This article is part of the District of Columbia Survey

Ward, William

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The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law

Catholic University Law Review Volume 30 Issue 4 Summer 1981 Article 14 1981 Criminal Law William Ward Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview Recommended Citation William Ward, Criminal Law, 30 Cath. U. L. Rev. 731 (1981). Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/14 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. CRIMINAL LAWI. INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTERIn Faunteroy v. United States,' the District of Columbia Court of Ap-peals held that a jury instruction containing an improper definition of thestandard of negligence, necessary to sustain an involuntary manslaughterconviction, was not prejudicial error where the record reflected that thedefendants were, in fact, guilty of culpable negligence.2After it was established that their child's death was caused by pneumo-nia and malnutrition, the defendants were convicted of involuntary man-slaughter. The jury was instructed that the proper standard of negligencerequired to sustain a conviction of negligence was "culpable negligence."However, the judge instructed in terms amounting only to simple or civilnegligence. Although the judge's instruction was incorrect, the recordshowed that the defendants were guilty of reckless omission in not suffi-ciently caring for their child.3 Since the test for culpable negligence, ofwhich the defendants were guilty, is more strict than for simple negli-gence,4 the court held that the improper jury instructions were not prejudi-cial error. By specifying malnutrition and pneumonia as examples ofunreasonable care by the parents, the court clarified the type of conductthat would sustain a conviction of involuntary manslaughter under theBradford test.5II. CRIMINAL COMMITMENTIn Jones v. United States,6 the District of Columbia Court of Appealsheld that an individual committed to a mental institution for a crime mustbe released after being held for a time equal to the maximum possible termfor which he could have been incarcerated. The defendant had beenfound not guilty of petit larceny by reason of insanity. Thereafter, pursu-ant to section 24-301(d) of the D.C. Code,8 a "release hearing" was held1. 413 A.2d 1294 (D.C. 1980).2. Id at 1299.3. Id See United States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208 (D.C. 1975).4. 413 A.2d at 1299.5. Id See 344 A.2d at 215-16.6. 411 A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980).7. Id at 630. See United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973).8. D.C. CODE § 24-301(d) (1973).Catholic University Law Reviewand Jones was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital indefinitely. Thecourt followed United States v. Brown 9 and agreed that there was no basisfor confining an acquitee under section 24-301(d) beyond the length of thehypothetical prison term, since that term marked the end of society's claimto punishment of that individual. A longer confinement term would haveto be preceded by a de novo civil commitment procedure.'°III. SENTENCINGIn Christopher v. United States," the District of Columbia Court of Ap-peals declared that the substitution of a greater sentence for an illegallesser sentence is not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause of the fed-eral constitution. Petitioner appealed the trial court's imposition of agreater sentence by sua sponte correction of an illegal earlier sentence thatpetitioner had already begun to serve.The court stated that the constitution allows a court to mitigate a sen-tence but not increase punishment. 2 However, an established exception tothe rule has arisen where the original sentence was illegal, because an ille-gal sentence is a nullity. 3 Hence, a longer term of imprisonment uponresentencing is not a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the federalconstitution. 14In Jones v. United States,'5 the District of Columbia Court of Appealsupheld the use of a defendant's one prior felony conviction for the purposeof enhancing both his sentence for robbery and his sentence for carrying apistol without a license. The defendant's conviction for armed robberywas disclosed to the court before his arraignment on charges of armed rob-bery and carrying a pistol without a license. The defendant entered pleasof guilty to both charges. Henson v. United States,'6 a District of Columbiacase decided the day after Jones entered his guilty pleas, held that in the9. 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973).10. 411 A.2d at 630. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510-11 (1972); Baxstrom v.Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110-11 (1966); United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d at 611-12.11. 415 A.2d 803 (D.C. 1980).12. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); accord, Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18Wall.) 163, 175 (1873).13. See, e.g., Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947); Burns v. UnitedStates, 552 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1977); James v. United States, 348 F.2d 430, 432-33 (10thCir. 1965).14. See Bums v. United States, 552 F.2d at 831; James v. United States, 348 F.2d at432-33; Hayes v. United States, 249 F.2d 516, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1957).15. 416 A.2d 1236 (D.C. 1980).16. 399 A.2d 16 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 848 (1979).[Vol. 30:731Criminal Lawsame proceeding a single prior felony conviction could not be used both totransform a violation into a felony offense and serve as one of the twoprior felonies required to impose a greater sentence. In the present case,Jones' prior felony conviction was used first to expose him to the expressprovisions for recidivism in the District of Columbia Code,' 7 which pro-vide that if the violation of the Code occurs after conviction of a felony,"he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years. '"18The second use of the prior felony conviction-to enhance the maximumsentence for the robbery-was permitted by the provisions of section 22-104 of the District of Columbia Code 9 and by case law interpreting con-gressional intent concerning recidivism.20 As distinguished from Henson,Jones' prior felony conviction was not used both to convert his pistol-car-rying offense into a felony and serve as one of the two prior felony convic-tions necessary for enhanced sentencing. The court found that such"bootstrapping," prohibited by Henson, was not present in Jones.In Daniel v. United States,2' the District of Columbia Court of Appealsemployed a "rational basis" test and upheld the constitutionality of section23-1328 of the District of Columbia Code,22 which imposes a harsher sen-tence on defendants who commit crimes while released on bail pendingtrial. The defendant was charged with three misdemeanors and releasedon bond pursuant to section 23-1328 of the District of Columbia Code.23While out on bond, he was arrested on felony charges and notified that hewould be subject to additional penalties under the release offender stat-ute.24Historically, courts have employed the less rigorous rational basis test toexamine such statutory sentencing classifications as section 23-1328.25 Asthe legislative history of the section reveals, Congress was concerned aboutthe large number of crimes committed by people on pretrial release. The17. D.C. CODE § 22-3204 (1973).18. Id19. D.C. CODE § 22-104 (1973).20. 416 A.2d at 1238; Smith v. United States, 304 A.2d 28 (D.C.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.1114 (1973).21. 408 A.2d 1231 (D.C. 1980).22. D.C. CODE § 23-1328 (1973).23. Id24. D.C. CODE § 23-1321 (1973).25. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S.263 (1973); United States v. Thomas, 485 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1973).1981]Catholic University Law ReviewDaniel court therefore held that Congress's attempt to deter "bail recidi-vism" was a permissible governmental objective on which to base thecriminal sanctions of section 23-1328.26William Ward26. 408 A.2d at 1233.[Vol. 30:731

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