A widespread design approach in distributed applications based on the
service-oriented paradigm, such as web-services, consists of clearly separating
the enforcement of authorization policies and the workflow of the applications,
so that the interplay between the policy level and the workflow level is
abstracted away. While such an approach is attractive because it is quite
simple and permits one to reason about crucial properties of the policies under
consideration, it does not provide the right level of abstraction to specify
and reason about the way the workflow may interfere with the policies, and vice
versa. For example, the creation of a certificate as a side effect of a
workflow operation may enable a policy rule to fire and grant access to a
certain resource; without executing the operation, the policy rule should
remain inactive. Similarly, policy queries may be used as guards for workflow
transitions.
In this paper, we present a two-level formal verification framework to
overcome these problems and formally reason about the interplay of
authorization policies and workflow in service-oriented architectures. This
allows us to define and investigate some verification problems for SO
applications and give sufficient conditions for their decidability.Comment: 16 pages, 4 figures, full version of paper at Symposium on Secure
Computing (SecureCom09