The literature on
behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates
first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference
on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the
preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as
clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information
asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people's
initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people
intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2--4, we experimentally
tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in
information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background
information and the other has none --- it is actually preferable for both
counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the
implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making,
and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue