Campbell, David A.

Jones, David R.

English

The Open Repository @Binghamton (The ORB)

Binghamton UniversityThe Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)Public Administration Faculty Scholarship Public Administration2002Philanthropy and 9/11: How Did We Do?David R. JonesDavid A. CampbellBinghamton University--SUNY, dcamp@binghamton.eduFollow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/public_admin_facPart of the Public Administration CommonsThis Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Administration at The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has beenaccepted for inclusion in Public Administration Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (TheORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.Recommended CitationJones, D.R., & Campbell, D. (2002, fall). Philanthropy and 9/11: How did we do?. The NCRP Quarterly, Responsive Philanthropy.By David R. Jones and David CampbellIn little over a year, more than $2 billion has been raised to address the needs of indi-viduals and communities affected by the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.The brutal loss oflife and livelihood created for many Americans an imperative to help, leading to anunprecedented response.This tremendous largesse was funneled both to direct relief organizations, such asthe Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and to new and existing funding entities, suchas the United Way and New York Community Trust’s September 11th Fund and theTwin Towers Fund. Without question, all these organizations were motivated by thesame basic desire to help that generated the donations.One year later, what can we say about our work? Were the charitable and philan-thropic organizations successful stewards of the resources that the American publicentrusted to them? What lessons can we can apply to future situations? “Philanthropy and 9/11” continued on page 12Philanthropy and 9/11:How Did We Do?IN THIS EDITIONPhilanthropyAnd 9/11:How Did We Do?Cutting toThe CoreNonprofitsThreatened asKey OperatingSupport WanesOn the Need forSubstantivePhilanthropicAccountabilityElection 2002 NewChallenges andOpportunitiesFor Philanthropy DonorEducationA Strategy forProgressiveChange125810ResponsivePhilanthropyAP Photo/Daniel HulshizerThe philanthropic community can be proud ofmany aspects of its disaster-relief efforts. Significantresources were generated to meet the needs ofindividuals and families affected by the events ofSept. 11. Systems for distributing emergency finan-cial assistance and providing social services wereestablished quickly, and serious attempts weremade to ease bureaucratic barriers to obtainingassistance. From the start, charities acknowledgedthe need to coordinate their efforts. By the begin-ning of 2002, comprehensive efforts were underway to coordinate ongoing emergency relief andto address unmet needs.Some aspects of our Sept. 11 response leaveless room for congratulation. Most seriously,fundraising appeals after Sept. 11 were so nonspe-cific about how funds would be used that theycreated a credibility gap between donors andcharities, presenting a long-term threat to the non-profit sector. In addition, while there was a gener-al spirit of cooperation among philanthropic andcharitable institutions, the dizzying array of fundsand service programs complicated coordinationand led to duplication of service.At the same time, there was insufficient use ofgrassroots organizations to deliver emergencyassistance to the most marginalized and at-riskmembers of the affected population, particularlylow-wage workers and immigrants. Philanthropiesstruggled with how to involve Sept. 11 victims inplanning and decision making. Finally, charities andphilanthropies were ineffective in communicatingthe good work they did in the wake of Sept. 11,allowing the public’s perception of them to bedefined by critics who undermined its credibility.What Went Right?1. Significant Emergency Assistance Funds WereRaised. The nonprofit sector should be mostproud of the significant resources raised in thewake of the attack.The sudden death of 3,000people, the immediate loss of 50,000 jobs inNew York (with economic ripples that soonaffected others) and the dislocation of manyresidents of lower Manhattan created urgentneeds. Families who lost a breadwinner, eitherthrough death or unemployment, faced finan-cial uncertainty. How would householdexpenses, both routine (rent, utilities, food) andunanticipated (funerals), be met while familiessorted out their futures? How would affectedfamilies who were ineligible for public assis-tance get by? Philanthropic organizations’recognition of these needs and their ability toraise money quickly to meet them were impor-tant accomplishments.2. Significant Emergency Assistance ResourcesWere Distributed. Money raised for emer-gency assistance only matters if it is effectivelydistributed to those who need it. Significantamounts were distributed to the families ofthose who died, the injured and those affectedeconomically. For example, as of September2002, the Red Cross reports it has distributed$643 million to more than 55,000 people inSept. 11 disaster relief. The Salvation Armyreports distributing $65 million and reachingover 100,000 victims. The September 11thFund of the United Way and New YorkCommunity Trust reports distributing $336million. The New York Times 9/11 NeediestFund reports providing nearly $60 million indirect assistance.The major providers of financial assistance,the Salvation Army, the Red Cross and SafeHorizons (a conduit for United Way dollars),streamlined their documentation requirementsand waiting periods; in some circumstancesthey distributed emergency financial assistance“on the spot.” There were, however, somebureaucratic difficulties, apparently due to inad-equate disaster-relief infrastructure. For exam-ple, a wait of three to four weeks for checksfrom the Red Cross was not unusual initially. ASalvation Army computer problem created anembarrassing delay in paying bills for Sept. 11victims. Nonetheless, the money raised wasgenerally available in a timely fashion to thosein need, and that is a positive outcome.3. Charitable Organizations Cooperated inProviding Assistance. From the start, the majorcharitable organizations involved in disasterrelief recognized the need to work coopera-tively. In New York, the primary private relieforganizations (along with government agen-cies) colocated their services at Pier 94 to pro-Themagnitude of thephilanthropicresponse toSept. 11 madeit perhapsthe highest-profilephilanthropicendeavor in Americanhistory,dramaticallyincreasing the number of people to whomcharities wereaccountable.12 Fall 2002     Responsive Philanthropy   One Year Later: Reflections From NewYork on the 9/11 Charitable Response“Philanthropy and 9/11” continued from page 1vide “one-stop” benefits. The organizationsworked to ensure their assistance processeswere easy to access. However, institutional dif-ferences among them inhibited, at least in thefirst several months, the creation of moreclient-friendly systems, such as a single intakeform, a common database and similar financialassistance practices.4. Philanthropies Acknowledged the Need forLong-Term Assistance. Over the past year,there has been tremendous pressure on theorganizations that received cash donations forSept. 11 relief to distribute that money quicklyand effectively, because many victims facedimmediate financial pressures. Resources, how-ever, will be needed to address long-termproblems for another five years, if not longer.Veterans of the Oklahoma City bombing reliefeffort advised Sept. 11 relief workers toreserve some resources to meet long-termneeds, such as mental health counseling andother social services.The United Way September 11th Fundhas earmarked approximately one-third ofthe resources it raised ($170 million) forlong-term needs. The New York Times 9/11Neediest Fund has set aside $20 million forsuch purposes, and the Salvation Army hasreserved approximately 25 percent ($23million) of donations for long-term needs.Saving resources for long-term needs is wiseas long as the organizations remain focusedabout the uses for which funds are reservedand communicate effectively with donorsand the public.What Went Wrong?1. Significant Funds Were Raised … But forWhat? The magnitude of the philanthropicresponse to Sept. 11 made it perhaps the high-est-profile philanthropic endeavor in Americanhistory, dramatically increasing the number ofpeople to whom charities were accountablefor the use of their donations. Ongoing public-ity about Sept. 11 relief efforts gave donors atall giving levels significant ability to assesswhether contributions were used in accor-dance with their wishes. Yet charities may nothave been sufficiently clear about the purposesfor which the funds would be used.Over the past year, there has been a per-sistent conflict between the proposed use offunds raised and donor perceptions about thepurposes for which they donated. The mostwell-known and most significant conflict con-cerned the Red Cross’s initial reservation ofsome post-Sept. 11 donations for future disas-ters. In that case, the disconnection betweendonor intent and the organization’s proposeduse of funds was dramatic—perhaps the rea-son the case received so much attention. Inother cases, the disconnection betweendonors and charities seems more subtle.Many fundraisers indicated that moneyraised would be used for “disaster relief,” anambiguous term at best. Differing interpreta-tions about what constitutes “disaster relief ”created conflict between charities and donors.What qualified as an “economic effect” of theSept. 11 attack? Unemployment due to thedestruction of one’s workplace? Unem-ployment due to recession in lowerManhattan? Unemployment due to recessionin New York City? The inability to specifically define their pur-poses, coupled with the lack of consensusabout appropriate relief activities and theunprecedented number of donors, threatenedcharities’ credibility as agents of donor intent.Admittedly, the ability of charities to be con-crete about “disaster relief ” may have been lim-ited in September and October as the scope ofthe disaster was unfolding and short- and long-term needs were being defined. Nonetheless,persistent conflict between donor intent andcharities’ use of funds is among the greatestthreats to the continued vitality of the non-profit sector. fundraising is impossible withoutdonor trust in the institutions to which theygive. Perhaps some of the confusion could havebeen averted by increased communicationabout donors’ intent, particularly betweencharities and major donors.Brookings Institution surveys suggest thatbetween December 2001 and May 2002,Differinginterpretationsabout whatconstitutes“disasterrelief”createdconflictbetweencharities and donors.Responsive Philanthropy     Fall 2002  13Community ServiceSociety case workerNatasha Baptiste meetswith a client in need of assistance in the aftermath of Sept. 11.(Photo courtesy of  theCommunity ServiceSociety of New York.)Americans grew more wary of charities, with 19percent of May respondents indicating that theyhad no confidence in charities, an 11 percentagepoint increase since December. While it is notpossible to attribute that change directly to crit-icisms of the use of Sept. 11 donations, it is notunreasonable to suggest that such negative pub-licity contributed to this increased wariness.2. Collaboration Was Insufficient to MeetCommunity Needs. Those affected by Sept. 11benefited significantly from the major disaster-relief organizations’ decision to collaborate.However, not all institutional barriers were eas-ily overcome, making the process of accessingrelief benefits less client-friendly than it couldhave been.a. “Major” Financial Assistance Coordination.Each of the three major New York charitablerelief organizations, the Red Cross, theSalvation Army and Safe Horizons, created itsown system for determining eligibility and dis-tributing funds. Although services were colo-cated, those requesting assistance had tomake separate applications to each organiza-tion, and documentation requirements varied.b. Coordination of Secondary Organizations.In addition to the three primary relieforganizations, more than 100 other charitiesprovided financial assistance to those affect-ed by the Sept. 11 attacks. For most ofthose organizations, the provision of finan-cial assistance was consistent with their mis-sion, history and community base; however,their participation in disaster relief was gen-erally uncoordinated.They reached those inneed through word of mouth or otherinformal mechanisms. Like the “major” relieforganizations, each smaller charity had itsown eligibility, application and documenta-tion requirements.c. Providing Relief to Hard-to-Reach andMarginalized Populations. In general, reliefefforts were administered through large,established institutional providers. Donorsselected those organizations because of theirhistoric success in providing relief and theircapacity to manage large-scale problems.Many of the smaller, secondary financial-assistance providers also had sufficient infra-structure in place to operate an effectiverelief effort.Large institutions’ lack of communitybase can be a problem when dealing withunderserved and marginalized populations.Without community roots, it can be difficultto provide assistance to such hard-to-reachpopulations as undocumented workers ornon-English speakers.The immediacy of needs and the chari-ties’ focus on creating response capacity dis-tracted them from ensuring informationreached all who needed it. New York City’snonprofit community includes a rich varietyof grassroots organizations, many based incommunities directly affected by the terror-ist attacks. The leaders of the disaster-reliefeffort, however, did not seek help fromthese community-based organizations inassisting the hard-to-reach. Several organi-zations (such as Asociacion Tepeyac)emerged as leaders because of their ownperseverance and the centrality of theirmission to the relief effort, but their experi-ence was more the exception than the rule.Charities also faced difficulties sortingthrough the family relationships of the deadto determine who was eligible for assis-tance. Many of those who died at the WorldTrade Center provided financial support todomestic partners—gay and straight—whowere not legally recognized as relatives. Inthe end, charities demonstrated more flexi-bility in such cases than did the government,but it took them some time to sort outrelationships and determine who meritedfinancial assistance. Not all charities agreedto support all domestic partners.Finally, there are equity issues that shouldbe examined. Was financial assistance dis-tributed equitably? One can argue that low-income populations should have been givena greater share of financial support becauseof the complex challenges they faced inrebuilding their lives. All victims certainlyfaced terrible rebuilding efforts, but in gen-eral, lower-income individuals had fewerresources and less social support to fallback on.3. Philanthropies Sometimes Failed to Act asPartners With Affected Communities. Inrecent years, philanthropies and charities haveincreasingly viewed their work as a partnershipwith communities in pursuit of a common goal(such as revitalization or economic develop-ment). In the first several months followingAll victimscertainly faced terriblerebuildingefforts, but ingeneral,lower-incomeindividuals had fewerresources andless socialsupport tofall back on.14 Fall 2002     Responsive Philanthropy   The disaster-relief effort was reactive. In manyways, it had to be.A new social problem was cre-ated overnight, and a response had to be craftedimmediately. Yet, by focusing on immediate chal-lenges, charities missed a critical opportunity totell their story. A media-savvy, coordinated effortby disaster-relief leaders could have delivered apositive message about the work of their institu-tions. Instead, critics filled that void and under-mined the charitable sector’s credibility.Looking AheadWhat lessons do the experiences of charitiesand philanthropies in the wake of Sept. 11 suggestfor the future? Perhaps one simple (and hopefullynot simplistic) lesson is to stick to the principlesand values that make our work credible to thegeneral public.As far as possible, we cannot let cri-sis excuse us from our obligations. We musthonor—and be clear about—donor intent.Institutional interests must take a back seat to mis-sions. Effective strategies to respond to urgentcommunity needs must be a first priority.We mustinvest in public relations. Because we work forcommunity change, we will be opposed; if we donot take the time to tell our story, even amid cri-sis, others—not friends—will tell it for us.David R. Jones is president and chief executive officerof the Community Service Society of New York, andDavid Campbell is its vice president of programs.TheCommunity Service Society is a social service organi-zation that for more than 150 years has focused onsolutions to alleviate the conditions of poverty in NewYork City. In response to the Sept. 11 attacks, it dis-tributed almost $5 million in emergency financialassistance to nearly 3,000 families and individuals.Sept. 11, charities developed assistance guide-lines based on their understanding of the needsof families and the resources available. By late2001, individuals and families eligible for assis-tance began to complain that they lacked avoice in resource-distribution decisions.Charities were uncertain about how torespond to these complaints.One can argue that those affected by theevents of Sept. 11 are a community, not unlikethe geographically defined communities withwhich charities have worked in partnership onother issues. Sept. 11 philanthropies that don’tview their relationship with their beneficiariesas a partnership leave themselves open toaccusations of paternalism.Responses to family requests for a voice indistribution decisions varied. A few organiza-tions, such as the United Services Group, haveplaced family members on governing boards,while others, such as the Windows of HopeFamily Relief Fund, have created advisory roles,feedback groups, or other mechanisms for fam-ily input. Others have ignored the issue. Theability of philanthropies and charities to workeffectively with any community—whether Sept.11 victims or residents of a low-income neigh-borhood in Brooklyn—requires a commitmentto partnership and a voice for all partners.4. Others Told Our Story. Over $2 billion wasraised to assist Sept. 11 victims. Philanthropiesand charities responded quickly to createcapacity and distribute resources.To date, fam-ilies have received hundreds of millions of dol-lars to address emergency needs. Yet, in thepast year, articles in The New York Times, DailyNews, New York Post and Newsday emphasizedthe negative aspects of the relief effort: the RedCross donation diversion, unsavory new organ-izations soliciting donations, bureaucratic barri-ers to financial assistance, questions about whoshould receive assistance, etc. One year later,what stands out is the absence of stories aboutthe speed with which disaster-relief infrastruc-ture was created and the amount of assistancethat was provided.Why is this issue important? As noted,Americans made a dramatic philanthropicinvestment in the Sept. 11 relief effort.The suc-cess of that relief effort is critical to the long-term viability of American philanthropy. Ifdonors feel that their contributions were usedpoorly, they will be less likely to contribute tofuture important charitable activities.Responsive Philanthropy     Fall 2002 15New Yorkers striving todeal with the economicimplications of Sept. 11attend a Windows ofHope financial seminar.(Photo courtesy of theCommunity ServiceSociety of New York.)

Philanthropy and 9/11: How Did We Do?

https://orb.binghamton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&amp;context=public_admin_fac

Philanthropy and 9/11: How Did We Do?

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

The Open Repository @Binghamton (The ORB)