Tappan, Paul W.

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Northwestern University Illinois, School of Law: Scholarly Commons

Journal of Criminal Law and CriminologyVolume 43 | Issue 3 Article 81952Medico-Legal Concepts of Criminal InsanityPaul W. TappanFollow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclcPart of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and CriminalJustice CommonsThis Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.Recommended CitationPaul W. Tappan, Medico-Legal Concepts of Criminal Insanity, 43 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 333 (1952-1953)MEDICO-LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL INSANITYPaul W. TappanThe author is Professor of Sociology and lecturer in law, New York University,Associate Reporter on Treatment of the American Law Institute project on aModel Criminal Code, Consultant to the American Bar Association Commission onOrganized Crime and to the United Nations, Division of Social Affairs.-EDrroR.The problem of relating law to psychiatry and other behavior sciencesis epitomized by the difficulties, on the one hand, of applying the archaicMcNaghton rules on insanity in the modern criminal court and, onthe other, of applying the common notion that all delinquents andcriminals are emotionally sick people. These conflicting ideas pointup very acutely the need in contemporary criminology to improve theintegration of the sciences of human behavior with the reasonable andrealistic operation of our criminal courts and correctional system. Tothat end we must exploit the skills of the biological and social sciencesmore fully, but we must also better adapt the techniques of these fieldsto the goals of criminal law, insofar as they may serve the administra-tion of justice. Much of the problem of relating law to the clinicalfields lies in the need to clarify the functions and objectives of each,to recognize the differences in their orientations, and to arrive at aneffective coordination of them.Putting it simply, it appears that the behavior sciences are concernedprimarily with the problems of maladjustment and emotional illness,while the criminal law aims basically to provide for the security ofthe community and its citizens. The former, therefore, looks to thediagnosis and therapy of pathologies in the individual; there is no directconcern with conforming the individual's conduct to standards of lawand morality. The clinician, by his training and philosophy, is moreconcerned with the individual than the mass, with the protection ofthe patient rather than the community. In contrast with this orienta-tion, the function of the criminal law is to protect society against theinvasion of the citizen's rights rather than to resolve problems of socialwelfare or of public health. While these objectives of law and behaviorscience are not uniformly and intrinsically inconsistent, neither are theyalways entirely compatible.Criminal justice is concerned in its utilization of clinical knowledgeand personnel that there be a large consensus among the behaviorexperts on basic matters of diagnosis and treatment of criminal devia-tions if their theories are to be introduced into criminal proceduresand correctional methods. Justice also requires that the public be pro-PAUL W. TAPPANtected even if the consequence is not ide'ally suited to the clinical require-ments of the offender. Where diagnosis is required by the court andwhere therapy is employed in the correctional system, the major objec-tive is the prevention of future crime. And to justify expenditures forclinical diagnosis and treatment, it must be reasonably economical intime and expense, particularly as to minor offenders whose threat to thecommunity is not great.The criminologist is generally hesitant today to establish a strictlyclinical orientation in the treatment of most offenders. He is skepticalparticularly concerning the application of medical psychology to thegreat mass of what appear to be psychologically normal criminals or to"emotionally deviated," "psychopathic" or neurotic offenders wheretheir conditions are not amenable to reasonably effective treatmentmodalities nor even to uniform diagnoses among the experts. In addi-tion he is (or should be) concerned that a thoroughly individualizedand clinical orientation in our courts and correctional system may toofar dilute the deterrent value of the law in its impact upon the wholecommunity. The notion, increasingly popular in some quarters of con-temporary criminology, that all criminals are products of "emotionalillness" requiring extensive analytic investigation and intensive clinicaltherapy appears-at least at the present state of our knowledge andtools-to lack the vindicative evidence that would be necessary tosupport a system of clinical justice. More resources for the under-standing and the effective treatment of the criminal we do surely need,but these cannot soundly be predicated upon narrow, sectarian, andinadequately tested hypotheses concerning etiology or therapy![Vol. 49

Medico-Legal Concepts of Criminal Insanity

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Medico-Legal Concepts of Criminal Insanity

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