Levi, Edward H.

English

University of Chicago Law School: Chicago Unbound

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEWof the course, with the New York Factors' Act and the New York Bulk Sales Actthrown in for good measure.In conclusion it may be noted once more that Bogert and Britton is not a functionalpresentation of the law of Sales. However, with such a wealth of excellent material athis disposal, no type of Sales teacher, be he functionalist, conceptualist, pragmatist,factualist, or plain garden variety, should encounter any difficulty in giving an excel-lent course.THomAs CLIFFORD BILLIG** Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.Cases and Materials on an Introduction to Law and the Judicial Process. By BernardC. Gavit. Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1936. Pp. xxiii, 633. $5.00.Mr. Gavit's book introduces the first year law student to many of the issues whichhave been fought over by the more jurisprudentially inclined law professors duringthe past years. It also retains the more traditional material for an introductory lawcourse in the form of material on the court system and organization, and some materialon briefing, and on common law procedure and common law actions. Having gonethrough the traditional material the freshman is then given a dose of what Mr. Gavitterms, with others, "the judicial process." The clear merit of the book is that any stu-dent having used all of the book will have a sense of awareness of how the law developsand a feeling for the conflict which is implicit. I suppose, also, that the student will bebewildered by what he finds. This bewilderment will be both good and bad.The book represents, I take it, most of the old and new notions about law and lawteaching now current among law teachers. Retaining the material on common lawactions, I think, is a mistake. Such material is not introductory for it leads nowhere.It should either be taught as history, in which case it cannot be quickly taught andneeds full development, or as a device whereby almost anything can be accomplished.I am aware that some persons believe that it can be taught as logic, although what thatmeans I do not know, and at any rate to do so would not be to give an introductorycourse. The place of logic in the law does need treatment in an introductory course,and Mr. Gavit has included it, although I do not think that he has a prize collection ofcases on it. Mr. Gavit bows rather deeply to the Hohfeldian concepts, which I alsothink is something of a mistake. A middle sized bow would be much better and thannot because the concepts are useful but because some people think they are. About onehundred pages are given over to what Mr. Gavit calls the judicial function. Here theplace of law in any theory of government may be well developed, but I think it ex-tremely questionable whether it can be done by the case method alone. The mate-rial on statutory interpretation which appears some one hundred and thirty pages latermight better fit in here, and so might the material on constitutional interpretation,which is now placed at the end of the book. Of course the book has in it a great deal ofthe talk about what is law, and includes Mr. Hutchins' life-story for the edification ofthe freshman. I do not know why the material on what the law is, is separated bymost of the book from the judicial process, but perhaps this is an adaptation of the cir-cular method of instruction.Certainly it is a mistake to take casebooks too seriously. They are, after all, onlyBOOK REVIEWSconvenient ways of getting some material into the hands of students. This book doesnot attempt to do more through the medium of footnotes; it does not have that type ofauthor's footnotes which gives a book a literary tone, as is currently popular, nor doesit have those penetrating notes with which, let us say, Mr. Ames used to embellishhis works. This book, however, will raise many fundamental questions in the student'smind about the law, -and thus will make his law work more interesting. It probablywill not answer these questions, nor will it tell the student which questions are by theirnature unanswerable. But an instructor using these materials could give these an-swers, if he knows them. The instructor also could impose some order on the materials.I don't know why Mr. Gavit chose the particular brand of disorder that he did. Per-haps as a matter of pedagogy it works, and that would be all that matters. And to theextent that the materials are confused and confusing I suspect they correctly mirrorcurrent ideas about law. In such a case I suppose it is better for the freshman to getover that stage in his first year, rather than to have him emerge with the confusion inhis third-or worse, have him not even see the confusion by that time.Mr. Gavit's book fills many of the needs of an introductory course. I do not think itdoes as good a job as might be done. By and large an introductory course must be acourse about the judicial process. It must discuss the nature of problems, that is,distinguish between those which have been finally settled (or unsettled), and thosewhich are practical and in which a choice in any particular case must always be made.A discussion of the principles by which this choice must be made would not be out ofplace, but possibly the kindergartens of the country will have to be reorganized to giveeffect to these principles since the only adequate training in the moral and intellectualvirtues probably occurs around that time. An introductory course must discuss theplace of law in the governmental system. Most importantly, it must trace the rise ofsome legal concepts in order to show their utility and to give some standard by whichlegal concepts may be judged. All of this may be placed under the heading of "prece-dent, logic and social policy." It is obvious that such an inquiry would constantly linklaw with other disciplines and would constantly attempt to find first, what kinds of in-formation would be useful in the law, and secondly, attempt to correlate some of the in-formation already present in other fields, as an example of what can be done. Thusone might have a systematic introductory course dealing with something other thanprocedure, raising problems as to the ultimate ends of law, and the practical nature oflegal problems, integrating law and other disciplines, and developing the history oflegal symbols.There will be one danger in doing this. The assumption of such a course must bethat there is something worth saying on these problems, and that there is a right viewand a wrong view. It must assume this unless it is going to be merely a history of whatpeople have said. But it must be careful to see that somehow or other counter-viewsare presented in equally strenuous fashion. It must face the dilemma involved in pre-senting one view clearly and intolerantly, and yet, insisting that other views must beequally strenuously represented. In other words, it must remember that in these fieldsthe spoils do not belong to the victor.EDwARD H. LEvI** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

Review of \u3ci\u3eCases and Materials on an Introduction to Law and the Judicial Process\u3c/i\u3e by Bernard C. Gavit

https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1513&amp;context=uclrev

Review of \u3ci\u3eCases and Materials on an Introduction to Law and the Judicial Process\u3c/i\u3e by Bernard C. Gavit

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University of Chicago Law School: Chicago Unbound