Lobbying Activity in the Standards Setting Process: FASB Statement on Financial Accounting Standards No. 106, Employers\u27 Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other than Pensions
The purpose of this study is to explain and classify the behavior of corporate managers in the accounting standards setting process as it related to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106. Evidence from this study provides readers a better understanding of participation of corporate managers in the accounting standards setting process. To accomplish the objective, this study surveyed corporate representatives who responded to the Financial Accounting Standards Board\u27s, February 1989, exposure draft, Employers\u27 Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, (OPEB). A sample of corporations whose representatives did not respond to the OPEB exposure draft, although the corporations did provide OPEB benefits, and which are of a similar industry distribution as firms which did respond, was also surveyed. Logistic regression analysis was used to identify statistically significant variables in the position choice and lobbying participation choice decisions. No other known study has attempted to investigate both the position and decision to lobby on the OPEB issue, although Saemann (1987) examined both the position and decision to lobby on Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, Employer\u27s Accounting for Pensions. Evidence from this research provides information useful involved in setting financial accounting standards. The Mission Statement of the Financial Accounting Standards Board includes the precept, to weigh carefully the views of its constituents in developing concepts and standards (FASB, 1992, p.l). Knowledge about why corporate managers choose to participate in the standards setting process for postretirement benefits other than pensions provides insight about the entire constituency of FASB, not only the respondents. The research hypotheses for the position choice model— firm size, impact on financial statements, and leverage position— were not supported by logistic regression analysis. Only one research hypothesis for the lobbying participation choice model was supported in the logistic regression analyses— the research hypothesis for firm size for industrial companies. The larger the number of employees, the more likely it is that the company participated in lobbying activities related to the OPEB exposure draft. The other attributes tested, maturity of the workforce and leverage position, were found not to be statistically significant
