We study the regret of optimal strategies for online convex optimization
games. Using von Neumann's minimax theorem, we show that the optimal regret in
this adversarial setting is closely related to the behavior of the empirical
minimization algorithm in a stochastic process setting: it is equal to the
maximum, over joint distributions of the adversary's action sequence, of the
difference between a sum of minimal expected losses and the minimal empirical
loss. We show that the optimal regret has a natural geometric interpretation,
since it can be viewed as the gap in Jensen's inequality for a concave
functional--the minimizer over the player's actions of expected loss--defined
on a set of probability distributions. We use this expression to obtain upper
and lower bounds on the regret of an optimal strategy for a variety of online
learning problems. Our method provides upper bounds without the need to
construct a learning algorithm; the lower bounds provide explicit optimal
strategies for the adversary
