Various organizations at Los Alamos have used tamper indicating devices (TID) to help control nuclear materials for several years. During the past year a formal documented TID program has been developed to be implemented throughout the Laboratory. Special needs of all organizations have been incorporated into the program. Applications vary from waste containers to unique configurations of special nuclear materials (SNM). Several examples of these applications will be discussed

Erkkila, B. H.

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LA-UR--89-2O47DE89 0143101111} UNIQUE APPLIcATIONS or TAMPER INIIICATING DEvIcESAUIHORIS) BruceH. Erkkila,OS-2SUBMIITED 10 INMMOrlando,Florida,,, . . .\, . ‘.,,111. ,,., ,.,,,,.,,.., ,! 1, ,, , ,,. .,, ,,! UIm,,.m1, 18,,5,1,1 u, 1,. ● I,b lm,~,,l,w,l 0,1s,101,lhn. ,4,,..,18, m,, ,18Il,mII ‘, Il,m,, wl,v,lntll ,,1 I IWI,J,-- . . . . “ ..— . . . . ..- ..-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _, _,. . . . . . . . . . . —. -.—1._.losAlkiilTimsLos Alamos National LaboratoryLos Alamos,New Mexico 87545~f~i!TFRIM-lUIMI. III!N Ili I HIS UULII~Il~’ ‘hIINI IMIII 1’, ,,,LI ., “ !, ,,,.%,1, . . .UNIQUE APPLICATIONS OF TAMPER INDICATING DEVICESBruce H. ErkkilaLos Alamos National LaboratoryLos Alamos, New Mexico 87544ABSTRACTVarious organizations at Los Alamos have used tamperindicating devices (TID) to help control nuclear materialsfor several years. During the past year a formal documentedTID program has been developed to be implemented throughoutthe Laboratory. Special needs of all organizations havebeen incorporated into the program. Applications vary fromwaste containers to unique configurations of special nuclearmaterials (SNM). Several examples of these applicationswill be discussed.INTRODUCTIONThe Laboratory conducts many activities involvingnuclear materials other than processing and storage.Activities include experimentation, research and developmentof assay techniques, analytical chemistry assay, SNM partscertification, and routine nondestructive assay of SNM. Allof these activities have different problems associated withthe application of tamper indicating devices (TIDs) or sealsto provide some assurance that the material is not tamperedwith. Traditionally seals have been used by processingpersonnel to control the activity associated with materialin process. It has been recognized for some time that asafeguards credit for TIDs is possible if the properprocedures are incorporated in the TID program. TheLaboratory has been designing a comprehensive TID programfor over a year, and is currently in the final stages ofimplementing this program. Much is to be learned about theapplication of TIDs and how much safeguards credit can bcgiven to this program throughout the Laboratory.THE REAL PURPOSE OF SEALSThere are many instances in the I,aboratory when it i%very important for operations to know when unauthorizedaccess to critical material has occurred. This is truewhether we are talking about a processing plant, a storagevault, or some experimentation. If the situation isextremely critical the material needs to bc sccurcd in amanner to pt-cvont any access to it. This mc!iinsn lockedcontainer or a locked repository of ~ome kind. From asafcgu~ards perspective, detection of unauthorized access tomaterfal is one element of an overall snfcquiirdu program tohelp ma~ntain control of t.hcnuclear mntcrii.11. With Viirjoufisystems such as materi~al r)urvci1liinw, physical protection,:;ccurp Vra[ll t.~, [and~c(:urc opcrat.jon% c~r~ii~, ‘1’1 1) program.%provlcic another element of as:;uri}nccthnt (’vrryt.hingi[;in.control. It must be understood that seals are designed todetect unau~horized access not to prevent it. A sealedcontainer itself may be a TID.The DOE Orders provide guidance to implement sealsas an element of the overall safeguards system. Cne of theprinciple benefits of a good TIi)program is a reduction inthe requirement to remeasure material at regular intervals.This alone may be viewed as a cost savings to operations.APPLICATIONSWith the wide variety of operation activities at theLaboratory, implementation of a Laboratory wide TID programrequires a review and evaluation of each activity todetermine the appropriateness of the use of TIDs.Operations in the R&D environment are quite different fromthose in a processing environment for example. Severaltypical applications are:1. Material in storage2. Material in process3. Material in experiments4. Material undergoing assay5. Classified parts6. Waste management7. Material in shipmentMaterial located in storage is usually packaged in asafe container configuration that can easily be sealed witha paper tape type seal which will detect any opening of thecontainer. This is one of the most typical applications ofseals to containers. When one of these sealed containers isselected for inventory a confirmation measurement isperformed. This measurement is much less stringent than averification assay. This can result in a significant ccstand time savings if you have a large quantity of material instorage that is subject to a statistical sampling plan forthe inventory.Material located in processes can be solid, liquid, orgas. Very often it is not practical to seal this materialfor safeguards purposes. Material inside a glove box isafforded a certain degree of protection without anyadditional seals. Careful eval~:ation is performed on allsuch material in process. In general very few TIDs are usedwith this category of material.Materials associated with experiments provide a verydifferent problem for safeguards. Very of-ten the cxperimel)t.is outside of a secure vault for long periods of time. F,~chexperimental arrangement is rcvicwcd and @VZIUfitCd forpotential application of seals. If it is not practical toutilize seals on such a configurat~on of mntcriaJ. othersafeguards clcmcnt(s) arc ~ncorporatca to qivc the samelevel of assurance. Sometimes n l’1[)can be locntcd on a~ortion of the experimental apparnt.us to provide n crrtnindcqrcc of assurance thi]t matcrjal is not movod or di%turbcdin any way. A good example is an experiment usingsolutions. The solution typically will be located in asystem of vessels, tubing, and other apparatus. If theapplication of a TID (or several TIDs) to the system ispractical then they will be used to provide the assurancethat a TID would provide in another application.Materials undergoing assay fall into two basiccategories. The first is chemical assay. Usually thequantity of material is very small and the use of seals isnot appropriate. The second category is nondestructiveassay where the entire item is placed in an instrumentdesigned to perform the assay. Normally these items aresealed to provide the assurance that no one has tamperedwith the item during the assay process. This can be veryimportant since it may take several hours for the assay tobe completed. Each case again needs to be reviewed andevaluated for appropriate TID application. If it just isnot practical to utilize a seal of some kind then they arenot used and some other element of a safeguards systemprovides the required assurance.Very often classified parts are stored or are certifiedas an operation. While in storage if the parts are notplacnd in suitable containers then the cage or location ofstorage may be sealed. If located in containers then thecontainer can be sealed. When these parts are removed fromstorage they usually have no need for bei]~g sealed untilthey are returned to storage.In general it is Laboratory policy to place seals onall waste containers destined for removal and storage to astorage repository. This not only provides some safeguardsassurance, but also helps to manage the operation ofhandling the waste materials. In some cases after reviewempty storage drums may by sealed to control the movement ofwaste and the drums. Sealed drums makes a lot of sense tohelp control waste materials in a plant environment.There are two categories of shipments at theLaboratory. These are internal shipments within theLaboratory and external shipments to/from the Laboratory.In general all shipments require a special Department ofTransportation (DOT) approved shipping container that isalways sealed before the shipment process begins. The sealserves to assure the receiver of the material thatuna~lthorized access to the material has not occurred sincethe seal was applied. This is a standard procedure for allhandlers of nuclear materials.cONCLUSIQNSFor a Laboratory as complex as the I,o:;Alarnos NationaJLaboratory the impl.ementation of a comprehensive ‘1’111programis not a trivial task. Every potential applicatiorc mustundergo exhaustive review and evaluation to test it for theappropriate usc of seals. It is usually obvious that no twoCappljcations can bc addressed in the %t~mcw,~y. Hvcry~app]ication has its own unique f’~(lturcr~to l)Pundcrst.ood nn(laddressed in the safeguards arena. The TID program at LosAlamos must accommodate all the various activities andoperations at the Laboratory.

Unique applications of tamper indicating devices

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Unique applications of tamper indicating devices

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