Bristow, Allen P.

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Journal of Criminal Law and CriminologyVolume 54Issue 1 March Article 9Spring 1963Police Officer Shootings--A Tactical EvaluationAllen P. BristowFollow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclcPart of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and CriminalJustice CommonsThis Criminology is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.Recommended CitationAllen P. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings--A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 93 (1963)POLICE SCIENCEPOLICE OFFICER SHOOTINGS-A TACTICAL EVALUATIONALLEN P. BRISTOWThe author is an Assistant Professor of Police Science at Los Angeles State College, Los Angeles,California. Professor Bristow supervised the collection of material by students on police officershootings and has prepared a series of studies of which this article is one. He is a former memberof the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department, holds a Master of Science degree in Public Ad-ministration from the University of Southern California and is an active member of several pro-fessional organizations including the American Society for Criminology.-EDIrO.Beginning in 1959 students in Police Patrolclasses at Los Angeles State College began tocollect detailed case studies of police officers whohad been shot (injury or fatality). No attempt wasmade to obtain a random selection of these cases,as they were extremely hard to collect. When thelocal cases, which were easily obtained by personalinterview, were exhausted, it became necessary toproceed by correspondence on a nationwide basis.In the spring of 1961, it was decided to dis-continue the collection of these cases and evaluatethose already on hand. By elimination of severalnon-applicable cases, a group of 110 incidents in-volving 150 officers was selected for study. Theresults *must be viewed with the considerationthat this is a pilot study, based on a small groupof cases.The preliminary report on the study was re-leased in the Fall of 1961.1 The material containedin this second report is a result of a study in depthof those cases primarily relating to officers whowere shot while dealing with suspects who wereeither in automobiles or buildings.An attempt was made to determine if othersuch studies had ever been attempted, and onlytwo could be identified. Kirkwood, at the PublicAdministration Institute, has completed a projectwhich deals primarily with the fatality rates be-tween one and two-man cars.The Federal Bureau of Investigation wasqueried by the writer, and, as nearly as can bedetermined from that correspondence, they haveno continuing program devoted to the analysis ofofficer shootings. This agency analyzed 28 cases1The preliminary report of this study appeared inthis Journal, Vol. 52, No. 4, pages 472-4, November-December 1961.which occurred in 1960.2 While this study appearsto go more deeply into the history of the suspectthan the tactical considerations in the shooting,much of the data verifies the results presented bythis writer.Companion studies, other than the two men-tioned are apparently non-existant, and the writerfeels that this is the first serious examination ofthe problem using analysis of case studies.SUSPECTS IN VEmCLESAfter careful analysis, 32% of the 110 cases (or35 cases) could be identified as occurring when theofficers were attempting to investigate, control, orpursue suspects who were in automobiles. Thesecases were separated and analyzed to determinewhat similarities or tactical circumstances oc-curred frequently enough to be significant. Theapproximate percentages discussed below arebased on the above 35 cases.Circumstances of Shooting. In 7% of the casesthe officers were involved in vehicle pursuit, andwere shot through the windshield or car bodywhile their vehicle was moving. After stopping apursued or violators vehicle, it was found that in28% of the cases the officers were shot while stillsitting in their patrol cars, prior to dismounting.In 22 % of these cases the officer was shot whiledismounting from his vehicle or while approachingthe suspects vehicle, up to and including the firstcontact. The most significant and striking statistichowever, is that in 43% of the cases the officerswere shot after the initial contact while inter-rogating, citing, or requesting a radio record checkon the suspect.2 This data is reported in the FBI LAw ENFORCEmENTBUrrxrTr of November 1961.ALLEN P. BRISTOWThese statistics, if valid, debunk the old policesaying that the most dangerous thing a patrolmandoes is to "walk up" on a vehicle he has stopped.According to this data, his most dangerous periodis after the initial contact. A great deal of policetraining material has been developed on the"approach" phase of this problem; perhaps someattention should be devoted to the subject ofoccupant control, after the approach.Location of Suspect. The location and activitiesof the suspects in 28 of the 35 cases were verified,and the below figures indicate approximate per-centages of these 28 cases. The suspect who shotthe officers was seated behind the wheel of hisown vehicle in 43 % of these cases. In 32 % of thecases, the suspect was outside his car, talking to orbeing searched by the officer.It was unusual to note that in 6% of the cases,the suspect who shot the officer was concealedsomewhere in the vehicle. It should also be notedthat the officers were shot while pursuing thesuspects on foot as they fled from their car in 7%of the cases. In 7 % of the cases, the suspect leapedfrom his car and shot the officer while he was stilldismounting from the vehicle.Indicated hazard areas. From this examination ofthe location and/or activities of the officers andsuspects it is possible to determine the point ofgreatest exposure hazard. The validity and re-liability of such a determination is easily chal-lenged on the size of the sample (35 cases). How-ever, in the absence of any other comparitativestudies, such an attempt will be made.On the basis of these statistics then, it may besaid that the greatest hazard to an officer occursafter his approach, while he is involved in: (1) is-suing a citation, (2) interrogation, or (3) using hisradio. It may also be said that there is a verygood possibility the suspect will be behind thewheel or standing outside the car; the chancesslightly favoring the former.Once this hazard area was identified, the caseswherein these situations occurred were restudiedin an attempt to determine if any of the circum-stances indicated similarities. One circumstancepermeated these cases: the officer-suspect contactswere almost entirely of a traffic violation or fieldinterrogation nature. The cases Y'herein theofficers knew or had reason to believe that theywere handling felony suspects were rare.Having identified the hazardous area and thehazardous circumstances, an attempt was madeto determine what prevention training has beendeveloped. The training manuals or publicationsof eleven major police agencies were examined, andit was found that while extensive space was de-voted to methods of approach, removal of suspectsfrom cars, and search or handcuffing procedures,little or no space was devoted to the control ofdrivers or occupants in citation or interrogationsituations.Indicated Research. The results of this portionof the study then, if valid and reliable, indicatethat safety procedures should be developed inthese hazard areas. Methods of controlling orisolating drivers or occupants during citations orinterrogations must be developed; methods whichwill not offend the innocent motorist yet which willprotect the officer.SuspEcrs iN BumDiNGsIt was established that 51% of the 110 casesoccurred when the officers were attempting toarrest or interrogate persons in buildings. Thesecases range in extremes from officers attemptingto interview the parents of a juvenile delinquentto officers in combat with barricaded suspects.For this reason analysis by circumstances wasmore difficult than in the cases involving auto-mobiles. The percentages discussed in this sectionrelate to these 51% of the 110 cases, or 56 casesin all.Circumstances of the Shootings. One of the out-standing and unbelievable circumstances that wasrevealed is that in approximately three-fourths ofthe cases (71%) the officers knew or had goodreason to believe that the suspects were armed.In approximately 41% of the cases the officerswere confronted with a barricaded and armedsuspect. In 11% of these cases the officers re-quested tear gas and special weapons and wereshot while using them. as they rushed the suspect.But, in the other ,30% of these cases the officerswere shot when they rushed the suspects withoutuse of special weapons or tear gas.In some cases, only one circumstance could beidentified, and in others several distinct circum-stances were combined in the shooting of theofficer. For this reason the percentages discussedwill total over 100%.Another identifiable circumstance involvesofficers who were too close together during anincident. In approximately 23% of the cases twoofficers were shot, where only one might have[Vol. 54POLICE OFFICER SHOOTINGSbeen, because they were too close together duringa room or building entry, or when interrogating asuspect. As one reads the cases the thought occursthat in some of these instances the suspect mightnot have opened fire if he had not felt that bothofficers could have been shot at once. Many ofthese cases occurred while officers were rushingbarricaded suspects.Failure to search the suspects or rooms properlywas identified as a circumstance in approximately19% of these cases. This is unusual as training insuch procedures is common on most police agencies.A number of the cases involved officers who wereentering buildings or rooms in other than "com-bat" conditions; for answering disturbance calls,making routine arrests, etc. It was interesting tonote that in 10% of the 51 cases, the officers wereshot through doors on which they were knocking.A review of these cases indicates that almost allof the officers were shot through doors while theywere involved in routine police business.The last circumstance which was identifiableas being significant; involved the honoring ofhostages. In approximately 9% of these cases theofficers were shot after the suspect had used ahostage to gain a position of advantage. Thisposition of advantage ranged from the officerthrowing down his weapon on one extreme torefusing to return the suspects fire on the otherextreme.Indicated hazard areas. The greatest hazard areaindicated in this portion of the study was therushing of barricaded suspects by officers. Thestatistics point up that far fewer officers wereshot in cases where chemical agents or specialweapons were used than in cases where the suspectwas rushed without such special equipment. Thiscomparison is somewhat dangerous because of thesmall number of cases evaluated.One unusual circumstance, however, becomesevident when the cases are read which involverushing without special equipment. In almostevery one of these cases the officers had accessto such equipment, had contained the suspects,and could have waited for the equipment to ar-rive before rushing the building.The other hazard areas are self evident andcould probably be alleviated by training or thedevelopment of procedural orders.Indicated research areas. The above mentionedproblem area involving use of special equipmentseems to the writer to be a proper and interestingarea for research. Why do officers fail to use suchsafety equipment, when they will use seat beltsand crash helmets? Is it because they lack trainingor confidence in such equipment, because theirsupervisors discourage its use, because they havea "hero complex", or does some other reasonexist?CONCLUSIONSThis article has discussed 83% of the 110 casescollected which were classified into two generaltactical areas; officers involved with suspects invehicles, and officers involved with suspects inbuildings. The remaining 17% of the cases oc-curred under infrequent circumstances which didnot lend themselves to classification.The study may be based on too few cases to bevalid or reliable. It is reported, however becauseto the writer's knowledge, no other such study hasever been made. After presenting this data fromthis phase of the study, the writer would presumeto make some suggestions to those agencies in-terested in reducing fatalities and injuries byshooting.1. The interested agency should conduct anindependent study by case method of asmany shotting cases as can be obtained. Theresults should be compared to those of thisstudy, and if correllation is noted, it mightbe prudent to accept the hazard areas in-dicated.2. The interested agency should experimentwith, develop, and implement by proceduralorder, techniques in the following areas.a. Vehicle occupant control while issuingtraffic tickets, interrogating, or otherroutine police business.b. Use of special police safety equipmentsuch as tear gas, shotguns, and portableflood lights on barracaded suspects.c. Tactical deployment of two or moreofficers to establish a "cover" and"approach" role for each, even onroutine contacts.d. Policy on recognition of hostages, andprocedures for withdrawal when neces-sary.e. And lastly, the routine training whichconcerns searching suspects after arrest,immobilizing them, knocking on doors,etc., must be reevaluated and reem-phasized.

Police Officer Shootings--A Tactical Evaluation

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Police Officer Shootings--A Tactical Evaluation

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