Schofield, Daniel L.

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Volume 70 Issue 2 Article 15 February 1968 Federal Courts--The Scope of Pendent Jurisdiction Daniel L. Schofield West Virginia University College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr  Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons Recommended Citation Daniel L. Schofield, Federal Courts--The Scope of Pendent Jurisdiction, 70 W. Va. L. Rev. (1968). Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss2/15 This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEWIt would be convenient if it should be held that, since thejudgment is binding under the amended rule on the entire class,the claims for or against the whole class are in controversy.This would be an entirely realistic view, and one consonant withthe stated purpose of the amount in controversy requirement, toavoid having the federal courts "fritter away their time in thetrial of petty controversies." A good deal of ancient learningwill have to be forgotten, however, if this practical and sensibleresult is to be reached.34Since their inception, federal courts have dealt with the problemof when to aggregate the similar claims of several plaintiffs or de-fendants, in order to satisfy statutory minimum jurisdictional amountrequirements. The traditional right of each person to have his dayin court seems to conflict with the practical necessity of solving amutual problem with the least amount of litigation. Through theyears the courts have set up various standards by which to judgethis issue, and each has subsequently been discarded as vague, con-fusing and unworkable. New Rule 23, however, seems to provide aliberal, more workable manner in which to consolidate cases for thegreater convenience of both courts and parties. Such a flexible rulehas been desperately needed for some time; yet now that it is here,many courts seem unwilling to break with traditional concepts formedunder now defunct rules which were largely unworkable even inthe less complicated days in which they were formulated. One canonly hope that this view of the new rule as being substantially the sameas the old is only a temporary setback, not a trend, and that thewell-reasoned arguments of the text-writers will serve to finally, albeitbelatedly, end the torturous practice of case by case fact study todetermine when to aggregate.Linda L. HuppFederal Courts-The Scope of Pendent JurisdictionA minor was injured in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania inwhich all parties involved were residents of Pennsylvania. For pur-poses of creating federal jurisdiction, a New Jersey guardian was14 2 BARRON & HOLZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Wrighted.), § 569 (Supp. 1966). The author adds that if the "ancient learning"prevails, we shall be right back to the inherent difficulties of "joint" and"common" of "which it was a purpose of the amended rule to avoid."[Vol. 701Schofield: Federal Courts--The Scope of Pendent JurisdictionDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968CASE COMMENTSappointed for the minor to create diversity of citizenship. Anaction to recover for the minor P's injuries was then instituted in theappropriate federal court. The minor's mother, who lacked diversity,joined in the suit in her own right, seeking out-of-pocket medicalexpenses. D moved to dismiss the mother's claim. Held, motiongranted. The district court in granting D's motion stated that wherethe court had jurisdiction of the minor's action solely by reason ofdiversity of citizenship between the guardian appointed to prosecutethe minor's claim and the D, the minor's mother who lacked diversityfrom the D could not, as a matter of right, join her claim for out-of-pocket medical expenses. The court thus refused to allow theapplication of pendent jurisdiction as a matter of right McSparronv. Weist, 270 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa. 1967).The concept of pendent jurisdiction in our federal courts hasbeen subject to a constant evolution and liberalization since its incep-tion.' The factual situation in this case confronted the court witha difficult decision of whether judicial economy and expediencydictated a further liberalization of pendent jurisdiction as opposed toplacing definite limitations on its applicability. In restricting its ap-plicability, the decision offers an opportunity to explore generally themerits of pendent jurisdiction, particularly as applied to federaljurisdiction gained by diversity of citizenship.The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.2 This limitedjurisdiction as conceived by the Constitution has two branches: onegrounded on the nature of the parties; the other, on the character ofthe issues. With respect to the first branch, the federal courts haveoriginal jurisdiction of civil actions between citizens of differentstates.' The underlying purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to providea safeguard within the federal judicial system against the prejudices oflocal courts and local juries.4There has been an abundance of criticism concerning the valueand need for federal diversity jurisdiction. Justice Frankfurterrecorded his criticism when he referred to "the mounting mischiefIThe doctrine of pendent jurisdiction gives a federal court the powerover any claim for relief not otherwise subject to its jurisdiction so long asit derives from a common nucleus of operative fact with a federal claim thatis properly within the power of the court as outlined in the Constitution.Newman v. Freeman, 262 F.Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).2 U. S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332-33 (1966).3 Id.4 Riley v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 173 F.Supp. 416 (S.D. IM. 1959).1968]2West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 15https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss2/15WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEWinflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuanceof diversity jurisdiction."' It is argued that diversity cases causeundue congestion in the federal courts.6 In addition, federal judgesunder the rule of Erie R. R. v. Thompkins7 are required to apply statelaw and thus must decide difficult questions on which only thestate courts can speak authoritatively.' In the face of the mountingcriticism, Congress has shown no inclination to abolish this jurisdic-tion. Thus, the federal courts must attempt to resolve its problems.In determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists, nominal partiesare disregarded." However, a general guardian who has a legal rightto sue and represent one who has an equitable interest is not regardedas a nominal party, and the citizenship of the guardian determinesjurisdiction."° In Fallot v. Gouran," a New Jersey guardian broughtsuit in a federal court on behalf of an incompetent Pennsylvaniacitizen and the court held that "the means for determining theexistence of diversity jurisdiction in a situation such as this is not bylooking to the citizenship of the incompetent but to the citizenship ofthe guardian, if he has capacity to sue."' 2 And in Johnstone v.O'Connor,'3 the court ruled that the defendant was not entitled to adismissal of the action even though a guardian was appointed for thesole purpose of obtaining the diversity of citizenship requisite tobringing action in federal court."The foregoing authorities indicate that a valid federal claim underdiversity of citizenship jurisdiction was asserted in the guardian'saction in the present case. The propriety of the court taking juris-diction in addition to the asserted non-federal claim of the minorplaintiff's mother provided the troublesome issue.Early in our judicial history, Osborn v. Bank of the United States'5declared that once a valid federal claim was asserted and federaljurisdiction was established, the federal court could decide all relatedstate questions that were necessary to the final disposition of the5 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954).6 C. WmGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23 (1963).7 304 U.S. 64 (1938).8 id.9 Wood v. David, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 467 (1855); Carneal v. Banks, 23U.S. (10 Wheat.) 181 (1825).,o Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429 (1903).1"220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955)12 Id. at 327.13 164 F.Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1958).14' d.Is 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 204 (1824).240 [Vol. 703Schofield: Federal Courts--The Scope of Pendent JurisdictionDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968CASE COMMENTScase. 6 Although the roots of pendent jurisdiction can be traced to theOsborn case and later decisions,17 the commonly recognized sourceof the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is Hum v. Oursler.'8 TheHum doctrine, as it is often referred to, formulates a two-partcriterion for the proper application of the principle of pendent juris-diction. A federal court has jurisdiction over purely local or stateissues when the case involves first, a substantial federal question,and secondly, when the federal and non-federal claims are part ofa "single cause of action."' 9 It is generally conceded that the "singlecause of action" requirement is satisfied when the federal and non-federal claims rest upon facts that are substantially the same.2To further illustrate the application of pendent jurisdiction, it hasbeen held that where a federal court has jurisdiction of a cause ofaction based on alternative theories of recovery, one arising underfederal law and one under state law, then it has jurisdiction to disposeof the entire controversy even though the federal claim is decidedadversely to the party asserting jurisdiction.2 And in such a case,the court ruled that the "single cause of action," requisite to applyingpendent jurisdiction is satisfied when substantially identical facts willsupport both theories of recovery.22At first glance, the facts of the principal case indicate that therequirements for pendent jurisdiction were satisfied and the court waswrong in dismissing the mother's pendent claim; that is, diversity ofcitizenship constitutes a proper federal question and liability on bothclaims rests on substantially the same facts. However, there is anadditional aspect of pendent jurisdiction which makes the conceptflexible and enables the courts to prevent abuse of its application.The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction involves a discretionary elementwhich merits careful consideration in every case. The Supreme Courthas recently held that pendent jurisdiction need not be exercisedin every case in which it is found to exist. 3 "[P]endent jurisdictionis a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right."2 4 Judge Magruder16Id.'7 Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909).18 289 U.S. 238 (1933).19 Id.; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).2 0 Armstrong Co. v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938); Kleinmon v.Betty Dan Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).21 Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961).22 Id.23 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).2 4 Id. at 726; Moynahan v. Pari-Mutual Employees Guild, 317 F.2d 209(9th Cir. 1963); Massachussetts Universalist Convention v. Hildreth &Rogers Co., 183 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1950).1968]4West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 15https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol70/iss2/15WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEWin his concurring opinion in Strachman v. Palmer,2" counseled that"[fiederal courts should not be overeager to hold on to the determi-nation of issues that might be more appropriately left to settlement instate court litigation .... 26In McSparron, the court expressed its awareness of the problemsthat could result if the recent Newman v. Freeman27 precedent, afactually similar case, but which granted pendent jurisdiction onmotion to join after suit had begun, were to be construed as allowingpendent jurisdiction as a matter of right. It thus appears thatthe McSparron court was cognizant of the need for this discretionarypower and properly refused the mother's pendent claim.The expansion of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has beenjustified on the grounds of judicial economy, convenience andfairness to litigants. The beneficial aspects of this doctrine makepossible a complete remedy for the adjudication of the plaintiff'srights while avoiding piecemeal litigation. The essence of a successfulapplication of this doctrine is a balancing process which shouldencompass discretion by the court in the weighing of the variousproblems involved. The federal courts should remain cognizantof the adverse effects of an infringement upon state court integrity.Since there is no general Congressional authorization for pendentjurisdiction, it appears that in each particular case, provided therequirements of the Hum doctrine are satisfied, the federal courtshave a wide discretion in deciding whether pendent jurisdiction isproper and expedient.Daniel L. SchofieldMalpractice--Sterilization OperationPs, a mother of nine and her husband, employed Ds, three phy-sicians, to perform a sterilization operation upon the wife. Theoperation was suggested by Ds to prevent deterioration of the wife'sphysical condition which would result from the birth of another child.Subsequently the wife became pregnant. Prior to the birth of the25 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1949).26 Id. at 433. See also Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrineof Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLum. L. RExv. 1018(1962); 46 ILL. L. Rrv. 646 (1951); Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expand-ing Concept in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 51 IowA L. BEv. 151 (1965).27 262 F.Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966).[Vol. 705Schofield: Federal Courts--The Scope of Pendent JurisdictionDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968

Federal Courts--The Scope of Pendent Jurisdiction

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Federal Courts--The Scope of Pendent Jurisdiction

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