Much has been made of the ‘imperial’ influence of international actors (Chopra 2000) and their view of Timor-Leste as a petri dish for post-conflict development. However, this view obscures the ways in which conflict-era actors and their networks shape core decision regarding resource allocation. This article examines the political economies of resistance-era networks in the post-conflict period, focusing specifically on the large-scale pensions programme. The article argues that these former fighters tasked with registration verification serve as ‘street level bureaucrats’ and have re-shaped the programme to reflect their views of the conflict and interests. This is not a trivial matter–in 2015 the programme consumed 9 per cent of the national budget–and this work suggests that pensions should be viewed as a core aspect of post-conflict economic development in Timor-Leste and, more broadly, that the role of conflict actors in defining such programmes is essential to understanding redistributive policies after conflict
