Coyle, William F.

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Torts - Wrongful Death - Suicide as Result of Uncontrollable Impulse Caused by Negligently Inflicted Injuries

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Volume 7 Issue 3 Article 11 1962 Torts - Wrongful Death - Suicide as Result of Uncontrollable Impulse Caused by Negligently Inflicted Injuries William F. Coyle Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr  Part of the Torts Commons Recommended Citation William F. Coyle, Torts - Wrongful Death - Suicide as Result of Uncontrollable Impulse Caused by Negligently Inflicted Injuries, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 494 (1962). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss3/11 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. VILLANOVA LAW REVIEWTORTS-WRNGVUL DEATH-SUICIDE AS RESULT OF UNCONTROLLABLEIMPULSE CAUSED BY NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED INJURIES.Orcutt v. Spokane County (Wash. 1961).On January 4, 1956, plaintiff's intestate was a passenger in an auto-mobile which fell into a road washout, as a result of which she sufferedserious and painful injuries and was compelled to undergo surgery. OnOctober 13, 1957, plaintiff's intestate took her life by consuming an over-dose of sleeping pills. In the interim, the decedent had consulted a neuro-psychiatrist and had three times been thwarted in suicide attempts. Plain-tiff administratrix brought a wrongful death action, alleging that decedent'sinjuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant county in main-taining the road where the accident occurred, and that decedent took herown life as a result of an uncontrollable impulse caused by pain andsuffering resulting from those injuries. The neuro-psychiatrist who hadexamined decedent testified in support of the latter allegation. The trialcourt dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that plaintiff'sevidence was insufficient to -show causal connection between the accidentand decedent's death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington withfour judges dissenting, reversed and remanded, holding that the evidenceraised a jury question as to whether decedent's suicide was a result ofan uncontrollable impulse resulting from a mental condition caused byher injuries. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 364 P.2d 1102 (Wash. 1961).The problem of the causal connection between a defendant's negli-gence and the harm suffered by his victim is generally dealt with bythe courts in terms of proximate cause.' This is, in effect, a limitationwhich the courts have deemed expedient, as a practical matter, to placeupon one's liability for the consequences of his acts, even though thoseacts have actually caused harm to another.2 Recovery in cases wheresuicide follows harm negligently inflicted upon the decedent is generallydenied on the ground that the negligence was not the proximate causeof death in that the suicide was an unforeseeable and intervening cause.8However, a defendant will be liable for the death of his victim if thelatter takes his life while in a mental state caused by his injuries, as aresult of which he either does not understand the nature of his actionsor their inevitable or probable consequences, or, realizing that his actswill culminate in death, he is powerless to govern his conduct rationallybecause of an uncontrollable impulse to take his life.4 This is, as even1. PROSSZR, TORTS § 44 (2d ed. 1955).2. North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894).3. Scheffer v. RR. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1882); Cooper v. Mass. Mutual LifeIns. Co., 102 Mass. 227 (1869); Long v. Omaha Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930(1922); McMahon v. City of New York, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1955).4. Tate v. Canonica, 181 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960); Elliot v.Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515, 176 S.E. 112 (1934); Brown v. AmericanSteel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (1909); Daniels v. N.Y. Ry. Co.,[VOL. 71Coyle: Torts - Wrongful Death - Suicide as Result of Uncontrollable ImpuPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962SPRING 1962]the dissenting judges in the instant case agree,5 the generally accepted caselaw on this point and it agrees with the rule set forth by the Restate-ment of Torts6 and the leading text writers.7  Although damages havebeen awarded for suicidal death under workmen's compensation laws,8and in situations involving the special duty owed to patients by hospitals,9plaintiffs in negligence actions involving suicide in most cases have notobtained favorable results, generally because the difficulty of establishingproximate or legal causation is by no means slight; proof that decedentdid not understand what he was doing when he took his life, or that heacted under an uncontrollable impulse may often be difficult to obtain."Added to this evidentiary obstacle to recovery is the ghost of the oldcommon law abhorrence of suicide which lingers yet today."1 Unlike thenegligent tortfeasor, however, whose purse is often put beyond the graspof the plaintiff by these barriers to recovery, the intentional tortfeasor isliable if his conduct was a substantial factor1 2 in bringing about harm ofthe general type which he intended.1 3 The fact that his" conduct causesharm through an independent force for which he is not responsible, orthat the intervention of this new force was entirely- unexpected mattersnot, if the tortious conduct is intentional.1 4The instant case clearly sets forth the prevailing rule of law in thisarea,15 yet the case differs from most others in that it allows recovery ina situation where other tribunals have refused to do so. In vain didthe court attempt to find authority for the result it reached. Illustrative183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 425 (1903) ; Cooper v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass.227 (1869); Long v. Omaha Ry., 108 Neb. 342, 187 N.W. 930 (1922); McMahonv. City of N.Y., 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Arsnow v. Red Top Cab Co.,159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930).5. Orcutt v. Spokane County, 364 P.2d 1102, 1110 (Wash. 1961).6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 455 (1934).7. PROSSER, TORTS §49 (2d ed. 1955).8. Zytkewich v. Ford Motor Co., 340 Mich. 309, 65 N.W.2d 813 (1954); Nohev. Sheffield Farms, 163 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Allen v. Industrial Comm'n,110 Utah 328, 172 P.2d 669 (1946).9. Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 Atl. 81 (1934); Murray v.St. Mary's Hosp., 113 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Spivey v. St. Thomas Hosp.,31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450 (1947).10. Very often, a person attempting to recover in a situation like the presentone will encounter difficulty when seeking to obtain the testimony of psychiatristswho often object to the way in which they are forced to present their opiniontestimony insofar as they are forced to restrict their answers to the questionsof counsel. Others do not like to be used as partisans, while still others rebel againstcertain phraseology used in the courtroom. For example, some psychiatrists con-tend that the phrase "irresistible impulse" has no reality in mental life. See Gutt-macher, Why Psychiatrists Do Not Like To Testify In Court, 1 PRAc. LAw. 50(1955). See note 20, infra.11. At common law suicide was a crime. . . . the suicide is. guilty of adouble offense; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and rushinginto His immediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal, against the king, whohath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects . . . making it a peculiarspecies of felony ... committed on one's self." 4 BLACKSTONZ'S COMMENTARIES 189(8th ed. 1778).12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 279, 280 (1934).13. Id.14. See note 12, supra.15. See note 4, supra.CASE NOTES2Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1962], Art. 11https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss3/11VILLANOVA LAW REVIEWof this difficulty is the previous Washington case of Arsnow v. RedTop Cab Co.,16 which was relied upon by the court to a great extent forthe rule announced there. In Arsnow, a case factually similar to thepresent one, the court expressly approved the rule applied in the instantcase, but significantly it held as a matter of law17 that sufficient evidencehad not been produced to establish that death was caused by the de-fendant's negligence. The plaintiff in Arsnow, like the plaintiff in theinstant case, offered expert testimony to prove that the decedent was in-sane at the time of his death. This expert opinion, however, was notgiven the weight which the court in this case attached to it.28 In Danielsv. N.Y. Ry. Co.'9 there was also expert testimony that the decedent wasinsane at the time of his death, but the court, in denying recovery, wasevidently not as much impressed by such expertise as was the courthere.20 Perhaps the essential weakness of the instant case is the court'sfailure to distinguish between an "impulse" and a "compulsion," theformer being a spontaneous involuntary tendency to action which cannotbe traced directly to external stimuli, while the latter is traceable tosome irresistible stimulus or suggestion, such as the obsession of decedentto take her life.21 From the facts of the instant case, it appears thatdecedent's suicide resulted from a compulsion of many months' duration,rather than from a sudden impulse to commit suicide. Perhaps therule in the instant case should be stated so as to allow recovery wheresuicide is caused by an uncontrollable "urge" or "drive" to take one'slife. This would avoid the distinction heretofore drawn by the courtsbetween "impulse" and "compulsion,"' ' but it would not overcome the16. See note 4, supra. Decedent was injured by one of defendant's vehiclesand, after threatening several times to take his life, shot himself with a pistol whichhe had been hiding under his pillow.17. 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436, 444 (1930).18. 364 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Wash. 1961).19. See note 4, supra.20. After "shopping around" for expert opinion favorable to their respectivepositions, litigants then offer such expert opinion testimony to a jury often in-competent to resolve conflict in the scientific opinions. See McCormick, Some Obser-vations Upon The Opinion Rule And Expert Testimony, 23 Tzx. L. Rgv. 109 (1945).The use of neutral court-appointed experts has been widely recommended to correctthis weakness. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding ExpertTestimony, 15 HARV. L. Rxv. 40, 56 (1901); Morgan, Suggested Remedy forObstruction To Expert Testimony By Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CI. L. Rzv. 285,293 (1943) ; Van Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expert System: The Judicial Pointof View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386 (1961). McCoxosicK, EvIDmNc, 35, 38 (1954). Thissuggestion has, of course, been implemented in some jurisdictions, such as the U.S.District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.21. WARREN, DICTIONARY Or PSYCHOLOGY (1934). On the validity of the dis-tinction see also COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN Lirz 215 (2d ed.1956).22. Anderson v. Armour, 257 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960). Decedentgrabbed a knife and plunged it into a piece of meat. Shortly thereafter he wasfound dead in his truck with his wrists slashed. In Blasczak v. Crown Cork, 193Pa. Super. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (1960), which it should be noted arose under the Penn-sylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, decedent's leg was amputated after an acci-dent. His wife found him hanged. He left no note, nor had he ever given anyindication of suffering from melancholia. In both cases, plaintiffs recovered judg-ments, relying on the uncontrollable impulse rule.[VOL. 73Coyle: Torts - Wrongful Death - Suicide as Result of Uncontrollable ImpuPublished by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962

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Torts - Wrongful Death - Suicide as Result of Uncontrollable Impulse Caused by Negligently Inflicted Injuries

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