Lawinger, Jane M.

English

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DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law Volume 1 Issue 1 Spring 1991 Article 8 Soc'y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990) Jane M. Lawinger Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip Recommended Citation Jane M. Lawinger, Soc'y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990), 1 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 26 (1991) Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol1/iss1/8 This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. tion of the standard while the court questioned thereliability of the standard of the average Americanparent as a valid means of rating a film's content.The court's critique was not the first analysis of theMPAA's rating system. A large number of moviemakers and film critics had been strongly opposedto the "censorship quality" of the MPAA's ratingsystem for years prior to the case. Specifically,movie makers opposed the MPAA's 'X" rating be-cause it stigmatized a film as pornographic, and ithad serious negative economic impacts. However,the court's decision in Miramax, though legallyfavoring the MPAA, was the catalyst for a substan-tial change in the rating system. In September of1990, just two months after Miramax, the MPAAannounced that the '"X movie rating was to beabolished and replaced with a new category called"NC-17" in an effort to reform its rating system. 9Additionally, the MPAA has received a trademarkfor the new rating, thus allowing only films ratedby the MPAA's system to receive it. Where the adultmovie industry previously had been able to use the' ' rating to promote pornographic films, the newrating will be used solely by the MPAA.In summary, the change by MPAA to its ratingsystem addressed a fundamental issue that wasbeing neglected up until the Miramax litigation;was the system employed by the Rating Boardsatisfying the real underlying intent of ratingfilms? In a statement made to a writer of the Wash-ington Post, the MPAA said, "We have con-cluded that over the years some people havecome to endow the "X" film rating with meaningit does not have, never has had, and was notintended by founders of the rating program."20The significance of Miramax lies not in its con-clusions of law, but in its demonstration of thecourt's influence, through judicial reasoning, inaffecting institutional changes in importantareas of public concern. Q2E. Brooke Ward1. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 7803 (McKinney 1981).2. Miramax Films Corp. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 148Misc. 2d 1, -, 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 734-735 (1990).3. Classification and Rating Administration (CARA).4. 148 Misc. 2d at -, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 732.5. 148 Misc. 2d at _, 560 N.YS.2d at 733.6. 148 Misc. 2d at_, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 733.7. 148 Misc. 2d at_, 560 N.YS.2d at 732.8. 148 Misc. 2d at _, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 732.9. 148 Misc. 2d at _, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 732.10. 148 Misc. 2d at -, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 734.11. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1981).12. 148 Misc. 2d at_, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 735.13. 148 Misc. 2d at_, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 735.14. 148 Misc. 2d at _, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 735.15. 148 Misc. 2d at-, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 736.16. 148 Misc. 2d at_, 560 N.YS.2d at 732.17. 148 Misc. 2d at_, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 735.18. 148 Misc. 2d at-, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 733.19. The letters "NC" stand for "no children". The new ratingforbids admission of anyone under the age of 17 into a movietheater.20. Hinson, Film Industry Revises Rating System; Controver-sial X Movie Category Abandoned to Avoid 'Stigma', Wash. Post,Sept. 27, 1990, § 1, at Al.The Soc'y of Jesus of NewEngland v. BostonLandmarks Comm'n,409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990).IntroductionThe Boston Landmarks Commission (the "Commis-sion' designated elements of the interior of achurch' as a landmark. This church belongs to TheSociety of Jesus of New England (the "Jesuits),which challenged the designation and sought sum-mary judgment.2 The Supreme Judicial Court ofMassachusetts upheld summary judgment for theJesuits on the ground that the designation of thechurch interior violated Article 2 of the Declarationof Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.3FactsThe Church of the Immaculate Conception has aclassic mid-nineteenth century church design. In1986, the Jesuits established a plan to renovate thechurch because of sparse attendance, the immensestructure of the building, and the age of the build-ing. The renovation plan called for restructuring ofthe main church into office, counseling, and resi-dential space. After construction began, ten Bostonvoters petitioned the Commission to designate theinterior of the church as a landmark under "An ActEstablishing the Boston Landmarks Commis-sion."4The Commission approved landmark designationfor portions of the church's interior in May, 1987.5Under the landmark statute, the Jesuits had toobtain approval by the Commission before renovat-ing the portion of the church which was designatedas a landmark.6 The Jesuits challenged this desig-nation in the Superior Court and sought to have thedesignation set aside on constitutional grounds.The Superior Court ultimately held that the land-mark designation did violate the free exerciseclause of the First Amendment to the United StatesConstitution and granted summary judgment tothe Jesuits.726 Journal of Art & Entertainment Law1Lawinger: Soc'y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 409 MasPublished by Via Sapientiae, 2016Legal AnalysisOn appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-chusetts addressed whether the designation vio-lated Article 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution.In finding that it did, the Court quoted the Sectionof Article 2 that provides: "[N]o subject shall behurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty,or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner andseason most agreeable to the dictates of his ownconscience; or for his religious profession or senti-ments; provided he doth not disturb the publicpeace, or obstruct others in their religious wor-ship."8The Court stated that, according to the Massachu-setts Constitution, there are two exclusive excep-tions to freedom of religious belief and practice.First, the government may interfere when the pub-lic peace is disturbed. Second, the government canintervene in the event the religious worship ofothers is obstructed. In the case at hand, the Courtasserted that neither of the two exceptions weremet.The Court disagreed with the Commission's argu-ment thatthe design and placement of the altar ismerely a secular question of interior decoration andpointed out the great significance of the locationand positioning of the altar to the Jesuits' religiouspractices. The Court also stated that the configura-tion of the church interior is filled with religiousmeaning. Therefore, it must be considered part ofthe Jesuits' religious worship.ConclusionThe significant debate over the constitutionality ofapplying historic preservation laws to churchescontinues.9 The courts seem to have difficulty informulating broad rules that could apply in everycase involving church-owned property.10 Perusal ofcase law suggests that this difficulty arises from thedifference between decisions based on state versusfederal constitutions. There is a need for courts todeclare general principles for the application ofhistoric preservation regulations to church prop-erty.The opinion in The Society of Jesus of New Englandv. Boston Landmarks Commn is limited because itpertains solely to the interior of the church. Anygovernmental interference with the interior ismuch more intrusive than is interference with theexterior, since the former is the actual worshipspace. The Court emphasized that it did not reachthe issue regarding the designation of a church'sexterior or of a church as a whole. On the contrary,the Opinion of the Justices to the Senate statedthat a statute which required government approvalbefore renovating certain building exteriors's wasconstitutional even as applied to religious build-ings. 3In summary, since historical preservation law isstill in formative stages, it is somewhat under-standable that courts have difficulty in determin-ing which test to apply to resolve the constitutionalissues. The Society of Jesus court applied a strictscrutiny test.1 4 However, some courts use analysesless demanding than strict scrutiny, such as therational basis test. The problem with a rationalbasis test is that it requires no proof that the ruleactually furthers the state's interest. Therefore,future problems may continue to arise because therational basis test fails to provide the high degreeof protection from governmental interferencewhich an individual's constitutional right to thefree exercise of religion deserves. 92Jane M. Lawinger1. The Church of the Immaculate Conception.2. Summary judgment was granted to the Jesuits by theSuperior Court.3. Soc'y of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks, 409 Mass. 38,39,564N.E.2d 571, 571 (1990).4. 1975 Mass. Acts 772. This act states in pertinent part,"The mayor, any ten registered voters of the city or any commis-sion member may petition the commission to designate a land-mark..."Id. at § 4.5. The designation restricted permanent alteration of the"nave, chancel, vestibule and organ loft on the main floor-thevolume, window glazing, architectural detail, finishes, painting,the organ, and organ case."6. See 1975 Mass. Acts 772 §§ 5(a), 6, 7.7. 409 Mass. at 39, 564 N.E.2d at 572.8. Mass. Const. art. II, quoted in Society of Jesus v. BostonLandmarks, 409 Mass. 38,40, 546 N.E.2d 571, 572 (1990).9. See, e.g., Society for Ethical Culture, etc. v. Spatt, 51N.Y.2d 449,415 N.E.2d 922,434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980); LutheranChurch in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316N.E.2d 305,359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); First Presby. Church of Yorkv. City Council of York, 25 Pa. Commw. 154,360.2d 257 (1976).10. Note, Applying Historical Preservation Ordinances toChurch Property: Protecting the Past and Preserving the Consti-tution, 63 N.C.L. REV. 404 (1985).11. Opinion of Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 783, 128N.E.2d 563 (1955).12. This was for the purpose of preserving the architectureof the Historic Beacon Hill District.13. 333 Mass. at 790, 128 N.E.2d at 568.14. See Cupit v. Baton Rouge Police Dep't, 277 So. 2d 454 (La.App. 1973) (held that prohibition against wearing beards bypolice officers bore a rational relationship to the efficient opera-tion of police department, and dismissal of officers who wouldnot comply with the regulation because wearing beards wasrequired by their religion did not result in deprivation of consti-tutional right to free exercise of religion).Spring 1991 272DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol1/iss1/8

Soc\u27y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm\u27n, 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990)

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Soc\u27y of Jesus of New England v. Boston Landmarks Comm\u27n, 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990)

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