Razpravljati o argumentiranju v reviji za ustavnost zahteva, po mojem mnenju, dva koraka. Najprej je treba pojasniti, kakšna je vloga argumentiranja v odnosu do prava v ustavnih državah, to pa končno pripelje tudi do vprašanja, kako je sodobno ustavništvo spremenilo naše razumevanje prava in na neki način pripeljalo do tega, da v ospredje postavljamo argumentativno razsežnost prava: da torej govorimo o pravu kot argumentiranju. Le od tod naprej, v drugem koraku, se je mogoče lotiti vprašanja, kaj naj se razume pod »ustavno argumentacijo« in kaj, kratkomalo, pod »argumentacijo«, kako se med seboj razlikuje ustavno argumentiranje, ki ga izvajajo zakonodajalci, ustavni sodniki ali redni sodniki, kateri argumentativni obrazci se uporabljajo, katera merila pravilnosti je treba upoštevati, kateri cilji se zasledujejo itd.The historical process of the constitutionalisation of our legal systems is closely connected with progressive development of the argumentative practices. It has lead to a new perception of the law in general that is no longer compatible with legal positivism. In the core of this perception are the (neo)constitutionalist theories developing from the end of the 70’s onwards (Ferrajoli, Dworkin, Alexy, Nino, MacCormick and Raz). According to Atienza, they have in common fourteen characteristic features and reveal the importance of the argumentative dimension of the law. However, even those scholars who do not accept the neoconstitutionalist view place emphasis on this dimension.A distinction will be made between the formal, the material and the pragmatic (the dialectical and the rhetorical) dimension of the argumentation. Although legal argumentation consists of all these elements, it is still possible to discriminate different fields of legal argumentation in which one of them plays more or less a distinctive role. The argumentation of advocates is essentially dialectical (when pleading against the other party) and rhetorical (when trying to persuade a judge). The formal dimension is characteristic of jurisprudential and dogmatic analyses of legal texts and sentences whereas the material dimension is the gist of justifications of judicial decisions.The specificity of these justifications in easy cases diverges from that in hard cases, which usually go to the highest courts. The difficulty of a particular hard case may arise from the facts (thus posing the questions of evidence and qualification) or from the norms (raising the questions of relevance and interpretation). In addition to an internal justification, the hard cases also require an external justification based on the principles of practical reasoning such as the principles of universality, consistency, coherency, and acceptability of consequences. Moreover, the type of reasoning employed depends on the nature of the legal sentences that are applicable in a case at hand. Thus Atienza presents four typical formulas of legal reasoning: the subsumptive modus ponens (used in application of action rules), the formula of adequateness (used in a case of applying end rules), the weight formula balancing the principles of action and the one that is used in order to balance directives (principles of end).Given the fact that the constitutional argumentation is mostly characterised by weight formulas, Atienza discusses the question of relationship between the interpretation and balancing. Are these the same activities? Does one presuppose or encompass the other? Since the principles and directives are formulated in a vague and open manner, they, in fact, require both interpretation and balancing. There is no measure to predict the result of these two activities. Nonetheless, there are certain criteria which give the lead and pose the limitations to the reasoning of different constitutional agents. In conclusion, Atienza discusses these criteria and their respective application in the argumentative spheres of legislator, ordinary courts and constitutional judges
