Opportunistic routing protocols can enable message delivery in disconnected networks of mobile devices. To conserve energy in mobile environments, such routing protocols must minimise unnecessary message-forwarding. This paper presents an opportunistic routing protocol that leverages social role information. We compute node roles from a social network graph to identify nodes with similar contact relationships, and use these roles to determine routing decisions. By using pre-existing social network information, such as online social network friends, to determine roles, we show that our protocol can bootstrap a new opportunistic network without the delay incurred by encounter-history-based routing protocols such as SimbetTS. Simulations with four real-world datasets show improved performance over SimbetTS, with performance approaching Epidemic routing in some scenarios.Postprin

Bigwood, Greg

Henderson, Tristan

English

This paper considers second-best pricing as it arises through incomplete coverage of full networks. The main principles are first reviewed by considering the classic two-route problem and some extensions that have been studied more recently. In most of these studies the competing routes are assumed to be perfect substitutes, which is probably not the case for most parallel roads in reality, and even less likely for the case where competing connections represent different transport modes. In this paper a modelling framework in which the alternatives are imperfect substitutes is developed and numerical results for two roads and two modes are presented. In the model, trip generation and trip distribution are distinguished in a way that is consistent with economic theory. The model is used to consider situations in which one route or mode cannot be tolled. Simulation results show that, for the chosen parameter values, there is a substantial difference between the effectiveness of policies in which the capacities have to be taken as given, and those in which capacity of at least one mode can be changed. A striking feature of the policy in which the capacities of both modes/routes and the railway fare/toll on one road can be used as policy instruments is the existence of two equilibria for a range of values of a. In one equilibrium there are substantial numbers of users of both modes, whereas in the other use of one mode is negligibl

Rouwendal, J.

Verhoef, Erik

NARCIS 

Second Best Pricing for Imperfect Substitutes in Urban Networks

This paper considers second-best pricing as it arises through incomplete coverage of full networks. The main principles are first reviewed by considering the classic two-route problem and some extensions that have been studied more recently. In most of these studies the competing routes are assumed to be perfect substitutes, which is probably not the case for most parallel roads in reality, and even less likely for the case where competing connections represent different transport modes. In this paper a modelling framework in which the alternatives are imperfect substitutes is developed and numerical results for two roads and two modes are presented. In the model, trip generation and trip distribution are distinguished in a way that is consistent with economic theory. The model is used to consider situations in which one route or mode cannot be tolled. Simulation results show that, for the chosen parameter values, there is a substantial difference between the effec!tiveness of policies in which the capacities have to be taken as given, and those in which capacity of at least one mode can be changed. A striking feature of the policy in which the capacities of both modes/routes and the railway fare/toll on one road can be used as policy instruments is the existence of two equilibria for a range of values of â. In one equilibrium there are substantial numbers of users of both modes, whereas in the other use of one mode is negligible

Rouwendal, Jan

Verhoef, Erik T.

EconStor (ZBW Kiel)

Second-best Pricing for Imperfect Substitutes in Urban Networks

This paper considers second-best pricing as it arises through incomplete coverage of full networks. The main principles are first reviewed by considering the classic two-route problem and some extensions that have been studied more recently. In most of these studies the competing routes are assumed to be perfect substitutes, which is probably not the case for most parallel roads in reality, and even less likely for the case where competing connections represent different transport modes. In this paper a modelling framework in which the alternatives are imperfect substitutes is developed and numerical results for two roads and two modes are presented. In the model, trip generation and trip distribution are distinguished in a way that is consistent with economic theory. The model is used to consider situations in which one route or mode cannot be tolled. Simulation results show that, for the chosen parameter values, there is a substantial difference between the effec! tiveness of policies in which the capacities have to be taken as given, and those in which capacity of at least one mode can be changed. A striking feature of the policy in which the capacities of both modes/routes and the railway fare/toll on one road can be used as policy instruments is the existence of two equilibria for a range of values of â. In one equilibrium there are substantial numbers of users of both modes, whereas in the other use of one mode is negligibl

Scipedia

Second-best pricing for imperfect substitutes in urban networks

Greg Bigwood

Tristan Henderson

Crossref

Bootstrapping opportunistic networks using social roles

Opportunistic routing protocols can enable message delivery in disconnected networks of mobile devices. To conserve energy in mobile environments, such routing protocols must minimise unnecessary message-forwarding. This paper presents an opportunistic routing protocol that leverages social role information. We compute node roles from a social network graph to identify nodes with similar contact relationships, and use these roles to determine routing decisions. By using pre-existing social network information, such as online social network friends, to determine roles, we show that our protocol can bootstrap a new opportunistic network without the delay incurred by encounter-history-based routing protocols such as SimbetTS. Simulations with four real-world datasets show improved performance over SimbetTS, with performance approaching Epidemic routing in some scenarios

St Andrews Research Repository

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Verhoef, E.T.

VU Research Portal

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0739-8859(04)09002-X

Bootstrapping opportunistic networks using social roles

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