructural Imperatives’and comment by Alagappa on Japan’s postwar‘abnormality’1/Jid. (25) On the unlikelihood of mo問 thanincremental change see comments by Paul Stares，‘Japan's Security Pohcy: Continuity or Change?', paper delivered at Sophia University International Relations Workshop, 23 October 1999 

Japan, Asia, and the Crash:The Region and Realities, 1997-200

https://icu.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=3152&item_no=1&attribute_id=18&file_no=1

Japan, Asia, and the Crash:The Region and Realities, 1997-200

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

International Christian University Repository / 国際基督教大学リポジトリ