CORE
🇺🇦
make metadata, not war
Services
Services overview
Explore all CORE services
Access to raw data
API
Dataset
FastSync
Content discovery
Recommender
Discovery
OAI identifiers
OAI Resolver
Managing content
Dashboard
Bespoke contracts
Consultancy services
Support us
Support us
Membership
Sponsorship
Community governance
Advisory Board
Board of supporters
Research network
About
About us
Our mission
Team
Blog
FAQs
Contact us
research
Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
Authors
Santiago Oliveros
Publication date
9 January 2013
Publisher
'Elsevier BV'
Doi
Cite
Abstract
We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology and intensity. In contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information, in equilibrium voters collect information of different qualities. We show that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated: some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are. We also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non-monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity. © 2013 Elsevier Inc
Similar works
Full text
Open in the Core reader
Download PDF
Available Versions
University of Essex Research Repository
See this paper in CORE
Go to the repository landing page
Download from data provider
oai:repository.essex.ac.uk:745...
Last time updated on 14/09/2013
Supporting member
Explore Bristol Research
See this paper in CORE
Go to the repository landing page
Download from data provider
oai:research-information.bris....
Last time updated on 29/07/2020