This note outlines and discusses the major changes in industrial legislation to take place in New Zealand during 1985

Hodge, W. C.

Open Journal Systems at the Victoria University of Wellington Library

/\'ewZealandjournalofindustrialrelations 1 1985,10,157-161 Industrial relations legislation in 1985 W C Hodge* This note outlines and discusses the nzajor changes in industrial legislation to take place in Ne·w Zealand during 1 985. Introduction The signal achievement of the 1985 legislative calendar was the passage of the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1985 (hereafter, the IRAA) and 9 companion pieces of amending legislation, all signed into law on 18 June. introduced into the House on 20 December 1984 ( 460 NZPD 2 790) as an omnibus Union Membership Bill, that Bill had 7 self-contained components, which provided for amendments to the Industrial Relations Act 1973, The Agricultural Workers Act 1977, the Aircrew Industrial Tribunal Act 1971, the NZ Railways Corporation Act 1981, the Post Office Act 1959, the State Services Conditions of Employment Act 1977, and the Wages Protection Act 1983. Thanks to a Supplementary Order (5 March 1985, 461 NZPD 3405), amendments to the Coal Mines Act 1979, the Fire Service Act 1975, and the Waterfront Industry Act 1976, were added, so that when the planned-for breakup took place (31 May 1985,462 NZPD 4457) 10 self-contained amendments to 10 statutes were ready for passage. Nine of the amendments were of a piece, providing for preference for union members, ballots for that preference clause, and consci,entious objection rights and procedures, but the tenth amendment was an across-the-board provision protecting the automatic deduc-tion of union dues from wages. The union membership and conscientious objection provisions will be discussed under the heading of the IRAA, the other 8 limited sector amendments being a repetitive statutory chorus, while the Wages Protection Act will be discussed separately. Before discussing these substantive law changes, it is appropriate to make several introductory comments: (1) The parliamentary debates on the union membership legislation reveal the strengths and weaknesses of our parliamentary system, the best and worst in our parliamen-tarians. Readers with time and fortitude can however, find principled, thoughtful, and insightful debates on individual integrity, collective security, principles of collec-tive bargaining and industrial relations generally (see 460 NZPD 2790-2808, 461 NZPD 3404-3410,462 NZPD 4181-4210,4415-4456, 4477-4496). (2) The complexity of modern lawn1aking is staggering. Whereas the old Industrial Con-ciliation and Arbitration Act of 1894 took up only 23 pages of the statute book, with 91 sections to define and create the systern, the Union Me1nbership Bill, as • Senior lecturer in Law, University of Auckland • 158 W C Hodge reported back from committee, subsumed 213 pages and as many sections just to reverse the effects of section 5 of the IRAA of 1983. This complexity, and the neces-sary attention to detail justifies the frequent remark of Mr Stan Rodger, Minister of Labour, that reversal of National's voluntary unionism programme was not simply a matter of turning the clock back to 1983. Had the job been done in haste, in the last days of 1984, as this writer has already suggested (Hodge, 1985), it may well have become the proverbial ''dog's breakfast" . (3) In an ordinary year, the Union Membership Bill would have been the centrepiece of legislative attention and media scrutiny. Even compulsory versus voluntary unionism, however, took second billing in 1985 to interest generated by Fran Wilde and the homosexual law reform legislation. Still, according to Fred Gerbic ( 462 NZPD 4181 ), the Union Membership Bill attracted some 389 submissions, with at least 358 against and only 25 in favour. The debates were fiercely contested, and it seems likely, given New Zealand's legislative revolving door, that the law of union membership will appear on the order paper again before too long. IRAA 1985- Union preference and balloting The return of compulsory unionism, after 1 7 months of voluntary union membership (1 February 1984 - I July 1985) is accomplished by a new substantive union membership clause (hereafter, the UMC) and by several procedural provisions . • The new substantive UMC is contained in the new section 98 of the Industrial Rela-tions Act 1973, (hereafter called the principal Act), as substituted and inserted by section 4 of the 1985 IRAA, effectively repealing section 4 of the 1983 IRAA; the model clause requires that persons 18 years and older employed by an employer covered by an award must join the relevant registered industrial union of workers within 14 days after being employed, and must remain such a member while so employed. Statutory teeth are found in a new section 103, also inserted into the principal Act by section 4 of the 1985 IRAA, entitled "Enforcement of union membership clauses". A $500 breach of award penalty (sl48(1) of the principal Act) is imposed on employers who continue to employ a non-unionist after being notified by the union, and a $50 fine (s148(3) of the principal Act) is imposed on workers \Vho fail to become a member after being requested to do so by the union. The union must notify the employer that the worker has rejected the union request. The pre-1984 (and post-1976) Labour Department abstention is reinstated by section 1 03(2) which relieves the Department from responsibility of policing and prosecut-ing breaches of UMCs. Ancillary protection against abuse is found in section 98A and 146A, which make the section 98 UMC the exclusive measure and compulsion of union membership, and which, by implication, thereby outlaw any pre-entry closed shop potentiality. The employer retains complete freedom to hire the members of any union or no union, so long as the proper union is joined within 14 days of engagement. Further protection is guaranteed by section 12 of the IRAA 1985, inserting a new subsection (IA) into section 182 of the principal Act, and forbidding any retrospective collection of past union subscriptions which might have gone unpaid during the I 7 month membership holiday. (Presumably that would not protect a worker who remained in employment and who never formally resigned from the union in question; he or she would remain a member, non-financial to be sure, but a member subject to union subscriptions as a debt.) Section 182 is itself of importance in the conscientious objection debate, and is discussed below. Machinery provisions A a mere definition in section 98, the UMC is not part of the law of the land; it only Industrial relatiooa tion in 1985 159 become legally meaningful and operative through being included in awards and agreements. There are 2 mechanisms which make the connection; the fust is the so-called transitional clause, in section 1 7(2) of the 1985 IRAA. That section bluntly stated that the UMC shall be deemed to be part of any award or agreement, from 1 July 1985, if the predecessor of that award or agreement, on 1 February 1984, contained an unqualified preference clause, for a period of 18 months, or until a section 99 ballot is conducted and certified. The fust mechanism thus envisages that the second, a "retention" ballot, will take place before the end of 1986. Ballots, both the standard "retention" and the less common "restoration" or "initial" ballot are described in clauses set out in section 99, as statutory imposed union rules, and transmitted into awards and agreements by the registrar in section 100. The rule book of every registered industrial union of workers is deemed to include a detailed set of rules for the appointment of returning officers, the issue of special ballots, categories of persons eligible for special ballots, conduct of meetings, written notice of the special meeting, and (in the case of restoration and inital ballots) publicity measures to insure notice being given to non-union members who would be covered by UMC. In sum, these rules provide for special meetings to be organised convened and con-ducted by the union, with a secret ballot (supervised by an agent of the Registrar of Industrial Unions) of the fmancial members present at the meeting (or in the case of restoration and initial ballots, other qualified workers present at the meeting) in the following terms: I vote in favour of the Union Membership Clause because I believe workers should be obliged to join the union. or I vote against the Union Membership Clause because I believe workers should not be ob~ed to join the union. Further provisions implement the majority decision, allow electoral inquiries, create jurisdiction in the Arbitration Court to hear such an inquiry, impose offences in relation to balloting (personation, intimidation, bribery, multiple voting etc.) and prohibit a fresh election to be legally effective until 3 years have elapsed from the previous ballot (what-ever the result). The details and procedures seem as fair and meticulous as the environment permits. Whatever the guarantees of a secret ballot, however, the meeting will be organised and advertised by the union in premises occupied by the union, the gate and the chair will be kept by the union, the special ballots will be issued by a union-appointed officer, and those conditions may be inherently coercive or at least off-putting to the non-enthusiast and anti-unionist alike. A more evenhanded and democratic measure might be taken on neutral ground (entry to the work place?) of all workers (not just those bold and determined enough to enter union territory to speak and vote against the union). Given the friendli-ness of the balloting environment, it might be predicted that: (1) a low percentage of workers will tum out to vote; (2) a high percentage of those voting will be in favour of the UMC; and (3) union officials will claim great support for compulsion. Exemption from union membership The second major feature of IRAA 1985, the opposite side of the compulsory coin, is a generously-defined conscientious objection escape hatch from the UMC. Sections 105 - 112A create a Union Membership Exemption Tribunal, with the powers of a commis-sion of inquiry (s105) and a flexible procedure (sill) whose 3 members are to have ex-perience in religious beliefs, human rights, or industrial relations (sl07). Section 112C defines the grounds for exemption exclusively as "genuine objection, on the grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction, to becoming or remaining a member 160 WCBodae of any union whatsoever or of a particulu union". (Compare the oqtn•J '-co" clause, in section 6 of the 1951 Industrial ConciHaiion and Arbitration Amendment Act: "Any person who objects on religious grounds to being a mentber of a union may apply ••• for a certificate . . . The Registrar shall refer every such applicant to the Conscientious Objec-tion Committee appointed under the Military Training Act 1949"). The objection need not be religious in character and seems to encourage, unlike ita predecessor in the principal Act (s1 OS), selective conscientious objection. "Selective" objection suggests opposition to a particular union, not compulsory unionism as such: "Although I have happily joined other unions in the past, I object to the Westland Asbestos IUOW because of its politics". Compare, in the sphere of military conscription, a similar selective conscientious objection, that of R v District Court : exparte Thompson (1968) and US v Gillette (1971) : "I do not object to serving in the defence of my country, but I won't go to Vietnam". The applicant must complete Form 7, contained in the Schedule to the IRAA 1985, make out a cheque for $100, which goes into the consolidated account (s112E; SR 1985/162, Regulation 3), and attend a hearing conducted by the Tribunal. The applicant has a right to be assisted by counsel (s1121). The union concerned has a right to appear (s112G) and the Federation of Labour (or other "central organisation of workers") may apply to be heard (s112J) but the FOL's appearance is a matter for the Tribunal's dis-cretion, not a matter of right. No hearing need be held if the union concerned does not object to the application (s112H). In the past the conscientious objection option has been little-known, and used primarily by certain Christian groups. (To take a random year, in 1982 there were some 213 CO applicants - of those 116 were Exclusive Brethren, 16 were Seventh Day Adven-tist, 44 were "other religions" and only 37 were "other grounds". (Department of Labour, 1982). Given the rather more prominent profile of the compulsory - voluntary issue, the media attention given to the early cases, and the broader grounds entitling objection, it may be that applicants for the CO exemption may number in the thousands in 1986, instead of hundreds. It should be pointed out that existing law continues to protect union members, in a political minority, against forced contributions to political levies. Section 182(2Xa) of the principal Act allows a registered union to bind its members to pay "a levy to be applied in furtherance of political objects" (i.e. capitation fees to the Labour Party) but section 3 of the Political Disabilities Removal Act 1960 exempts union members from paying such levies if objection is made to the union secretary within 14 days of receiving written notice that the levy is payable). Wages protection An amendment to the Wages Protection Act 1983 is an essential part of the union membership package. When National's voluntary unionism programme came on line in 1984, it did so in 2 stages. The fust stage was the substantive law of voluntary member-ship, commencing on 1 February 1984. At that time, and until 1 July 1984, a union member could resign from the union, but he/she had to take the initiative, had to resign formally from the union, and inform the employer that the automatic salary deduction in favour of the union should be stopped. On the 1st of July 1984, when section 16 of the Wages Protection Act 1983 became operative, automatic salary deductions became illegal and the employer committed an offence if he made such a deduction without express written consent of the worker concerned. After 1 July 1984, fmancial member-ship of many unions melted away through inertia and attrition with the apathetic majority who did nothing becoming unfinancial automatically. The 1985 Amendment to the Wages Protection Act reverses that aspect of section 16, and exempts union subscription from the prohibition against deductions from the wage packet. Unless the employers' assessors fight against it in the annual dispute of interest, Industrial r,elations legislation in 1985 161 autotnatic deductions will again be part of the award system. Finally, an accounting change, chiefly important to conciliators, mediators and · Arbitration Court judges, makes the salary of those officers determinable by the Higher Salaries Commission (Industrial Relations Amendment Act (No.2) 1985). Conclusions: the future It seems likely that the debate on the proposed Bill of Rights, focussing on Article 10: Freedom of Association, will keep the union membership clause in the public eye; similarly, more intensive pursuit of exemption status will give that issue more prominence than ever before. The coming year will see employers resisting automatic deduction of union dues, and unions will seek a tighter conscientious objection procedure. References Department of Labour (1982) Annual Report of the Department of Labour Appendices to the Jounwl of the House of Representatives G 1, Table 15. Hodge, W C ( 1985) Industrial relations legislation in 1984 Ne'v Zealand journal of indus-trial relations 1 0( 1) : 29-33. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (various issues). List of cases R v District Court: exparte Thornpson (1968) 118 CLR 448 US v Gillette (1971) 401 US 437 • 

English

Industrial relations legislation in 1985

This note outlines and discusses the major changes in industrial relations legislation to take place in New Zealand during 1984

Ne\Ao.' Zealand journal of industrial ~elations, 1985, I 0, 29-33 Industrial relations legislation in 1984 W C Hodge* This note outlines and discusses the nzajor changes in industrial relations legislation to take place in JVew Zealand during 1984. The year 1984 was characterised n1ore by electoral can1paign than by legislative passage. The snap election of 14 July 1984, which produced the only rnid-year change of government in recent New Zealand history, abridged the legislative programme of the outgoing National Government, and left the incoming Labour Governn1ent with insuf-ficient time to effect its own statutory schedule. There were, therefore, 2 much abbreviated parliamentary sessions in 1984, and they will be discussed here separately and labelled Mark I (National) and Mark II (Labour). 1984 Mark I (National) The outgoing National Party adn1inistration of Sir Robert Muldoon completed the third reading of and gubernatorial signature to only 2 bills before the June break-up of the fortieth Parliament. One, the hnprest Supply Act, is a standard and typical annual legis-lative event; the second, the \\'hangarei Refinery Expansion Project Disputes Act (hereafter, the WREPDA), is absolutely unprecedented and unique for any legislative year in any Comrnonwealth country. Before surveying the background of WREPDA, its preamble and 4 provisions will explain its peculiar significance. The WREPDA is enacted because: ... work on the expansion of the \Vhangarei Refmery at Marsden Point is effectively at a standstill: and [because] it is in the public interest that work on the expansion of that refinery be resumed as soon as possible and continued and that provision be made for compliance with terms and condtions of employment and for the observance of procedures for settling industrial disputes that arise in relation to that work. Four of the salient provisions. with their legalisms paraphrased, are set out below: (1) It statutorily directs all project workers to report for work on 13 June 1984, with a penalty imposed on those who fail to comply and who cannot prove a reasonable excuse (sections 3 and 7); (2) it adds terms and conditions to the collective agreement made by the parties; (section 2(3)); (3) it names 8 individuals, all engineering scaffolders, who are not to be discrilninated against by other workers (section 2(3)(a)); and * Senior lecturer in Law, University of Auckland 30 (4) WC Hodge it enables police constables above tb.tJ pickets, with potential penalties of 3 Since the background to the legislatioa fJ rafl 1 out first the details of matters which led to the site ing with legislation itself. New Zealand's only facility for "craclda&" U., ... ·-filii elL ~ .. petrol products is the refinery at Mars<loa qa . C1J Whangarei Harbour. That facility is wholly t1tt lllf which in turn is owned (68.6 percent) by the m.gor on compaatea (Mobil. 19.2 perceat; Shell, 17.1 percent; BPNZ 15 .I percent; Caltex, 8.6 percent; Buropa, 8.6 perjlellt) and individual investors (31.4 percent). The owners of NZRC, together with the government, recopdaed a need to explnd the Marsden Point facility to: (I) increase production quantitatively; (2) increase the range of raw crudes that could be refined; and (3) broaden the range of product mix, to include higher octane kerosene and a¥Jation fuels. The NZRC awarded the expansion project contract (then estimated to cost S103S million) to an overseas joint venture, Badger-Chiyoda, based respectively in The Hague, Holland; and Yokohama, Japan. Badger-Ciliyoda as the main contsactor then sub-con-tracted to Joint Venture II (JVII), which is a partnenhip of and "tile consortium", being 5 of New Zealand's largest construction compaaiea (Fletcher CoDStruc-tion, McConnell Dowell, Robert Stone, Wilkins and Davies, and Downer). Labour relations at the site in early 1984 were taut, for 2 reaons. First, an inherent feature of any "Think Big" project was a national spotUgb.t, with all acton conacious of their leading roles on a nation-wide, precedent-setting stage. Therefore, as large as the pro-ject itself was, each site dispute was played out in a far larger context. There were no quiet solutions; there were no insignificant disputes. Second, one of the umesolved matters in dispute concerned accommodation and accommodation aDowanoes. Many sub-contractors were happy to pay an accommodation allowance based on an average Whangarei rental, while union leadership was concerned that such cash in hand, as opposed to guaranteed company housing, would compromise the bargairdng position of any dis-missed worker who wished to contest that dismissal. The catalyst which activated the unstable elements described abQve was the double legal persona of one of the aforementioned sub-contractors, Bob Duncan Scaffolders (BDS). The sub-contractor, BDS, had given notice of concurrence with the sl1e agreement and had been accepted in turn. Eight employees of BDS, all scaffolders, were observed to be working on site on a Saturday, in apparent violation of an informal site ban on over-time. Furthermore their employment may have been for the non-concurring Whangarei Scaffolding Limited (WSL), an incorporated version of BDS. It was this event which triggered the site walk-out, the televised clashes between pickets and police, and scenes of a semi-armoured van conveying the 8 scaffolders to and from the site through m888 pickets. It was in this atmosphere of crisis that the WREPDA was p888ed, and signed on 12 June 1984. The language, and "feel" of the legislation is that of wartime emergency -"workers shall report for work on 13 June" [emphasis added) - and the imperative/ punitive clauses have the ring of indentured servitude. As a political document it has the odour of a "who's going to run the country - a few union leaders or the elected govern-ment of New Zealand?" pre-election manifesto. On the other hand, the vast majority of the workforce did return to work on the appointed day; productivity did increase significantly after the return to worki and tha penalty for non-return (in section 7) was a mere 4 months' dilentitlement to the unem· ployment benefit (especially insignificant, in light of the SocJal Security Act provisions which allow up to 12 weeks' standing down time for voluntary unemployment in any case); and many, not all on the management side, might be heard to eay that workora took Industrial relations legislation in 1984 31 the Act as an opportunity to save face and return to work. Taken as a whole, the \VREPDA simply dictates that both parties will abide by the agreetnent they already agreed to abide by. The new terms, set out in section 2( 3 ), express tenns itnplied in any contract of ernploytnent and contain nothing oppressive. Paragraph (b), for exarnple, purports to forbid "dangerous conduct'' towards any of the 8 scaffolders named in paragraph (a), but intentional or negligent dangerous conduct tO\\'ard a co-worker would be rnisconduct and grounds for dismissal in any contract of employment, and may well be a crin1e. In any event, in this writer's opinion, the WREPDA is of no significance to industrial law and industrial relations generally. It has no legal import to anyone but the parties to the JVII Collective Agreen1ent and the project workers covered thereby. It will soon be relegated to the musuen1 of parliamentary oddities, a historical hiccup of the 1984 elec-toral campaign. 1984 Mark II (Labour) Perhaps the most significant aspect of the 1984 session of the forty-first NZ Parlia-Jnent was the Sherlock Holn1esian dog who barked in the night (Sir A C Doyle, Silver Blaze), or, the conspicuous absence of Labour's promised repeal of the "voluntary unionisn1" of National's Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1983 , as reinforced by the Wages Protection Act 1983. As a n1atter of practicality, the r,epeal was a step best done quickly, if done at all. Thousands of contracts of employment have been entered into since 1 February 1984, contracts which have never included an unqualified preference clause and the complica-tions of reversal have thereby intensified. (The European Court, in Young, Janzes and Webster v UK (1981) would probably have distinguished a contract where the state \Vas directing con1pulsory men1bership as a fresh term, as opposed to a contract wher,e com-pulsory membership was being reintroduced after a short gap). 1n addition, the Human Rights Comn1ission (1985) in its discussion paper has suggested that the right to associate includes a negative right not to be associated by compulsion. 1 And as the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Young, Janzes and Webster becomes better known in New Zealand political opposition to unqualified preference will increasingly take the fonn of principled opposition. Perhaps Labour found some utility in delay during the wage round as an inducement to the trade union n1ovement to adhere to government guidelines. The Labour Government did pass an Industrial Relations Amendment Act in 1984, (hereafter, IRAA) and consequential an1endments to the Agricultural Workers Act 1977, the Aircrew Industrial Tribunal Act 1971, and the Waterfront Industry Act 1976. These 3 consequential amendments are described below, following a brief discussion of the IRAA. The principal features of the IRAA are adjusttnents to institutional n1achinery, not substantive changes in parties' rights and liabilities. Section 3 inserts a new part IIA, with 12 sections, into the principal Act to provide a statutory basis for an annual sun1mit con-ference of the central wage fixing organisations. Section 16A directs that the Minister of Labour shall arrange a Tripartite Wage Conference, each year, between the government , the central organisations of both public and private employees (in CSU and the FOL or their successors in interest), the central organisation of employers and the State Services Co-1. "The law should protect rights to freedom of speech and association but should not compel anybody to exercise them. Accordingly, as far as trade unions and human rights are concerned, the protection of human freedom should come first. From a human right~ point of view, the law should encourage, but no coerce, men and women to take an active part in determining conditions in which they live and work. Equally the law should protect people from being constrained to join any association including an industrial union''. (p. 11) 32 W C Hodge ordinating Committee. Attendance is not cmapma., ,_ _ _.,...lalt...,. 16A{4) provides that no meeting shall takeplaceifa&yaaeef41ae,- • The minister must also give public notioe of the Tripl1&tae •• (a.aimn I6E), and must make submissions made by any peraoa . Tripar-tite Wage Conference, which is to be chaired by a Mmtlt• of 'dle CroWD (aect1011 16BJ shall be a forum for consultations about "the economic envfronmeat" aad ''the govem-ment's economic policies" as they effect wages and condltlona of employment (sectioD I6G). The consultations must relate to inflation, income dtatnbutioa, the of New Zealand industry, the implications of the soverament policies, unemployment, and the interests of low-paid workers (section 16G and H). The Tripartite Wqe Con-ference may make conclusions and recommendations, if arrived at unantmouslJ (section 161), but to the extent that any such recommendation is a percentage "guideline", that percentage shall operate as a guide to wage-fiXing tribunals, but shaJJ not have "any greater standing". (Section I6J ). In addition to this potentially useful annual summit conference, the 1984 IRAA also makes institutional adjustments to the constitution of the Arbitration Court, perhaps anticipating a 4 judge court, by providing for temporary nominated members, as well as acting nominated members (as per the 1977 IRAA). Section 7 of the 1984 Act ex-pands, and markedly changes the concept of voluntary settlmnents (section 65 of the principal Act) by allowing reference to the court on unresolved issues; issues then to be treated as part of the voluntary settlement. Section 8 of the 1984 Act extends the useful-ness of composite agreements (a special type of voluntary agreement under section 66 of the 1973 Act) by allowing latecoming unions and employers to become parties to a regis-tered agreement during its currency, and by allowing a union to withdraw by giving 7 days' notice (section 66( 11 )). An interesting feature of conciliated settlements, per section 82 of the principal Act, as inserted by section 10 of the 1984 IRAA, is a requirement for the assessors to memorialise any wage increases, for reasons for such increase, and a quan-tification of the components that go into such increase, such memorandum to be delivered to the Secretary of Labour, the central organisations and the Court. Section 13 of the 1984 IRAA amends section 84 of the principal Act by prohibiting a withdrawal (at the reference stage) under section 7 6 of the principal Act. Perhaps the primary substantive changes of note, contained in section 16 and 17 of the I984 IRAA, amend, respectively, section 115 ("Dispute of Rights") and section 117 {"personal grievances") of the principal Act by allowing the parties to measure and taylor their own disputes clause and personal grievance machinery, in lieu of the standard clauses set out in section I16 and section II 7( 4). The standard clauses will still be inserted into awards and agreements if the parties choose not to fashion one of their own. Finally, in a marked change in political-economic policy, a new section 86A directs the court, when making an award under section 86, to have regard to "the supply and demand factors for the skills of the workers" concerned, and not to be bound by historical precedent and practice. Other factors the court is directed to take into account include fairness and equity, changes in job content, changes in productivity and technology, and relativities. The consequential amendments, referred to above, in relation to the Agricultural Workers Act, the Aircrew Industry Tribunal Act, and the Waterfront Industry Act, are of a piece with the just noted section 86A. The respective wage-fiXing tribunals in the 3 industries are to take account of supply and demand factors and are not be bound by historical precedent and practice. In sum, then, it can be argued that National's 1984 legislation (the WREPDA) is characterised by intervention and the substitution of state direction for agreement between the parties. Labour's 1984 legislation (the IRAA and 3 consequential amendments) is characterised by loosening restraints on bargaining, giving greater scope for parties to create their own dispute resolution machinery, and directing wage fiXers to follow the market place instead of historical practice. Industrial relations legislation in 1 '984 33 Refe.rences HUinan Rights Con1n1ission (1985) J\1enzbership of Unions and the right to freedonz of association Wellington. List of cases Young, Janzes and JVebster v UK (1981) IRLR 408 . ~ I ' I . ~ ~( '·--~- c ~l 4 r or-ltbRAR'' 

Industrial relations legislation in 1984

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Industrial relations legislation in 1985

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