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                  84085.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access)CT-RSA 210, 1 januari 201

Batina, L.

Gierlichs, B.

Pieprzyk, J.

Preneel, B.

Verbauwhede, I.

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Revisiting higher-order DPA attacks: Multivariate mutual information analysis

Radboud Repository

Security devices are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that perform statistical analysis on data leaked from cryptographic computations.
Higher-order (HO) attacks are a powerful approach to break protected implementations. They inherently demand multivariate
statistics because multiple aspects of signals have to be analyzed jointly. However,
all published works on HO attacks follow the approach to first apply a pre-processing function to map
the multivariate problem to a univariate problem and then to apply established $1^{st}$ order techniques.
We propose a novel and different approach to HO attacks, Multivariate Mutual Information Analysis (MMIA), that allows to directly evaluate joint statistics without pre-processing. While this approach can benefit from a good power model, it also works without an assumption.
A thorough empirical evaluation of MMIA and established HO attacks confirms the overwhelming advantage of the new approach: MMIA is more efficient and less affected by noise. Most important and opposed to all published approaches, MMIA\u27s measurement cost grows sub-exponentially with the attack order. As a consequence, the security provided by the masking countermeasure needs to be reconsidered as $3^{rd}$ and higher order attacks become very practical

Benedikt Gierlichs

Lejla Batina

Bart Preneel

Ingrid Verbauwhede

Cryptology ePrint Archive

Revisiting Higher-Order DPA Attacks: Multivariate Mutual Information Analysis

Abstract. Security devices are vulnerable to side-channel attacks that perform statistical analysis on data leaked from cryptographic computa-tions. Higher-order (HO) attacks are a powerful approach to break pro-tected implementations. They inherently demand multivariate statistics because multiple aspects of signals have to be analyzed jointly. How-ever, most works on HO attacks follow the approach to first apply a pre-processing function to map the multivariate problem to a univariate problem and then to apply established 1st order techniques. We propose a novel and different approach to HO attacks, Multivariate Mutual Infor-mation Analysis (MMIA), that allows to directly evaluate joint statistics without pre-processing. While this approach can benefit from a good power model, it also works without an assumption. We present the first experimental results for 2nd and 3rd order MMIA as well as state-of-the-art HO attacks based on real measurements. A thorough empirical evaluation confirms the advantage of the new approach: 3rd order MMIA attacks require about 800 measurements to achieve 100 % success while state-of-the-art HODPA requires 1000 measurements to achieve about 40 % success. As a consequence, the security provided by the masking countermeasure needs to be reconsidered as 3rd and possibly higher or-der attacks become more practical. 

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Revisiting higher-order DPA attacks: Multivariate mutual information analysis

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Radboud Repository

Cryptology ePrint Archive

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