Larrea, Margaret A.

English

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DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law Volume 6 Issue 1 Fall 1995 Article 9 Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994) Margaret A. Larrea Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip Recommended Citation Margaret A. Larrea, Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994), 6 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 115 (1995) Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss1/9 This Sports Law Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. Crawn v. Campo,136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2D 600 (1994).INTRODUCTIONPlaintiff Michael Crawn sued defendant John Campo to recover for injuriessustained during a pickup softball game. The New Jersey Law Division ruled forthe plaintiff. The jury found that Campo acted "in reckless disregard for thesafety of [Crawn]." The court determined that the applicable standard of duty ofcare for players engaged in informal sports is to avoid injurious conduct that isreckless or intentional. The appellate division reversed the trial court on theproper standard of care required, concluding that the applicable standard is toavoid conduct that would constitute negligence under the circumstances. The Su-preme Court of New Jersey modified the judgment, and as modified, affirmed.The court held that the appropriate duty of care of participants in informal recre-ational sports is to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentionalconduct. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion bygranting the defendant's motion for a new trial.FACTSOn May 1, 1988, the plaintiff, Michael Crawn, and the defendant, JohnCampo, were participants in a "pick-up" game of softball. Friends or bystandersjoined in each week, so that the composition of the teams changed from week toweek. The teams were not part of a league, and there were no official referees orumpires. The parties agreed that the general rules of softball governed. Theydisagreed, however, whether there was a rule prohibiting sliding.The defendant was the runner on first base, and the next batter hit a groundball to the shortstop. The shortstop flipped the ball to the second baseman to tryfor the force-out. The defendant slid into second base, taking the legs out fromunderneath the second baseman.With the defendant safe on second, the next batter hit a fly ball to right field.The defendant rounded third base and headed for home. The plaintiff, the catch-er, testified that he was standing on the first base side of home plate. His leftfoot touched the right side the plate, and he faced the oncoming runner. The de-fendant, according to the plaintiff, lowered his body and ran into the plaintiff'sleft side. The plaintiff fell backwards, with the defendant ending up on top of theplaintiff's lower leg. The plaintiff heard a pop in his leg, followed by severepain. He later tried to resume play, but when he tried to run, his left leg col-lapsed under him. The plaintiff went to the hospital and was diagnosed with atorn knee ligament, which required surgery.'1. Plaintiff claimed that defendant deliberately ran into him, with the goal of dislodging the ball1Larrea: Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994)Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAWThe plaintiff sued to recover for his personal injuries, alleging in three sepa-rate counts that the defendant was liable because his conduct had been eithernegligent, reckless or intentional. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the inten-tional conduct claim before the trial. The jury found for the plaintiff, holding thatthe defendant's conduct had been reckless and that the plaintiff had not assumedthe risk of reckless conduct. The defendant brought a motion for a new trial,which the court granted on evidentiary grounds.The plaintiff appealed the grant of a new trial, and the defendant cross-ap-pealed. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's grant of a new trial, butreversed on the proper standard required to establish liability for injuries sus-tained in informal athletic competition. It held that the proper standard was rea-sonableness under the circumstances - ordinary negligence.The defendant filed a motion for leave to appeal the appellate division deci-sion on the standard of care issue. The plaintiff filed a motion of leave to crossappeal on the affirmance of the grant of a new trial. The Supreme Court of NewJersey granted both motions.LEGAL ANALYSISThe Supreme Court of New Jersey considered two main issues: (1) the natureof a player's duty to avoid afflicting physical injury on another player, and (2)the necessity of expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care governinga softball game. The court also briefly dealt with the trial court's grant ofdefendant's motion for a new trial.The main issue the court discussed was the appropriate standard of care appli-cable to informal sports activities. The trial court had determined that only reck-less or intentional conduct would be liable, but the appellate division accordedliability to conduct unreasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Courtheld that the trial court had been correct in its determination.The court stated that the majority of jurisdictions that have considered thisissue have concluded that to constitute a tort, conduct must exceed the level ofordinary negligence. "[T]he emerging legal standard requires either recklessnessor specific intent to injure by defendant."2 The Illinois Appellate Court inNabozny v. Barnhill3 held that, "a player is liable for injury in a tort action if hisconduct is such that it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard forthe safety of the other player to cause injury to that player.",4The reasoning behind the preference for a standard of care that exceeds negli-gent conduct is the perception that the risk of injury is a common and inherentfrom plaintiff's glove to avoid the out. He argued there was enough room for defendant to run pasthim and touch home plate without making contact. Defendant, on the other hand, claimed that plain-tiff had one foot on either side of home plate, and that the only way to tag home safely was to slide.2. Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts & Sports: Participant Liability to CoParticipants for Injuries Sus-tained During Competition, 7 U. MAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 191, 195, 198 (1990).3. 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).4. Id. at 261.[Vol. VI: 1152DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss1/9CRAWN v. CAMPOaspect of informal sports activity. In Knight v. Jewett,5 the Supreme Court ofCalifornia noted that "the nature of a sport is highly relevant in defining the dutyof care owed by a particular defendant ... in some situations, ... the carelessconduct of others is treated as an 'inherent risk' of a sport ..... ' That court con-cluded that only if one player intentionally injures another or engages in conductthat is "so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activityinvolved in the sport ..." is there a breach of duty.'The New Jersey court discussed the two policy reasons that justified the im-position of a recklessness standard: the promotion of vigorous participation inathletic activities9 and the desire to avoid a flood of litigation."0 The appellatedivision, however, had concluded that these two policy justifications did notoutweigh New Jersey's well-established reliance on the ordinary negligencestandard and its aversion to tort immunities. It explained that the only immunitiesacceptable were for important reasons of public policy and availabe in relativelyexceptional situations. The appellate division did not consider the policy reasonsthat favor and encourage sports activities important enough to warrant such im-munity. The Supreme Court agreed that wrongful conduct by the participants insports activities should not be totally removed from the law of torts, but shouldbe accorded partial immunity. It stated that legislative policy at least indirectlysupports such a partial immunity. The New Jersey legislature established tortimmunity for volunteer athletic coaches for injuries to participants except whenconduct is willful, wanton or grossly negligent." Accredited sports officialshave the same sort of immunity.12The court next asserted that participating in recreational sports is differentfrom participating in other activities. For example, in many sports, includingsoftball, some amount of contact is expected." Furthermore, a high level ofemotional intensity accompanies the physicality of sports. 4 The wide variations5. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).6. Id. at 708.7. Id. at 711.8. See also Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989) (applying reckless disregard of safetystandard to injury during college hockey game); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1982)(applying recklessness standard to injuries arising from church picnic softball game); Dotxler v.Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990) (applying wilful-or-reckless-disregard of safety standard to inju-ry arising in a pickup basketball game); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990) (applyingeither recklessness or intentional conduct standard); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 742 P.2d 290, 294 (Tex.Ct. App. 1983) (disallowing claim for negligence for injury in recreational football game). But seeLestina v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993) (adopting the ordinary standard ofnegligence for sports cases).9. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (stating that the lawshould not "place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports by ouryouth").10. See Marchetti, 559 N.E.2d at 702 (asserting that failing to apply a recklessness standardwould "open the floodgates to a myriad of lawsuits involving the backyard games of children").11. NJ. STAT. § 2A:62A-6 (1993).12. NJ. STAT. § 2A.62-6.1 (1993).13. See Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Mass. 1989).14. See Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1982) (noting "proper fervor" of competition);1995]3Larrea: Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994)Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAWin expectations regarding the physical contact and emotional intensity that isappropriate from sport to sport and from game to game complicates the analysisof the appropriate standard of care, as does the fact that violations of rules, evensafety rules, are often a part of the game." Yet is spite of this, the appellatedivision felt that courts could adequately evaluate sports conduct and make clearto juries that a participant who creates only "normal" or "ordinary" risks acts asa "reasonable person" under the circumstances. 6The Supreme Court of New Jersey found three problems with the appellatedivision's determination. To begin with, it would be extraordinarily difficult tojudge conduct based on limitless variables concerning how different groups ofpeople play the same game. Second, the reasonableness of conduct of an averageperson is highly subjective and cannot be reliably equated with the conduct of anaverage person under similar circumstances. Finally, there rarely is completeagreement between a group of people, eighteen to twenty in the case of softball,playing a team sport. A legal duty of care based on the standard of what anaverage reasonable person objectively would do under the circumstances is "illu-sory.The Supreme Court concluded that a recklessness standard is the correct oneto apply in the sports context. This heightened standard will result in accordingliability for conduct that is clearly unreasonable and unacceptable from the per-spective of those engaged in the sport, while leaving free from the supervision ofthe courts the risk-laden conduct that is inherent in sports and usually assumed tobe "part of the game."The second issue before the Supreme Court of New Jersey concerned thedefendant's contention that expert testimony was essential to establish the stan-dard of care that applied to players in a softball game. The trial court and ap-pellate division determined that expert testimony was not necessary to establishthe duty owed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed.The test as to the need of expert testimony is whether the subject matter is"so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a validjudgment whether the conduct of the party was reasonable."'7 The court recog-nized that some sports-injury cases from other jurisdictions have allowed the in-troduction of expert testimony, but these cases dealt with organized leagues withspecific rules. That was not present in this case. The court concluded that eventhough an expert would not be able to testify as to idiosyncracies of a specificsoftball game, jurors have sufficient understanding of the rules and conventionsof a particular game as explained by its participants. Therefore, the lower courtLazaroff, supra note 2, at 195 (noting difficulty of distinguishing "between negligence and reckless-ness in the context of a game where players are encouraged to play with reckless abandon").15. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992); Oswald v. Township High Sch. Dist.,406 N.E.2d 157, 160 (11. App. Ct. 1980); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 969-70 (N.Y. 1986).16. The Appellate Division listed at least 10 different factors to be considered in determiningwhether conduct was reasonable. Crawn v. Campo, 630 A.2d 368, 376 (NJ. Super. 1993).17. Butler v. Acme Markets, 445 A.2d 1141, 1147 (NJ. 1982) (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES,LAW op TORTS § 17.1 (1956)).[Vol. VI: 1154DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss1/9CRAWN v. CAMPOcommitted no error by refusing to allow the defendant's expert to testify.The third and final issue presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court was thebasis for the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial. Thedefendant based his motion on the combined effect of three procedural rulings.The trial court determined that these three factors combined to create a manifestdenial of justice. The appellate division found support in the record for the grantof a new trial. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, finding that theresult was "clearly the product of mistake, passion, prejudice or partiality.""8CONCLUSIONIn summary, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the applicable stan-dard of care for participants in recreational sports activities is to avoid recklessor intentional conduct, and not just conduct that would constitute negligenceunder the circumstances. It also found that expert testimony was unnecessary inthis situation where the jury gained sufficient knowledge about the rules of thisparticular softball game from the participants who testified. The court modifiedthe appellate division's judgment concerning the proper standard of care, and asmodified, affirmed.Margaret A. Larrea18. Crawn, 643 A.2d at 609 (citing Lanzet v. Greenberg, 594 A.2d 1309, 1312 (NJ. 1991)).1995]5Larrea: Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994)Published by Via Sapientiae, 20166DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss1/9

Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994)

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Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2d 600 (1994)

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