Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Abstract
In contrast to the preceding article, Professor Kennedy argues that executive discretion in trade remedies often destroys the protection for domestic industry that the U.S. trade relief process intends to give. As a background for his discussion, Professor Kennedy uses the protracted litigation over Zenith Radio Corporation’s challenge to a Commerce Department settlement of massive antidumping duties imposed against Japanese television importers. Professor Kennedy concludes that the Carter Administration’s settlement of all claims for antidumping duties, for approximately one-half of the duties originally imposed, denied meaningful relief to American industries. Professor Kennedy asserts Congress intended to limit executive discretion in antidumping law under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, but that the courts in Zenith Radio misconstrued congressional intent. Professor Kennedy concludes that Congress should expressly limit executive discretion in trade relief in legislation such as the Omnibus Trade Bill
