Pensiero e azione: l’habit peirceano tra enattivismo e cognizione distribuita
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Abstract
The proposal of this paper is to show how the pragmatist approach to
meaning developed by Pearce reveals important relations with some central trends of
contemporary cognitive science. These theories, like Peircean philosophy, detach
themselves from the dualistic idea of a completely inner thought, conceiving external
expressions as authentic part of the cognitive system. In order to argue this, I will
show how: i) the concept of belief, whose aim is to produce a readiness to act,
presents interesting parallels with the enactivist conception of habit, interpreted as an
immediate “know-how”; ii) the notion of habit, arising from a cultural and social
dimension, puts Peircean cognitive semiotics in contact with those theories that
conceive cognition as a distributed activity; i.e. situated both pragmatically and
within a social and cultural environment. Assuming these reference points, I will
show how Peircean pragmatism represents an interesting theoretical background of
the current needs to reconfigure the role of action, its products and its context of
realization