Moir, John B.

Wattenberg, William W.

English

Northwestern University Illinois, School of Law: Scholarly Commons

Journal of Criminal Law and CriminologyVolume 48 | Issue 1 Article 61957Phenomenon in Search of a Cause, AWilliam W. WattenbergJohn B. MoirFollow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclcPart of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and CriminalJustice CommonsThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.Recommended CitationWilliam W. Wattenberg, John B. Moir, Phenomenon in Search of a Cause, A, 48 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 54 (1957-1958)A PHENOMENON IN SEARCH OF A CAUSEWILLIAM W. WATTENBERG AND JOHN B. MOIRWilliam W. Wattenberg is Professor of Educational Psychology at Wayne StateUniversity. Since 1947, he has worked with the Youth Bureau of the Detroit PoliceDepartment on a series of studies on delinquency. These have involved determiningthe relationships between delinquency and family recreation, length of school year,age of father, and age of boy. Special studies have depicted a number of "types" ofdelinquency: preadolescent poor judgment, gang membership, juvenile drinking, andauto theft in good neighborhoods.John B. Moir is a psychologist on the staff of the Child Study Clinic of the WayneCounty Juvenile Court. He is co-author of studies on the counselling of homeless alco-holics and on juveniles charged with heavy drinking.-EDITOR.In 1953, there was a sharp increase in the number of boys picked up for felonious oraggravated assaults by Detroit police. This serious offense involved 203 boys thatyear as compared to 128 in 1950, 92 in 1951, and 83 in 1952. The authors were askedby the Youth Bureau of the Detroit Police Department to try to find the reason forthis abrupt upsurge of serious fighting. The Youth Bureau opened its files and offeredfull cooperation.'A.number of hypotheses were promptly advanced to account for the phenomenon.Here are a few of what then appeared to be the most promising:1. The boys who in 1943-44 were "door key children," and had been deprived ofparental protection and supervision due to working mothers or fathers in service hadbecome old enough to get into trouble. The assaults were a delayed reaction to earlychildhood neglect.2. The fighting was a product of race antagonisms resulting from Negroes movinginto formerly white residential neighborhoods following the Supreme Court decisionon restrictive convenants.3. The upsurge was spurious and represented merely a change in the police classifi-cation of offenses formerly listed only as simple assaults.4. Youth was turning to violence because of the examples held out in televisionprograms.As a first step, the authors made a tabulation of the location of the offenses, bypolice precincts, and classified these by racial occupancy into three groups: pre-dominantly white, mixed, and predominantly colored. The results of this analysis areshown in Table I.As compared with 1952, there had been little change in the location of incidents,certainly nothing to warrant a finding that there was a serious outbreak of juvenilerace wars. However, racial differentials plainly were involved. Therefore, this nextI The authors wish to express their appreciation to Ralph Baker, who was at the time Inspectorin charge of the Youth Bureau. Patrolman Christ Kotsopodis spent hours of his own time helpingwith the statistical work.IN SEARCH OF A CAUSETABLE ILOCATION OF OFFENSES IN PERCENTAGESRacial Composition of PrecinctYear Number of BoysWhite Mixed Colored1950 128 10 38 521951 92 25 27 481952 83 18 42 401953 219 16 43 41drew our attention. A series of comparisons with statistics for 1952 were made, andthe following facts established:1. In 1953, there had been an increase of 65 percent in white boys charged withfelonious assault but an increase of 268 percent in Negro boys so charged. Apparently,the phenomenon we were studying tended to be concentrated among Negro young-sters.2. There had been an increase of 41 percent in white boys charged with other(less serious) assaults and a 222 percent increase in Negro boys so charged. Ap-parently, the phenomenon was not merely a product of police. classification of of-fenses. The ratios between simple and aggravated assaults had remained constant.3. There had been a 91 percent increase in white boys picked up for carrying con-cealed weapons and a 182 percent increase in Negro boys so charged. Apparently,then, there was a rise in fear of assault or preparations for assault among boys. Thisrise was proportionately greater, as compared with assaults, among white boys. Also,the police vigilance was being directed as much toward white boys as toward Negroes.4. There bad been an overall increase of 5 percent in white boys picked up on allcharges and a 44 percent increase in Negro boys. The rise in felonious assaults wasmuch sharper than in other juvenile delinquency, but Negro delinquency in generalbad risen.5. There had been a tremendous rise in number of girls picked up for assaults of allkinds. In 1952, these involved 10 white girls and 14 Negro girls; in 1953, 40 whitegirls and 100 Negro girls. The phenomenon then extended to girls.A field investigation was made of a series of incidents. With rare exceptions it wasfound that the victims of the assaults were of the same race as the assailants. Thismuch had been ascertained: our search must be diverted to locating some factor orfactors which in a very short time had produced an increase in open aggression andwhich operated more strongly amon'g Negroes. Of the four original hypotheses, twohad been denied by data in the preliminary investigation: the rise in assaults wasclearly not confined to changing neighborhoods, nor was it due to a change in classifi-cation of offenses.The next step in the investigation was to compare the boys involved in feloniousassaults with all other boys in trouble with the police. Advantage was taken of theexistence of history sheets, forms filled out by Youth Bureau officers after they hadinterviewed each boy and visited his home. These sheets contain some fifty items ofinformation or rating.1957]WATTENBERG AND MOIRThe history sheets of the 203 boys charged with felonious assaults were comparedwith those of the 3,890 other boys picked up by the police in 1953. For each item onthe sheet, a tabulation was prepared and the chi-square test used to test the nullhypothesis as to differences between the two groups. On this basis, statisticallysignificant differences were found for seventeen items. These items appeared tocluster around three major factors: the assaults were largely among older boys,Negroes and gang members. The significant items follow: Boys who commit feloniousassaults were:1. more likely to be in the age group 14 to 16 than in the age group thirteen orunder. (Significant at the one percent level.)2. are more likely to be repeaters or on probation. (Significant at the onepercent level.)3. . . . prefer dancing or going to amusement parks as their favorite form of enter-tainment. (Significant at the five percent level.)4.. . .are more likely to have chores around the house than other boys. (Significantat the one percent level.)5. ... are more likely to receive money from parents in the form of pay for workaround the house and less likely to receive an allowance. (Significant at the fivepercent level.)6... . are more likely to come from families where the parents approve of dating.(Significant at the two percent level.)The next group of items all were found linked to race in a previous study.2The boys who commit felonious assaults:7... were mostly Negroes. (Significant at the .001 level.)8. are more likely to be Protestant. (Significant at the .001 level.)9.... are more likely to be living with a single parent, stepmother and father, orgrandparents. (Significant at the one percent level.)10. were more likely to live in flats or apartments than single homes. (Signifi-cant at the one percent level.)11 ... were more likely to come from homes whose condition could be char-acterized as sub-standard or in need of repairs. (Significant at the one percent level.)12. ... are more likely to come from neighborhoods rated as slums or belowaverage. (Significant at the two percent level.)13. are more likely to come from families in which the parents are separated.(Significant at the .001 level.)With one exception the remaining items all bore upon gang or group membership.14. Boys who commit felonious assaults are more likely to belong to the BoysClub or similar groups and to participate in recreational programs (Significant atthe one percent level.)15. . . .are more likely to belong to a gang or a regular group than to be "lonewolf" offenders or members of loosely knit crowds. (Significant at the two percentlevel.)16 .... are more likely to belong to groups whose activities were rated by policeofficers as aggressively assaultive. (Significant at the .001 level.)2 WILLIAM W. W,.\TTr.XBERG, Factors Linked to Race among Boys in Trouble with Detroit Police,1948, JotR. OF NEGRO EDL-c., 1954, Vol. 23, Pp. 186-189.[Vol. 48IN SEARCH OF A CAUSE17. . . .are more likely to come from families in which there are no siblings.(Significant at the five percent level.)Although this phase of the study did not verify any of the original hypotheses itdid narrow somewhat the nature of what we were seeking. We now knew we werelooking for a force or combination of forces resulting in group activity among olderyouth. The prevalence of broken homes did not seem to meet the standards set be-cause there had been no rise sharp enough in any one year to account for the phenome-non we were investigating.The third step was to engage in intensive interviewing of boys in detention forfelonious assault. Twelve such interviews were held.The immediate outcome was to cast doubt on the remaining two of the originalhypotheses. The fathers of eleven of the twelve had not been in the armed servicesduring World War II. The mothers of only three had worked, and all but one boy wassure there was someone at home daytimes to care for him during the war years.Incidentally, the interviews confirmed the present prevalence of broken homes; onlytwo of the boys came from families where both parents were living in the home in1953.Television did not appear to be a major factor. Although all twelve interviewees hadTV sets at home, their taste in programs paralleled that of the general population.Comedy was most frequently mentioned. Four of the boys liked to watch fights andfive, detective stories. None acted out or attempted to live out scenes from televisionshows.The interviewing produced an interesting picture of the fighting. All boys agreedthere had been an increase in violence. Six attributed it to gangs, and three to adesire to show off. There seemed to be considerable antagonism to the police; allboys told of incidents in which friends had been physically abused by police officers.The boys also reported that the adults they knew were uneasy lest there be an econ-omic depression.As to the actual fighting, the boys interviewed agreed that a great deal took placearound schools. They said that girls enjoyed watching the battles, that some boysfought to get a reputation of being tough. Another locale for fighting was at parties,which someone tried to crash. All but two of the boys habitually caried weapons.Five recalled drinking being a factor. Nine said that the fights seemed to be suddenin their outbreak; only three remembered fights that had brewed for one or moredays. None recalled any inter-racial fighting. The general atmosphere was revealedby the boys' answer to the question as to what they would do if they found themselvesin trouble with another gang or with a bigger boy. The unanimous answer was thatthey would either get a bigger boy to act as their champion or they would call outtheir own gang.At this point in the investigation we found ourselves in the unhappy position ofhaving substantially disproved all our original hypotheses. Worse than that, newones were being destroyed as rapidly as they could be dreamed up.A police report of action to prevent a gang fight finally provided a helpful clue. Atone of the high schools attended largely by Negro students there had been a series ofominous skirmishes. A gang, whose fighting costume consisted of distinctive jackets,had precipitated fighting in the hallways. To prevent further trouble all were pickedWATTENBERG AND MOIRup on a day when reports of a pitched battle at a bus-loading point were received.Interestingly, of the 29 arrested, only two were enrolled as students. The remainderhad all quit school. All were unemployed.At the time there was a slackening in production. On the hunch that finding jobsmight have been more difficult for Negro youth, the matter was pursued.A series of questions on unemployment was introduced into the interview schedulein time to be asked of ten boys. Six declared that of their friends or fellow-gangmembers, most were out of school. All ten made statements to the effect that "every-one" was out of work and the prospect for employment was poor. One boy said hisfriends had money but robbed to get it. All said that most boys they knew wereshort of funds and, as a result, were restless for lack of things to do.A key question was whether or not the unemployment had struck Negro youthmore heavily than white youth. A check of the police reports on boys picked up in1952 and 1953 revealed that among the white boys 1,643 had no job of any kind in1952, and 1,656 in 1953. Among Negro boys, total unemployment had affected902 in 1952 and 1,321 in 1953. The chi-square test indicated the difference wassignificant at the .001 level. (A boy was considered unemployed if he had no full-timeor part-time job, regardless of his school status.)Here, then, was a change which met the specifications of our search. It had takenplace in one year, touched older boys, and was brought to bear mostly on Negroes.The final stage of the investigation consisted of trying to trace out the dynamics ofthe situation. This was complicated by the fact that the jurisdiction of the YouthBureau of the Detroit Police Department extended only to 16-year-olds, and manyof the most serious incidents involved older boys. Legal school-leaving age in Detroitis 16. Only ten percent of the boys on whom we had records of felonious assault wereout of school.However, it was possible to trace developments in a number of incidents involvinggroups which included youth who were technically adults as well as juveniles. Inmany of the gangs, the older members were unemployed, and the hunt for time-filling excitement had been a factor. In a number of incidents, the sequence of eventsrevealed that in their eagerness for "fun" older boys had acted as instigators offights involving younger boys.Undoubtedly, other factors were operating and quite possibly the change in theemployment situation acted more as a trigger than as the only cause. Further partialverification of our findings became apparent in 1955, when production in Detroitapproached boom proportions. Police reports of gang-fighting incidents showed alarge decline over previous years.[Vol. 48

Phenomenon in Search of a Cause, A

https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4570&amp;context=jclc

Phenomenon in Search of a Cause, A

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Northwestern University Illinois, School of Law: Scholarly Commons