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Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property
Authors
William A. Fischel
Publication date
1 October 1991
Publisher
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
Abstract
Abstract is not available.
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Last time updated on 09/07/2019
