Hundreds of cases have grappled with the application of the United States Supreme Court\u27s decision in Miranda v. Arizona. Many of those cases have dealt with the question of what constitutes  custodial interrogation  requiring  Miranda warnings  by law enforcement officers before statements elicited from a defendant may be used against him. In State v. McLean, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that, under the facts of that case, confronting a defendant with evidence against him does not constitute  interrogation.  Therefore, statements made by the defendant properly were admitted against him even though he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda

Spivey, William M.

English

oai:scholarship.law.campbell.edu:clr-1008Hundreds of cases have grappled with the application of the United States Supreme Court\u27s decision in Miranda v. Arizona. Many of those cases have dealt with the question of what constitutes  custodial interrogation  requiring  Miranda warnings  by law enforcement officers before statements elicited from a defendant may be used against him. In State v. McLean, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that, under the facts of that case, confronting a defendant with evidence against him does not constitute  interrogation.  Therefore, statements made by the defendant properly were admitted against him even though he had not been advised of his rights under Miranda

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Campbell Law ReviewVolume 1Issue 1 1979 Article 9February 2012Constitutional Law - Confronting Accused withEvidence Against Him as "Interrogation" Within theMeaning of MirandaWilliam M. SpiveyFollow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clrThis Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusionin Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.Recommended CitationWilliam M. Spivey, Constitutional Law - Confronting Accused with Evidence Against Him as "Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda,1 Campbell L. Rev. 173 (1979).CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONFRONTING ACCUSED WITHEVIDENCE AGAINST HIM AS "INTERROGATION" WITHINTHE MEANING OF MIRANDA-State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623,242 S.E.2d 814 (1978).Miranda Gets the Silent TreatmentINTRODUCTIONHundreds of cases have grappled with the application of theUnited States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona. IMany of those cases have dealt with the question of what constitutes"custodial interrogation" requiring "Miranda warnings" by law en-forcement officers before statements elicited from a defendant maybe used against him.'In State v. McLean,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court heldthat, under the facts of that case, confronting a defendant withevidence against him does not constitute "interrogation." There-fore, statements made by the defendant properly were admittedagainst him even though he had not been advised of his rights underMiranda.THE CASEThe State tried and convicted the defendant on an indictmentcharging him with second degree rape. The rape occurred in a park-ing lot behind an apartment building. A few hours after the rape, afriend of the victim found a driver's license, a checkbook bearing thename "Robert McLean, Jr." and a cap in the parking lot. Theseitems were turned over to the police when the rape was reported.A warrant for the defendant's arrest on the rape charge wasobtained on May 10, 1977. Sometime prior to May 13, 1977, thedefendant was arrested and placed in jail on an entirely unrelatedcharge. The subsequent events were reported by the court as fol-lows:At about 7:55 a.m. on 13 May, Detective Holder went to the jail.He had in his pocket at the time the arrest warrant charging defen-1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).2. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a rightto remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence againsthim, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained orappointed." Id. at 444.3. 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978).1Spivey: Constitutional Law - Confronting Accused with Evidence Against HiPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [dant with rape. Officer Holder walked into the room carrying inhis hand a work pad and a check which was found at the scene ofthe rape in the rear parking lot of 1832 Wilshire Avenue. He alsohad the cap found at the scene. The check had the name "RobertMcLean, Jr." on it and was on top of the work pad in plain view.Officer Holder did not speak. He -placed his work pad and thecheck on top of a desk in plain view of defendant but said nothing.Defendant reached over, looked at the check, took hold of it andsaid, "This is my check. I wrote this check when I did not knowhow to write checks. However, the check is good." Officer Holdersaid nothing. When defendant observed the cap he looked at Offi-cer Holder, began to act nervous, his hand began to quiver, andhe said "What's that man?" Officer Holder said nothing. A fewseconds passed and the officer lit a cigarette. Defendant asked fora cigarette and the officer gave him one. In the words of OfficerHolder: "Few more seconds passed as we were smoking the ciga-rettes and before I started to leave the room he stated 'I liked tohave been a free man.'" Shortly thereafter, at 8:15 a.m., OfficerHolder read the warrant charging defendant with rape and adviseddefendant of his constitutional rights. Defendant refused to sign awaiver. No interrogation thereafter took place.'At trial the defendant challenged the competency of OfficerHolder's testimony as to the defendant's statements. The trial judgefound that defendant's statements were voluntary and not in re-sponse to any in-custody interrogation. The statements were admit-ted in evidence.BACKGROUNDMiranda v. Arizona5 held that: "The prosecution may not usestatements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming fromcustodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates theuse of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege againstself-incrimination." ' The court set forth with particularity thewarnings which the defendant must be given before interrogationmay take place if any statements elicited are to be admissible attrial.7The rationale of Miranda was that the Fifth Amendment prohi-bition against compelling the accused to incriminate himself ex-tended to an accused who was in custody. Since custodial surround-4. Id. at 626, 242 S.E.2d at 816.5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).6. Id. at 444.7. Supra note 2.[Vol. 1:1732Campbell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 9http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol1/iss1/9SILENT INTERROGATIONings are inherently compulsory, adequate procedural safeguards arenecessary to insure that any statement made by an accused is trulythe product of his free will rather than the inherently compellingatmosphere of police custody.8Only statements elicited by interrogation from a defendant whois in custody must be preceded by-warnings designed to inform theaccused of his rights.' Voluntary statements by an accused remainadmissible under Miranda. Miranda designated "custody" as thepoint at which the privilege against self-incrimination begins tooperate" and "interrogation" as the conduct which is prohibitedunless the required warnings are given.Miranda did not provide a clear definition of what constitutes"interrogation" for purposes of applying the warnings required. Atone point the court said, "By custodial interrogation, we meanquestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person hasbeen taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom ofaction in any significant way."" The court then proceeded to dis-cuss at length the psychological techniques of interrogation. 2 Theopinion is unclear as to what conduct other than questioning mightbe considered "interrogation." State courts are divided on whatconduct other than questioning constitutes "interrogation."'"ANALYSISThe North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. McLean 4elected to decide what constitutes "interrogation" for Miranda pur-8. The court said that procedural safeguards are necessary to dispel the com-pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings in order for a statement obtained froma defendant to be truly the product of his free choice. 384 U.S. at 458. However, itis clear from a reading of the decision as a whole that the fact of custody alone isnot sufficient to render otherwise voluntary statements involuntary. Some type ofinterrogation must also take place. There is not a right to Miranda warnings merelybecause the defendant is in custody.9. What constitutes "custody" for purposes of Miranda has been the issue inmany cases. The question is beyond the scope of this note. The cases on the pointare collected in Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).10. 384 U.S. at 478.11. Id. at 444 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).12. Id. at 448-58. It would appear that the court did not intend to confine"interrogation" to verbal questioning in light of its concern with the psychologicaltechniques used in modem police investigation. The court has subsequently heldthat a declaratory statement by a police officer to a defendant constituted interro-gation. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 424 (1977).13. The McLean decision cites several examples. 294 N.C. at 629, 242 S.E.2dat 818.14. 294 N.C. 623, 242 S.E.2d 814 (1978).1979]3Spivey: Constitutional Law - Confronting Accused with Evidence Against HiPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979CAMPBELL LAW REVIEWposes on a case by case basis, rather than by adopting any particulardefinition or test.15 The court offered no explanation of its conclu-sion that the officer's acts did not constitute interrogation statingthat "[the officer] did not ask questions or engage in conductwhich, in our view, is inquisitional in nature."" The court refusedto give any insight as to what factors it would consider in determin-ing what conduct would constitute interrogation.A policy of post hoc determinations and no announced criteriaby which such determinations will be made certainly provides thecourt with ample flexibility in formulating its standards. This sameflexibility, however, presents the North Carolina bench and barwith certain difficulties in determining at what point confrontingthe defendant becomes inquisitional in nature so as to mandate theMiranda warnings. The court made clear that future cases mayinvolve conduct which will constitute "interrogation" even thoughno questions are asked.The McLean decision may be analyzed with reference to threeelements involved in confronting a defendant with evidence: (1) thelength of time during which the confrontation takes place; (2) thecausal connection between the confrontation and any statementselicited; (3) the intent of the law enforcement officer in causing theconfrontation.The confrontation in McLean took place over a period of ap-proximately twenty minutes: If "interrogation" occurs withoutMiranda warnings, then its duration is irrelevant since any state-ment elicited would be inadmissible. Thus, the question is whetherthe length of time during which the confrontation takes place hasany bearing on whether such conduct constitutes interrogation. Cer-tainly if a defendant were repeatedly confronted with incriminatingevidence over a prolonged period of time, this should be a factor tobe considered to determine if interrogation has occurred. The lengthof the confrontation should also shed some light on the intent of thepolice officer in staging the confrontation. However, the court didnot discuss that issue, and the facts make it clear that the policeofficer had more than ample time to serve the warrant if that werehis only intent." Thus, while the length of time may become a factorin future cases, apparently it was not a factor in the McLean case.15. Id. at 629, 242 S.E.2d at 818.16. Id.17. Id. at 630, 242 S.E.2d at 818.18. The officer in McLean asserted that his intent was to ascertain the trueidentity of the defendant. Record at 7, 40, State v. McLean, 294 N.C. 623, 242S.E.2d 814 (1978).[Vol. 1:1734Campbell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 9http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol1/iss1/9SILENT INTERROGATIONThe existence of a causal connection between the police officer'sconduct and the defendant's statements is not the sole factor -indetermining whether interrogation has occurred. If the defendant inMcLean had not been confronted with the evidence against him, hewould not have made a statement. The defendant made his state-ments in direct response to the evidence placed in front of him.When the defendant was advised of his rights, he refused to waivethem and made no further statement.If one looks to the facts of this case to determine the policeofficer's intent in staging the confrontation, clearly his intent wasto elicit a statement from the defendant.19 The officer had the war-rant for defendant's arrest in his pocket when he went to the jail.He went to the jail for the purpose of seeing the defendant. Heplaced the evidence in plain view of the defendant and never spokea word in response to defendant's questions. Thus, apparently thecourt did not feel that the intent of the officer to elicit informationwas a determining factor.Since none of the factors discussed above constitutes a deter-mining factor in deciding what constitutes interrogation, and thecourt does not discuss the reasons why it held the officer's conductnot to be inquisitional in nature, the case provides no guidelines asto what will be treated as interrogation in future cases.The dissent 0 takes the view that the officer's conduct was in-tended to elicit an incriminating statement and placed the accusedunder a compulsion to speak, thus constituting interrogation. Thedissent further noted that the practical effect of the majority opin-ion would be to encourage the police to devise ways to evade therequirements of Miranda .2 1CONCLUSIONThe supreme court's decision in McLean is inconsistent withthe clear intent of the Miranda decision to protect the privilegeagainst self-incrimination against the inherently compelling atmos-phere of custodial surroundings. McLean encourages law enforce-ment officers to devise means of indirectly interrogating defendantswithout advising them of their constitutional rights. The case offers19. Even if the officer's assertion that his purpose was to ascertain the identityof the defendant is true, id., supra note 18, his effort was still an attempt to elicitincriminating information since the items he used were the same items whichtended to connect the defendant with the crime scene.20. 294 N.C. at 635, 242 S.E.2d at 821.21. Id. at 636, 242 S.E.2d at 822.1979]5Spivey: Constitutional Law - Confronting Accused with Evidence Against HiPublished by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979178 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:173little guidance to lawyers and judges for the decision of future cases.The dissent takes the better view that if the purpose is to elicitinformation, no matter what form it takes, then the defendant mustbe given Miranda warnings if his statements are to be admitted attrial.William M. Spivey6Campbell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 9http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol1/iss1/9

Constitutional Law - Confronting Accused with Evidence Against Him as  Interrogation  Within the Meaning of Miranda

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Constitutional Law - Confronting Accused with Evidence Against Him as Interrogation Within the Meaning of Miranda

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