This paper is a response to Serge Grigoriev\u27s article Living Art, Defining Value: Artworks and Mere Real Things (Contemporary Aesthetics Volume 3, 2005) in which he develops Joseph Margolis\u27 provocative Danto-criticism. He especially criticizes Danto\u27s art-philosophical starting point, the problem of indiscernibles, claiming that it presupposes an objective value judgment that cannot be maintained and that it misrepresents the way in which people interact with art. In this article, Grigoriev\u27s argument is found lacking mainly on two grounds. First, it overlooks where the source of Danto\u27s starting point lies; and second, I argue that it does not lead to the kind of radical dualism Grigoriev believes. In order to show the problematic aspects of Grigoriev\u27s criticism, Danto\u27s conception of philosophy is introduced together with certain ideas from his latest work, The Abuse of Beauty
