Stoll, Richard C.

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University of Kentucky

Kentucky Law JournalVolume 21 | Issue 1 Article 51932Does a Lien Exist on a Motor Vehicle for Oil andGas Furnished for Its Transportation?Richard C. StollFayette Circuit CourtFollow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/kljPart of the Property Law and Real Estate CommonsRight click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefitsyou.This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal byan authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.Recommended CitationStoll, Richard C. (1932) "Does a Lien Exist on a Motor Vehicle for Oil and Gas Furnished for Its Transportation?," Kentucky LawJournal: Vol. 21 : Iss. 1 , Article 5.Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol21/iss1/5NOTESDOES A LIEN EXIST ON A MOTOR VEHICLE FOR OILAND GAS FURNISHED FOR ITSTRANSPORTATION ?*FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURTESTER BELLE BROWN, &c., - - - - Plaintiffs,vs.--OPiNIoN OF THE COURTMR~S. H. H1. (MARGARET C.) WILSON, - - Defendant.The question herein submitted for decision is whether theplaintiff has a lien upon the automobile of the defendant for oiland gas furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant and used mthe operation of the automobile.In the case of Doll v Young, 149 Ky 34, the Court, in dis-cussing statutory lines, said."The security afforded to mechanics and material men by the stat-utes of the several states of the union has no recognition in the com-mon law, but rests and must find support in the statute creating thelien or security. The language of each particular statute thereforemust govern its interpretation without much aid from the judicialdeclarations from other jurisdictions."If I understand the language correctly, it means that eachstatute giving a lien to mechanics and material men must be con-strued according to the language of the statute, and tins rule ofconstruction is, of course, applicable to all other statutory liens.Section 3463, of the Kentucky Statutes, gives a lien to onewho performs labor and furnishes material in the erection, alter-lig or repairing of a house, building or other structure, or forany fixture or machinery therein, or for the erection of cellars,cisterns, vaults, wells or for the improvement in any manner of* An opinion by Judge R. C. Stoll, formerly Judge Fayette Cir-cuit Court. This is the third in a series of opinions by Judge Stoll. Inmany instances they discuss the constitutionality of statutes and ques-tions of law not as yet passed upon by the Court of Appeals of Ken-tucky.DOES A LIE EiS T ON A MOTOR VEICLEreal estate under certain conditions. This statute clearly meansthat the labor or material must actually go into the improvementof the realty, so in the case of Avery v. Woodruff, 144 Ky 227,the Court held that a material man had a lien for lumber out ofwlnch the concrete forms were made for the creation of a con-crete building, the Court saying-"In the case at bar the material furnished by the appellant wasraw lumber to be used in the erection of the concrete building, and itwas contemplated by the parties at the time it was furnished that itwould be totally used up in making forms in the erection of Avery &Sons' plant. If the lumber had been furnished to make a scaffold, moldsor forms with the intention of using them in the erection of thatbuilding and then carry them away and use them in constructing otherbuildings, then no lien would attach, as they would be regarded as apart of the appliances of the workman and would occupy the sameplace as a hammer, saw, or other tool used by the workman for wnchno lien is allowed by the statute."On the other hand in the case of BsckeZ v. National SuretyCompany, 156 Ky 695, the court held that the owner of anengine who rents it to a sewer contractor to use in the construc-tion of a sewer has no mechanic's lien for the rent of the engine,although used m the construction of the sewer.Section 2462, of the Kentucky Statutes, gives a lien on rail-roads to all persons who furnish labor, material, supplies orteams for the construction or vmprovement of a canal, railroador turnpike, and therefore the Court held, in the case of Carson& Co. v Shelton, Etc., 128 Ky 248, that a storekeeper who fur-nished supplies to hands who were working on a railroad was notentitled to a lien for supplies so furnished because they were notfurnished for the construction or improvement of the road.It will be noticed that Sections 2463 and 2492 of the Ken-tacky Statutes, as construed by the Court of Appeals, requireby express language that the material or supplies should actuallygo into the construction or inprovement of the propertyThe Automobile Statute, however, differs materially inlanguage from the two statutes above referred to, in that itnowhere contains any express language requiring the accessoriesor supplies to go into the improvement of the car. This statuteis in part as follows. (2739h-1.)"All persons, individuals or corporations in conducting the busi-ness of selling, repairing, furnishing accessories or supplies for motorvehicles shall have a lien on such motor vehicle for the reasonable oragreed charges for repairs, work done, accessories or supplies furnishedfor or on machines, and for storing or keeping said machine, and suchKENTucKY LAW JouRNALpersons, individuals or corporations may detain all motor vehicles intheir possession on which work has been done by them until the rea-sonable or agreed charges therefor have been paid."The question then to be deternnned is whether the suppliesfor motor vehicles must actually go into the improvement orrepair of a motor vehicle, or whether it includes gasoline and oil,which are necessary for its operation. It must be rememberedthat Courts do not concern themselves with the wisdom of anAct, that is for other branches of government. It is the dutyof the judiciary only to interpret an act, and in so construing itthe Courts seek to arrive at the legislative intention. Unlessprohibited by the constitution the Legislature may pass any actit desires, and, this being the function of the legislative branchof the government, it is the duty of the Executive to approve ordisprove the Act, or to permit it to become a law without hisapproval.It must be presumed that the legislative branch of the gov-ernment has knowledge of the statutes of Kentucky as well asthe interpretation placed on such statutes by the Courts; and mSections 2463 and 2492 the Legislature, by the language in thestatute itself, provided that the material and supplies should gointo the improvement or repair of the property, and the courts,following the language of the Legislature, so construed the stat-utes.In the Motor Vehicle Statute, there is no such expressedprovision, and so in order to arrive at the intention of the Legis-lature, we must consider why the Legislature used differentlanguage in the Motor Vehicle Statute than it used in the otherstatutes above referred to, and to ascertain, if possible, the sig-nificance of this fact. If the Legislature meant that the suppliesmust go into the repair and improvement of an automobile, weare naturally compelled to inquire why the Legislature, havingknowledge of the former statutes and the interpretation placedon them by the Courts, did not so expressly provide, and whyit did not use language identical or similar to that used i theformer statutes. By using different language did the Legisla-ture not mean something different IOn the other hand, under Section 2487 of the KentuckyStatutes, when a railroad, manufacturing plant or other enter-prise, as set out in the Statute, becomes insolvent and is in theDO S A LiEN EXIST ON A MOTOR VEHICLhands of a trustee, etc., for the benefit of creditors, the employeesbave a lien on the property "and the persons who shall havefurnished materials or supplies for carrying on or operating anyrailroad shall likewise have a lien" on the property Thislanguage has also been construed by the Court of Appeals, andthe language of the statute, as well as the construction placed onit by the Court of Appeals, are presumed to be known to theLegislature.In the Mot6r Vehicles Law it is not provided that a lienshall exist for supplies used in carrying on or operating thevehicle, and, therefore, the question naturally arises that, if theLegislature meant to give a lien for supplies used in the mereoperation of a motor vehicle, why did it not say so, as it did inthe statute last quoted? It will then be seen that the Legisla-ture, knowing the language used in the previous laws enactedby it, and knowing the interpretation placed on these laws bythe Courts, failed to use the language used in either of the abovementioned statutes, so in accordance with the principles laiddown in the case of Doll v. Young, supra, the Motor Vehicle.Statute must be construed in accordance with the language usedin it. The other statutes and the decisions of the Court ofAppeals construing them are of very little assistance in con-strumng the statute in question. The statute gives a lien to per-sons conducting the business of selling, repairing, furnishingaccessories or supplies for motor vehicles for the reasonable oragreed charges for repairs, work done, accessories or suppliesfurnished for or on machines, and for storing and keeping saidmachines.An automobile accessory, as I understand the term, meanssomething that is added to the automobile, such as a spot-light,a clock, a speedometer, a bumper, a shock absorber, or suchsimilar device not always necessary perhaps to its actual opera-tion, but something which increases the utility of the vehicle asoriginally manufactured, and which renders its operation morecomfortable, more safe or more convement. A bolt used inrepairing an automobile is not an accessory, neither is a newpiston rod which is placed in the engine of the machine to takethe place of an old one. Such things are merely supplies usedfor the purpose of repairing the automobile. Upholstering andKENTUCKY LAW JouiNALthe curled hair padding used in such work and covered byleather or cloth would also come under the head of supplies.In arriving at the proper construction of the language oftins statute, let us leave out, for the moment, the word acces-sories, for I have already determined the proper definition ofthis word. The statute would then read that the lien is givenfor repairs, work done and supplies for or on the machine. Whatsupplies ' Manifestly, supplies necessary for repairing or fordoing work on the machine. I am strengthened in this belief bythe further provisions of the Statute, wnch, when read as awhole, indicates unmistakably that the lien given is for work doneon a motor vehicle, for accessories furnished for a motor vehicle,for repairs done on and for the supplies used in making repairson or for an automobile and that the word supplies, as used mthe statute, does not include oil or gasoline used in the operationof a motor vehicle. Surely the Legislature did not mean, whenit passed this Act, that the Standard Oil Company, or the IndianRefining Company, or any other corporation who furnishes aperson at his home or place of business oil or gasoline to operatea motor vehicle should be given a lien on the car, nor did itintend that the various gasoline filling stations should have a lienon every car to which it furnishes gasoline or oil. Such a resultwould, in my opinion, place a construction on the statute thatwas never intended by the Legislature. In construing a statuteit is always proper to consider the history of the time and ascer-tain the evil which the acts was designed to prevent. It is amatter of common knowledge that, prior to the enactment of thisstatute, many owners of automobiles frequently placed theircars in a garage for storage, or for the purpose of having themrepaired, or to have new accessories placed upon them, and thenwould drive away without paying the bill which had been incur-red, leaving the garage-men to the unsatisfactory and inadequateremedy of an ordinary suit at law. A careful reading of thisAct as a whole leads to the conclusion that the motor vehicleupon which the lien is given must be in the custody of the per-son in whose favor it accrues. If this were not so the Act wouldnot provide as it clearly does, that the lien shall not be lost bythe removal of such motor vehicle from the garage, shop, orpremises of the person, individual or corporation performinglabor, repairing, furnishing accessories or supplies therefor.DOES A LIEN EXIST ON A MOTOR VEICLENothing can be removed until it has theretofore been at or in theplace from which it is taken. Generally, it is evident that thestatute contemplates such .accessories and supplies as. areordinarily put on or furnished under circumstances winchrequire the automobile to be placed in the custody of the personperforming the work, and it is a fact, known generally, that oiland gas are such commodities as may be furnished to an auto-mobile owner without the machine ever being in the garage orplace which sells these commodities. If the term supplies, asused in this statute, means gasoline or oil, then certainly everyperson furnishing them is entitled to a lien, and yet many per-sons have gasoline and oil delivered to their own premises by oilcompames, and the motor vehicle in which they are used is neverin the custody of the person or company dealing in these com-modities. If these things are supplies within the meaning ofthis Act, then the Company that delivers a can of oil at the homeof the 'automobile owner has a lien upon the car in which it isused, just the same as if the oil had been delivered to the eardirectly from the tank in front of the garage or from a receptacleinside the garage, and this I do not believe that the Legislatureever intended to do.I am, therefore, of the opinion that under Chapter 75, ofthe Acts of 1918, which is Section 2739h-1 of the Kentucky Stat-utes, no lien exists on a motor vehicle for oil or gasoline furnishedfor the purpose of its operation.I am of the opinion that the demurrer to the petition shouldbe overruled, for it states a cause of action for a debt, butinasmuch as the exhibit controls the petition, the petition shouldbe so reformed as to set out the amount claimed to be due foroil and gasoline used in the operation of the car separately fromthe other items for which the plaintiff has a lien, and then theCourt will strike all portions of the petition which claim a lienfor oil and gasoline furnished for the operation of the car.The motion to paragraph the answer should be sustained,and I will not rule on the motions of the plaintiff until the peti-tion is properly paragraphed.R. C. STOLL, Judge.

Does a Lien Exist on a Motor Vehicle for Oil and Gas Furnished for Its Transportation?

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Does a Lien Exist on a Motor Vehicle for Oil and Gas Furnished for Its Transportation?

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