These two works are useful additions to the growing literature on China-Africa relations and on the emergence of South-South linkages in general.  Two very different books, to be sure: one is a special issue of the journal Outre-Terre that ambitiously sets out to draw up a multidimensional account of this new “Chinafrican connexion.” The other is an essay seeking to chart the course of Sino-Indian-African Relations until 2030, its subtitle somewhat at odds with its main conclusion. While thes..

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre

English

OpenEdition

 
China Perspectives 
2013/2 | 2013
Real Estate Speculation and its Social Consequences
“Chinafrique, avez-vous dit?” (Chinafrica, did you
say?), Outre-Terre / Jean-Joseph Boillot and
Stanislas Dembinski, Chindiafrique. La Chine, l’Inde et
l’Afrique feront le monde de demain (Chindiafrica:
China, India, and Africa will shape tomorrow’s
world)
Revue européenne de géopolitique – European journal of geopolitics),
No. 30, December 2011, 442 pp. / Paris, Odile Jacob, 2013, 370 pp.
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Translator: N. Jayaram
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6205
DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.6205
ISSN: 1996-4617
Publisher
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 June 2013
Number of pages: 85-86
ISSN: 2070-3449
 
Electronic reference
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, « “Chinafrique, avez-vous dit?” (Chinafrica, did you say?), Outre-Terre / Jean-
Joseph Boillot and Stanislas Dembinski, Chindiafrique. La Chine, l’Inde et l’Afrique feront le monde de
demain (Chindiafrica: China, India, and Africa will shape tomorrow’s world) », China Perspectives
[Online], 2013/2 | 2013, Online since 01 June 2013, connection on 24 September 2020. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6205  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.
6205 
© All rights reserved
JEAN-PIERRE  CABESTAN
These two works are useful additions to the growing literature onChina-Africa relations and on the emergence of South-South linkagesin general. 
Two very different books, to be sure: one is a special issue of the journal
Outre-Terre that ambitiously sets out to draw up a multidimensional ac-
count of this new “Chinafrican connexion.” The other is an essay seeking to
chart the course of Sino-Indian-African Relations until 2030, its subtitle
somewhat at odds with its main conclusion. While these two studies, or
rather collections of studies, complement each other, neither seeks to cover
the subject exhaustively. With 54 states (55 if Western Sahara is included),
Africa is obviously diverse and fragmented. Moreover, works on relations
between Africa and China (and Asia) tend to avoid North Africa, for wholly
understandable reasons – its close links to the Middle East. While Outre-
terre has chosen to omit North Africa, Chindiafrique has opted to include
it, but rather vaguely, the kernel of its argumentation and examples being
focused on Sub-Saharan Africa.
Those unfamiliar with the journal Outre-terre might be surprised by the
structure and style of the special issue. The volume, divided into seven dis-
tinct parts and 47 articles, is a long collection of research analyses and many
brief reports on a number of facets of Chinafrica. It is no doubt informative.
But the choice of contributions was not motivated by a desire to identify
and classify the main characteristics of the new dimension this relationship
has taken. It seems to have stemmed from the primary aim of gathering
together research on the theme in France. Of course, there are a number of
foreign contributions, including Deborah Brautigam’s previously published
essay in English on Chinese special economic zones in Africa, and a short
article by former US ambassador David Shinn focusing on American per-
ceptions of Sino-African relations. (1) Similarly, an interview with Mthuli
Ncube, Chief Economist at the African Development Bank, provides an “in-
side view” on the Chinese economic presence in Africa. The articles were
mainly pulled together by sinologist Thierry Pairault, director of research at
CNRS (France’s National Centre for Scientific Research), and many were
written by a research group and doctoral candidates he has led and super-
vised at EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences). This is not
a criticism; quite the contrary. All the contributions, even the briefest ones,
contain information or ideas on the true nature of Chinafrica. That said, if a
criticism can be made, it is that of eclecticism or more precisely, the incom-
plete and at times arbitrary nature of the mosaic created.
It is impossible to do justice to all of the articles. Only the most useful
and novel ones will be pointed out. In the introductory part, Lin Yue of the
University of Applied Management in Beijing provides basic comparative
data on Sino-African trade. The much more original and detailed analysis
of Ronan Morin-Allory, a PhD candidate at University of Paris IV-Sorbonne,
on “Beijing’s media machine” in Africa offers an excellent and welcome as-
sessment. The volume’s first part, entitled “Chinafrican Myth,” includes two
contributions by Thierry Pairault showing how limited Chinese direct invest-
ment has remained ($9 billion in 2009), whereas trade topped $200 billion
in 2012. A good article by Laurent Hou, also a PhD candidate at Paris IV,
sets the record straight on the so-called Chinese land grab in Africa: the real
picture of so-called “land acquisitions” (mostly rented or leased) by outside
operators (Chinese, Indians, or others) highlights among other things the
extent of uncultivated arable land on the continent (31% of the world total,
according to the FAO, and as cited by Boillot and Dembinski, p. 285): while
such transfers pose several problems and must be dissected with care, the
stand of African states and experts on this issue is more nuanced than is
often surmised. The second part – “African Polygon” – notably includes an
article on Chinese investments in central Africa by the Brazzaville-based ac-
ademic Théophile Dzaka-Kikouta, and another by Lucy Corkin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies on the role of the Exim Bank and what is
known as the “Angolan Model” (oil for concessional loans). The third part –
“Resistible Rise” – introduces other actors, especially European and including
French, and tries to pinpoint sources of competition as well as factors of
cooperation. The most original contribution is no doubt the one authored
by Arnaud Chaumasse on what I would call the “competitive coexistence”
between “Françafrique” – or what remains of it – and Chinafrica. The last
four parts are much shorter, containing rushed images rather than articles
on, for instance, cultural frictions between Africans and Chinese, the now
marginal competition between Beijing and Taipei on the continent, and the
state of research on Africa in the People’s Republic or on Africans in China.
All of these make up a kaleidoscope that provides the reader with a host
of information on some of the multiple facets of the Chinafrica relationship. 
Chindiafrica presents other problems: like all other prospective works it is
both stimulating and frustrating. Armed with statistics and citing authors
and theories, notably Albert Hirschman and Amartya Sen (which is wel-
come), Indian economy expert Jean-Joseph Boillot and financial journalist
Stanislas Dembinski raise useful questions, but the answers are a range of
possibilities and potentially contradictory paths that may contribute to
weakening and even undermining their thesis, or at least the one flagged in
the title and introduction. What is it?
Chindiafrica’s main thesis is that of a “global rebalancing” benefiting not only
China but also India and Africa, which unlike Brazil, Russia, or Japan constitute
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 85
Book reviews
“Chinafrique, avez-vous dit?”
(Chinafrica, did you say?), 
Outre-Terre (Revue européenne de
géopolitique – European journal of
geopolitics), No. 30, December 2011,
442 pp. 
Jean-Joseph Boillot and 
Stanislas Dembinski, 
Chindiafrique. La Chine, l’Inde et
l’Afrique feront le monde de de-
main (Chindiafrica: China, India,
and Africa will shape tomorrow’s
world), Paris, Odile Jacob, 2013, 
370 pp.
1. David Shinn is also joint author (with Joshua Eisenmann) of China and Africa: A Century of En-
gagement, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, reviewed in this issue by Leïla Choukroune.
FRÉDÉRIC  PUPPATTI
Far from being yet another panoramic account of China’s economicand diplomatic breakthroughs, this latest work by François Godementtakes readers (whether well-versed in contemporary China or not)
through the arcana of Communist Party politics a few months after one of
the worst political scandals in the history of the People’s Republic and at a
time when it is witnessing a top-level changing of guard that will guide it
through the decade to come.
Chapter 1 briefly reviews the case of Bo Xilai, the former Party Secretary
for Chongqing Municipality (pp. 17-34). Bo sought to turn the autonomous
city into a political, economic, and social laboratory for China by promoting
the Great Helmsman’s thoughts (especially by encouraging “Red Songs” in
the city’s public spaces). He wanted to use his successful crackdown on
crime as a launch-pad to the highest rungs of power. His downfall consti-
tuted the first real shakeup at the top since the 1989 Tiananmen events.
“incomparable continental and human masses” and whose “trilateral relations
are poised to play a role in structuring tomorrow’s world” (p. 9). Europe rejects
this rebalancing, which will determine the future of developed countries and
fundamentally reduce their relative political influence and economic might. 
In terms of changes in human resources (Part 1), Chindiafrica will account
for half the world’s population in 2030. And in 2050 it will also have half the
world’s human capital. In economic terms (Part 2), the grouping’s total GDP
(in purchasing power parity) will rise from a fourth to almost half of the
world’s in 2030 (China: 25%, India: 10%, and Africa: 11%) and 60% in 2050,
the authors say, although they are careful enough not to come up with precise
estimates. Of course, in 2030, the West will retain technological supremacy
in terms of innovation (Part 3), but “Chindia” and then Africa will be able to
adopt “low cost and frugal processes and business models” that are innovative
and better suited to their needs. The authors cite the success of Huawei or
the Indian “little cool” refrigerator in Africa as promising illustrations. 
All these changes could lead to industrialisation and agricultural moderni-
sation in Africa and as a result reduce pressure on natural and agricultural
resources (Part 4). Here, Boillot and Dembinski sound more cautious but on
the whole optimistic: oil-rich African countries could overcome the “curse
of black gold,” or the so-called “Dutch Disease,” China and India have the
capacity to become less voracious for hydrocarbons and other raw materi-
als, and Chindiafrica has the potential to become self-sufficient in food. The
authors also sound upbeat when it comes to the political consequences of
the shakeup (Part 5), while noting the weaknesses and contestations of the
“Chinese Model,” India’s soft state, the insurmountable fractures of the
African continent, and the US capacity for rebound, as well as the attrac-
tiveness of the European Union’s institutional norms.
What conclusion does this prospective analysis indicate? Many questions
and propositions, but no real conclusion. Actually, that is what the authors
have done. How will the main actors in this new grouping and other coun-
tries or groups of states, such as Europe, react and adapt to these changes?
No one knows. What Boillot and Dembinski seek to promote is a “moderated
globalisation” rightly inspired by the economist Dany Rodrik. (2) It is difficult
to disagree with this, seeing how China and India have sought to protect
themselves selectively against what they see as the destabilising currents
of “hyper-globalisation,” strongly suggesting that African countries
strengthen their states and do likewise, including vis-à-vis China and India.
That is precisely what Nigerian central bank governor Lamido Sanusi pro-
posed recently in a well-publicised op-ed highly critical of China. (3)
The main weakness of this work, it should be clear, lies not in observing
the unprecedented emergence of South-South economic, political, and
human linkages, especially among the three entities chosen, but rather in
the nature, coherence, and density of the trilateral relationship that forms
the basis of the authors’ approach. It is questionable whether China, India,
and Africa constitute a relevant grouping. The expanding relations and com-
plementarities among these economies are known, but what is their future
weight relative to US/EU relations, China/developed countries, and even
Brazil/Africa or the famous BRICS? What this book lacks is a comparative
and prospective analysis of the economic flows and diplomatic-strategic re-
lations among China, India, and Africa as well as among the current and fu-
ture main partners of these three entities. Thus, Sino-Indian economic and
political relations would most probably remain a complex mix of relatively
limited cooperation and lasting strategic competition. China’s weight in Africa
is heavy, India’s lighter, but tomorrow the two powers will have to continue
to face other major actors, such as the aforementioned Brazil, the United
States, EU, Japan… and South Africa. Moreover, the persistent tensions among
Chindiafrica – and within Africa – are not really addressed in the book’s
prospective construction. For instance, while the new Chinese diaspora in
Africa (one to five million people) represents a small share of the emigration
from the People’s Republic, it greatly influences local economies (or at least
some of them) and constitutes a source of real inter-community tension. 
All in all, it is clear that the weight of Chindiafrica or of the South in general
will keep growing, but neither constitutes a coherent grouping. Even less
than the BRICS, in fact. One is a statistical aggregate with no real projects or
common objectives, the other a convenient concept that includes not only
political regimes and cultures that are bound to remain very different but
also economies that, given the intrinsically unequal nature of development,
have increasingly less in common. Rebalancing, yes, but Chindiafrica will not
by itself make up tomorrow’s world. China, India, and Africa will contribute
to it no doubt by cooperating and also by squabbling occasionally. 
z Translated by N. Jayaram.
z Jean-Pierre Cabestan is Senior Researcher at CNRS, Professor at
Hong Kong Baptist University, Associate Researcher at Asia Centre,
Paris and CEFC, Hong Kong (cabestan@hkbu.edu.hk).
86 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 3 / 2
China p e r s p e c t i v e s
2. The Paradox of Globalization: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, New York, W.W.
Norton & Co., 2011.
3. “Africa must get real about its romance with China,” Financial Times, 12 March 2013, pp. 1 and 9.
François Godement,
Que veut la Chine? De Mao au
capitalisme (What does China
want? From Mao to capitalism),
Paris, Odile Jacob, 2012, 283 pp.


“Chinafrique, avez-vous dit?” (Chinafrica, did you say?), Outre-Terre / Jean-Joseph Boillot and Stanislas Dembinski, Chindiafrique. La Chine, l’Inde et l’Afrique feront le monde de demain (Chindiafrica: China, India, and Africa will shape tomorrow’s world)

http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/pdf/6205

“Chinafrique, avez-vous dit?” (Chinafrica, did you say?), Outre-Terre / Jean-Joseph Boillot and Stanislas Dembinski, Chindiafrique. La Chine, l’Inde et l’Afrique feront le monde de demain (Chindiafrica: China, India, and Africa will shape tomorrow’s world)

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

OpenEdition