University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Abstract
In earlier work, I explored the role of fiduciary duties in the bankruptcy trustee\u27s administration of a debtor\u27s estate, noting the absence of any explicit demarcation of those duties in the Bankruptcy Code. In this piece, I report the highlights of that analysis and see to what extent (if any) fiduciary duties can inform policy prescriptions for the issue of bankruptcy claims trading, colorfully referred to by some as the world of bankruptcy M&A. My initial take is pessimistic. Fiduciary duties, at least as traditionally conceived in bankruptcy, are unlikely to provide much help. But there is still a source of optimism. Namely, the structural and procedural institutions of the Bankruptcy Code and court system may, through a transparent, court-supervised litigation process, achieve many of the same conflict-checking functions with which fiduciary duty law concerns itself
