People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 116, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1962)

Frederic Dufaux

Susie J. Wee

John G. Apostolopoulos

Touradj Ebrahimi

Mack, Thomas C.

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law

Buffalo Law Review Volume 13 Number 1 Article 28 10-1-1963 Criminal Law and Procedure—Legal Insanity Not Established By Showing Defendant Operates Under Own Standard Of Morality Thomas C. Mack Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview  Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Thomas C. Mack, Criminal Law and Procedure—Legal Insanity Not Established By Showing Defendant Operates Under Own Standard Of Morality, 13 Buff. L. Rev. 200 (1963). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol13/iss1/28 This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. BUFFALO LAW REVIEWrelease because he may have feared that his wife would be charged with therevolver violation again, if he didn't give the testimony after he gave the falseinformation. In regard to the difference between a promise for testimony and apromise for information, the Appellate Division majority in the instant casesaid that they were the same in substance.20 It seems impractical that the prose-cutor would not use the informant after information is given. In fact, the prose-cutor received testimony from Gramando at the trial. It seems that the juryshould know about the promise for information so that it can consider whetherthe witness was deceptive when he gave the information and continued tellingfalsehoods at the trial. Jurors rather than appellate courts should evaluate thewitness' credibility.21 The physical benefit of the promise to the witness mayrun to the witness' wife, but this does not mean that the husband will not fabri-cate for his wife. In this case the witness wanted his wife free for his baby'ssake. He said "my baby means more to me than anybody. ' 2 2 Even thoughthese considerations exist, it is apparent that the jurors were sufficiently in-formed of the facts surrounding the promise for the information. But, a casewith a weaker indication of the witness' interest in testifying should warranta new trial.Anthony S. KowalskiLEGAL INSANITY NOT ESTABLISHED BY SHOWING DEFENDANT OPERATES UNDEROWN STANDARD OF MORALITYDefendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced todeath. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the defense urged that defendant wasinsane in that he believed his acts to be pursuant to the command of God. De-fendant's statement to an Assistant District Attorney revealed that while pan-handling on Broadway, he obtained an invitation from one Rescigno to spendthe night at the latter's apartment; that defendant intended to rob Rescigno;that following extensive drinking at the apartment, defendant learned thatRescigno was degenerate; that defendant thereafter killed both Rescigno andone Sess, Rescigno's roommate, who was asleep in another room; that defendanthated degenerates and believed himself to be commissioned by God to kill them;that he was able to deceive psychiatrists into believing that he was insane, andthat he had perpetrated such deception while in prison for a prior conviction inorder -that he could thereby obtain privileges not allowed in prison. At trial, ex-pert testimony on the issue of legal insanity clashed, although it appeared thatdefendant was not able to control his impulses, had a pathological personality,and had an undeveloped moral judgment. Held, conviction affirmed, three judgesdissenting. Legal insanity is not established where one operates under a standard20. People v. Romeo, 16 A.D. 2d 240, 242, 226 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (1st Dep't 1962).21. People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153, 163, 81 N.E.2d 65, 70 (1948).22. People v. Romeo, 16 A.D.2d 240, 241, 226 N.Y.S.2d, 957, 998 (1st Dep't 1962).COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERMof right and wrong set by himself, and is unable to control his impulses, wherehe does have the intellectual capacity to know an act is wrong according to thecommonly accepted standards of morality and contrary to the laws of God andman. People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 116, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1962).In 1843, the historic M'Naghten Rule' was formulated and to the presentday has governed almost exclusively the determination of criminal responsibilityin Anglo-American jurisprudence. The M'Naghten Rule is generally acceptedin most United States jurisdictions, but noteworthy attempts have been madefor change and modernization. In 1870, New Hampshire adopted the rule ofnon-criminal responsibility where the unlawful act is the product of mentaldisease or defect.2 In New Hampshire no set, defined rule exists to determinethe issue of insanity; the question is one of fact to be determined by the circum-stances of the particular case. The New Hampshire rule in essence was in 1954made the law of the District of Columbia in the now famous Durham case.3The court in Durham referred to the Gowers Report 4 where, in the M'Naghtenjurisdiction, the disparity between the M'Naghten concept of insanity and thatof modern medical science had been deplored. 5 In that report, the embodimentof the modern theory of insanity as affecting as a whole the action of an integralmind composed of intellect, emotions and will into the legal concept of insanitywas urged. The New Mexico court, refusing to abolish the M'Naghten Rule,expanded it by adding thereto the additional test of the deprivation or loss of thepower of will as constituting non-criminal responsibility. 6 In all instances ofreform of the M'Naghten Rule, the stress is upon the failure of the M'Naghtentest to account for the elements of will and emotions in the human psyche.The one hundred twenty year old M'Naghten language has been consistentlyand rigidly followed in New York in spite of the psychological and psycho-pathological advances since 1843. One obvious explanation is the judicially de-clared separation of the concept of legal insanity from that of the concept ofmedical insanity, 7 which naturally tends to the strait-jacketing of .the expertmedical witness, creates a double terminology confusing to both lawyer andpsychiatrist, and renders the legal concept static, depriving it of the nurture ofthe advances and insights of modern medical science. Other explanations can befound in limiting precedents ruling out as bases for relief from criminal respon-sibility low mentality or epilepsy,8 weak or disordered mind, 9 irresistible im-1. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).2. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).4. Gowers, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 (1954).5. Gowers, op. cit. supra note 4, at 73-129, as discussed in Durham v. United States,214 F.2d 862, 870-71 nn.26 & 28 (D.C. Cir. 1954).6. State v. White, 58 N.. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).7. People v. Nyhan, 37 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 74, 171 N.Y. Supp. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1918).8. People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928).9. People v. Farmer, 194 N.Y. 251, 87 N.E. 457 (1909).201BUFFALO LAW REVIEWpulse,10 morbid propensity," alcoholic mania,12 psychopathic personality,"3 andlow moral perceptions.14In the instant case, evidence was uncontroverted that defendant had brutallybeaten and killed the two old men. Paroled one month before from a sentencefor murder in the second degree, a history of three other killings and an attemptedsuicide followed by a period of confinement at Dannemora State Hospital waspresented. Four psychiatrists were called by the defense and two by the People.One prosecution psychiatrist testified that while no signs of a psychotic condi-tion were noted by him in his examination of defendant, "inability to controlhis impulses" was noted and described as a "pathological sign but not legalinsanity." The majority opinion, seemingly relying heavily upon -the testimonyof the People's psychiatrists, refused to upset the verdict, holding that the evi-dence showed that defendant knew "not only the nature and quality of his acts,but also that they were wrong," even though the evidence was clear that "Woodwas not well balanced mentally," and thus that legal insanity was not establishedaccording to the standard of the Penal Law.' 5 Judge Fuld, while agreeing withthe majority that the People proved its case on the insanity question "under thelaw of .this State as it now stands," expressed disfavor with the present "right-wrong" test as being unreal if not invalid, and dissented on other grounds.10 Ina separate dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Desmond and Judge Van Voorhisreached the opposite conclusion that by the clear weight of the evidence de-fendant was legally insane according to section 1120 of the Penal Law.' 7 Theinstant case pointedly poses the question of the desirability and the justiceof retaining the test of section 1120 of the Penal Law as it now stands. Thedicta in the dissent registered by Judge Fuld in the instant case questions thevalidity of its application; the dissent of Chief Judge Desmond and Judge VanVoorhis raises serious questions as to its workability and precision as a test ofcriminal responsibility.The basic need is to formulate and have an accurate legal standard tomeasure criminal responsibility. In all jurisdictions questioning the adequacy ofM'Naghten, the major inadequacy is seen as the limitation of the test to thefunctioning of the intellect alone, in view of an enlightened medical science10. Flanagan v. People, 52 N.Y. 467 (1873).11. N.Y. Penal Law § 34.12. People v. Pekarz, 185 N.Y. 470, 78 N.E. 294 (1906).13. See People v. Papa, 297 N.Y. 974, 80 N.E.2d 359 (1948) (conviction affirmed with-out opinion).14. People v. Farmer, 194 N.Y. 251, 87 N.E. 457 (1909).15. N.Y. Penal Law § 1120. The New York statutory embodiment of the M'NaghtenRules, the second paragraph of which reads:A person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic, orinsane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminalact, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as:1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or,2. Not to know that the act was wrong.16. Instant case at 78, 187 N.E.2d at 122, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 52.17. Ibid.COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERMthat envisions insanity as affecting the volitional and emotional aspects of thehuman mind as well as the intellectual. If criminal responsibility is to continueto be prerequisite to a criminal act; and if, as has been suggested, true insanityis more than the M'Naghten Rule admits with its standards phrased in termsof intellect alone; then the conclusion is inescapable that in New York, whereintellectual capacity alone controls the determination of legal insanity, trulyinsane persons have been and are being found guilty of and punished for"criminal acts" for which they are not responsible. Modernization of section 1120of the Penal Law to include volitional and emotional impairments which bearupon mens rea would seem well in order.Thomas C. MackCONSECUTIVE CITATIONS FOR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT ALLOWEDOn November 1, 1961 petitioner was initially jailed for contempt by giving"don't remember" answers at a grand jury hearing.1 After serving 30 days injail the defendant was subsequently asked similar questions before the samegrand jury, and was sentenced to an additional 30 days by again replying "don'tremember." The Appellate Division affirmed. On appeal, held, affirmed, onejudge dissenting. The New York Court of Appeals, applied lower court law andpersuasive law from other jurisdictions to affirm the lower courts in holding thata witness could be adjudged in contempt of a grand jury on two consecutiveoccasions even though the interrogatories were nearly identical at both hearings.Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138, 237N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963).Contempts are neither wholly civil nor entirely criminal, and this charac-teristically legal entanglement often results in a fundamental misunderstandingof the concepts. Punishment per se does not aid in distinguishing the terms, how-ever the purpose to be served often separates the particular proceedings. 2 Incivil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the purpose of benefitingthe complainant and/or the court.3 But in criminal contempt the sentence ispunitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.4 The problem of discerningcriminal from civil contempt is further alleviated by statutes which enunciatethe specific contempt to be utilized for certain proceedings and hearings. In theinstant case Cirillo was cited for criminal contempt under the provisions of aspecific state statute.5Even though immunity from state prosecution will not immunize a witnessfrom prosecution in other jurisdictions, the witness may nevertheless becharged with contempt, in the state court granting protection, for refusing1. People ex rel. Cirillo v. Warden of City Prison, 11 N.Y.2d 51, 181 N.E.2d 424, 226N.Y.S.2d 398 (1962).2. Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1904).3. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).4. Ibid.S. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 750. Compare N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 406(3) for an exampleof a civil contempt statute.

English

Criminal Law and Procedure—Legal Insanity Not Established By Showing Defendant Operates Under Own Standard Of Morality

bepress Legal Repository

Crossref