“Islamist vote” has been an area of interest in the academia for quite a long time and has attracted particular attention of scholars following the Arab Spring, as Islamist parties witnessed an increase of popularity at the ballot boxes in 2011-2012 in North African countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Whereas much of the recent academic literature on Islamist parties is oriented around the cases of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, limited attention has been paid to a puzzle that deserves profound analysis: given the many similarities between Algeria and its neighbors in the 2010s, why did Algerian Islamist parties failed to enlarge its supporting base as their counterparts in other North African countries did? This research attempts to examine the phenomenon of “Algerian exceptionalism” from a political process perspective by analyzing the political opportunities, organizational structure and framing of AAV, and how these factors affected the alliance’s mobilization. The approach presented in this article is not limited to the case of Algerian AAV but can be leveraged to study Islamist parties and Islamic activism in general. Keywords: Islamist parties; Mobilization; Algeria
