Tempo, soggettivita', esperienza. Per un'ermeneutica trascendentale e fenomenologica del rapporto aporetico tra esperienza soggettiva e analisi neuro scientifica della percezione e dell'azione.
The first chapter deals with one of the most radical questions in neuroscience regarding our perceptual experience: how is the stability and continuity of our experience generated, given the distortions emerging from the comparison between the experimentally recorded neural time and the lived time emerging from subjective referrals? Here, we critically examine the concept of distortion, which makes sense only in as much as the clock time and the geometrical space are regarded as absolute.
In the second chapter we examine the experiments that, starting from B. Libet's works, seem to undermine the existence of our free will, especially because of the existence of neural processes that precedes voluntary motor acts, making it possible for neuroscientists to read our decisions before we become aware of them. Here, a Kantian interpretation of conscious decisions allows us to find room for our freedom as the essence of humankind.
The third chapter evaluates the literature on the relationship between consciousness, action, and perception, stressing in particular their intrinsic presence in every act of constitution of spatial and temporal experience.
In the fourth chapter we analyze the binding problem, i.e. the problem of the global interconnection of our experience. We suggest that a process very similar to the Kantian structures of subjectivity as transcendental forms of our synthetic, coherent, and meaningful experience underlies the neural process of binding.
In the fifth chapter, the neuroquantistic interpretations of consciousness, according to which consciousness is a de-temporalized dynamic subjective structure, are shown to be very close to the Kantian concept of the transcendental unity of consciousness. In particular, the transcendental schematism allows for the detection of a possible reunification of our subjective experience and the scientific inquiry of action and perception.
Finally, we propose an innovative view of the relationship between consciousness, space, and time. Inspired by Kant's transcendental perspective, by Husserl's phenomenology, as well as by Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, and by Heidegger's notion of being-in-the world, we articulate a deep interpretation of the recently discovered neural mechanisms, by virtue of which subjectivity processes the active in-formation of objectivity.
The topic of the appendix is constituted by mirror neurons, whose behavior allows for a better understanding of intersubjective experience
