Franzen, Timothy G.

English

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DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law Volume 6 Issue 2 Spring 1996 Article 9 Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (Ill. Jan. 18, 1996) Timothy G. Franzen Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip Recommended Citation Timothy G. Franzen, Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (Ill. Jan. 18, 1996), 6 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 261 (1996) Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss2/9 This Sports Law Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201,No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (ILL. JAN. 18, 1996).INTRODUCTIONDonnell Palmer ("Palmer"), a student and star player on defendant's basket-ball team, and Suzanna Palmer, Donnell's mother, sued Mt. Vernon TownshipHigh School District 201 ("the school district") for negligence, which allegedlyresulted in a serious eye injury to Palmer. The Illinois Circuit Court of JeffersonCounty denied two jury instructions, recommended by Palmer, addressing theaffirmative duties owed to students by the school district. Instead, the circuitcourt instructed the jury that the school district only had the duty to exerciseordinary care in furnishing equipment to students to prevent serious injuries. Thecircuit court then entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of the schooldistrict. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District reversed the verdictand remanded the case for a new trial. The appellate court found that the circuitcourt had erred in failing to instruct the jury, as Palmer had requested, that theschool district had both the duty to warn students that they should furnish theirown protective equipment and the duty to allow them to use such equipment.The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court's decision and af-firmed the judgment of the circuit court.FACTSDuring a basketball tournament in December, 1985, Palmer was hit with anelbow on the cheekbone, below his left eye, but was not seriously injured. Atthat time Palmer began to have concerns that he might sustain a serious eyeinjury while playing basketball. However, at no time had Palmer been warned byanyone from Mt. Vernon Township High School that he should provide his owneye-protection equipment, nor did Palmer ever inform anyone from the schooldistrict that he felt he needed some form of eye-protection. Sometime in January,1986, while shooting baskets before the day's practice, Palmer was approachedby a teammate carrying a pair of "Rec-Specs" eye goggles. The teammate al-lowed Palmer to wear the goggles as he shot baskets before practice. Coach LeeEmery then came into the gymnasium, and upon seeing Palmer wearing thegoggles, told him not to wear them because someone else might get hurt. CoachEmery testified at trial that he could not recall any basketball practice at whichPalmer wore protective eye gear. After that January practice, Palmer did not tryto wear eye goggles again, because he presumed that Coach Emery would not lethim. During practice on February 4, 1986, Palmer was poked in the left eye byanother player's finger. As a result of the injury, Palmer lost all vision in thateye. Based on this injury, Palmer and his mother brought an action for negli-gence against the school district.1Franzen: Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 788Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAWAt the conclusion of the trial, Palmer was allowed to set forth his three theo-ries of negligence against the school district in a jury instruction. Palmer's juryinstruction number twenty-one claimed that the school district was negligent inone or more of the following respects: (1) that the school district did not furnishhim with protective eye equipment, (2) that the school district did not warn himthat he should furnish his own protective eye equipment, and (3) that the schooldistrict did not allow him to use protective eye equipment. Palmer also tenderedtwo jury instructions which the circuit court refused to give the jury. The twoinstructions refused by the court were as follows:Plaintiff's number 15: 'Where students are engaging in school activities, it is theduty of the school district to exercise ordinary care to warn the students thatthey should furnish their own equipment to prevent serious injuries.'Plaintiff's number 16: 'Where students are engaging in school activities, it is theduty of the school district to exercise ordinary care to allow the students to useequipment to prevent serious injuries."The circuit court refused to give the jury both instructions "for the reason that nocase in Illinois specifically set forth the rule of law stated by either instruction."2Instead, the jury received plaintiff's instruction number fourteen, taken almostverbatim from Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville Community UnitDistrict No. 10,' which stated: "where students are engaging in school activities,it is the duty of the school district to exercise ordinary care to furnish equipmentto students to prevent serious injuries."4 The jury then found for the school dis-trict, and the circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of theschool district.On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District reversed theverdict in favor of the school district and remanded the case for a new trial. Theappellate court reasoned that the jury instructions given by the circuit court failedto adequately instruct the jury, as Palmer had requested, regarding the schooldistrict's duty to warn students about wearing protective equipment, and its dutyto allow students to use protective equipment. The Supreme Court of Illinoisgranted the school district's petition for leave to appeal.'LEGAL ANALYSISThe issue before the Supreme Court of Illinois was whether a school districthas either an affirmative duty to warn students that they should provide theirown safety equipment or an affirmative duty to allow students to use their ownsafety equipment to prevent serious injury.' The supreme court began by point-1. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, 647 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (11. App. Ct.1995)(emphasis added).2. Id. at 1046.3. 412 N.E.2d 447 (Il. 1980).4. Palmer, 647 N.E.2d at 1047 (emphasis added).5. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, 652 N.E.2d 344 (111. 1995) (grantingpetition for leave to appeal).6. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (Ill.262 [Vol. VI:2612DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss2/9PALMER v. MOUNT VERNON TWNSHP H.S.ing out that the appellate court had relied principally upon the Lynch7 andGerrity v. Beatty8 decisions. Following the reasoning of those cases, the appel-late court found that the school district had both a duty to warn students thatthey should provide their own safety equipment and a duty to allow students touse their own safety equipment to prevent serious injury. The school districtargued "that Gerrity and Lynch set out the scope of a school district's duty toprovide adequate safety equipment for students' use during school athletic activi-ties but did not impose upon a school district"' either of the "separate and dis-tinct'"' duties found by the appellate court. In opposition, Palmer contended thatthese duties "are logical corollaries to the duty to furnish safety equipment thatwas established in Lynch and Gerrity."" The supreme court then briefly dis-cussed both the Gerrity and Lynch cases.In Gerrity, the plaintiff, a high school student, was seriously injured whilemaking a tackle in a high school football game, and alleged that the school dis-trict was negligent in furnishing a defective football helmet.' The school dis-trict claimed immunity under the School Code 3 for negligent acts of a teacherundertaken during supervision or discipline of students. 4 The supreme courtrejected the school district's argument reasoning that "a school district cannotvicariously claim immunity of a school teacher where it is alleged that the schooldistrict's liability is premised upon the district's independent duty to provideadequate safety equipment to the students."'5 Therefore, as expressly recognizedby the Gerrity court, a school district has a duty to provide safety equipmentnecessary to protect students from serious injury during school athletic activi-ties. 6In Lynch, the supreme court expanded the rule of Gerrity to include morethan just formally organized athletic activities. In that case, students engaged in afootball game on school property without the express authorization of theschool. 7 The school administration was aware that the game was planned butdid not provide safety equipment to those students participating." The supremecourt stated that the school district could be held liable for head injuries sus-tained by a student who was not wearing a helmet. 9 The Lynch court held that"a school district has an affirmative duty, where students are engaging in schoolJan. 18, 1996).7. 412 N.E.2d 447 (11. 1980).8. 373 N.E.2d 1323 (11. 1978).9. Palmer, 1996 WL 19018 at *3.10. Id.11. Id.12. Gerrity, 373 N.E.2d at 1324.13. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 122, para. 34-84a (1985) (105 ILCS 5/34-84a (West 1992)).14. Gerrity, 373 N.E.2d at 1324.15. Palmer, 1996 WL 19018 at *4 (citing Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d 1323 (111. 1978)).16. Id.17. Lynch, 412 N.E.2d at 451.18. Id. at 451-52.19. Id. at 459.199613Franzen: Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 788Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAWactivities, whether they are extracurricular, or formally authorized as part of theschool program, to furnish equipment to prevent serious injuries. ' °The supreme court then stated that Palmer's argument was in conflict with itsholdings in these two cases. Both Gerrity and Lynch impose an affirmative dutyto furnish equipment to prevent serious injuries." The supreme court found thatto impose upon the school district "[a] duty to warn students of the advisabilityof wearing such equipment, and a duty to allow students to wear such equipmentif it is purchased at their own expense... " would allow the school district toavoid its obligation to furnish appropriate safety equipment in the first place2The court further noted that if a school district were allowed to advise its stu-dents that they should purchase safety equipment at their own expense, then onlystudents who could afford such equipment would be able to participate in schoolathletic activities, and this result was clearly discouraged by the court inLynch?2 Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the school district's onlyduty was to furnish Palmer with "the safety equipment that was reasonably nec-essary in order to protect [him] from reasonably foreseeable, serious bodily inju-ry" 2 4The supreme court then examined Palmer's second contention that he de-served a new trial "because his evidence demonstrated that he was 'denied hisright' to wear safety equipment while playing basketball." The supreme courtbegan by stating that Palmer's contention failed to distinguish between the dutiesof a school district and those of its teachers. It was the supreme court's opinionthat "[a] school district has a duty to furnish safety equipment, while a teacherhas a separate and distinct duty to supervise the student's wearing or use ofsafety equipment."26 In light of the distinct duties of a school district and teach-er, the supreme court concluded that the decision as to whether Palmer couldwear the protective goggles was in the hands of the supervising teacher, CoachEmery. The supreme court then pointed out that it is well settled "that teachersstand in loco parentis to their students, and that their supervision of students'activities is cloaked with immunity.. ." in the absence of willful or wanton mis-conduct by the supervising teacher. Palmer did not claim that Coach Emery'sdenial of protective eye-wear constituted willful and wanton misconduct, nor was20. Id.21. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High Sch. Dist. 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018, *1 *5(1l. Jan. 18, 1996).22. Id.23. Lynch v. Bd. of Educ. of Collinsville Community Unit Dist. No. 10, 412 N.E.2d 447, 460(Ill. 1980).24. Palmer, 1996 WL 19018 at *5. The jury found that the school district had not breached thisduty to furnish adequate safety equipment, and Palmer did not dispute this finding on appeal. Id.25. Id. at *6.26. Id. (citing Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 395 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (Ill. 1979)).27. See Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 705 (111. 1976) (holding that an educatorshould stand in the place of a parent or guardian in matters of discipline, and absent proof of willfuland wanton misconduct the teacher and school district could not be held liable on a negligence theoryfor injuries sustained by students in physical education class).[Vol. VI:2614DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss2/9PALMER v. MOUNT VERNON TWNSHP H.S.there anything in the record to support such a claim.' Therefore, the supremecourt held that Palmer was not entitled to recover from the school district for theeye injury at issue in this case.CONCLUSIONThe Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision of the appellate court andaffirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The supreme court held that a schooldistrict has neither a duty to warn students that they should provide their ownsafety equipment, nor a duty to allow students to use their own safety equipmentto prevent serious injury. The court reaffirmed, however, that a school districtdoes have "a duty to furnish reasonably necessary safety equipment to protectstudents from reasonably foreseeable serious injury."'29Timothy G. Franzen28. Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School Dist. 201, 1996 WL 19018 at *6.29. Id. at *5.199615Franzen: Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 788Published by Via Sapientiae, 20166DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss2/9

Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (Ill. Jan. 18, 1996)

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Palmer v. Mount Vernon Township High School District 201, No. 78875, 1996 WL 19018 (Ill. Jan. 18, 1996)

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