This recent case discusses People v. Reeves (Cal. 1964

Odorico, Armando L.

English

University of San Diego

SAN DIEGO LAW' REVIEW[SEARCHES AND SEIZURES - INFORMATION SUPPLIEDBY AN ANONYMOUS INFORMER MUST BE CORROBO-RATED BY ESTABLISHING THAT THE LAW IS BEINGVIOLATED TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR PROBABLECAUSE TO SEARCH OR ARREST WITHOUT A WAR-RANT; VERIFICATION OF OTHER INFORMATION ISINSUFFICIENT CORROBORATION. People v. Reeves (Cal.1964).Inspector Martin, an experienced officer attached to the policenarcotics detail, received a telephone call from an anonymous fe-male informer with whom no previous police contact had been made.She told him that two 'narcotic losers' (persons previously convictedof narcotic offenses) named Reeves, staying at the King GeorgeHotel, and McDonald, who operated an auto agency on Van NessAvenue, were in possession of marijuana.Inspector Martin knew Reeves, and had talked with him duringthe course of a prior narcotics investigation which had not resultedin criminal charges. During this previous conversation with Reeves,Martin had discovered that Reeves had been convicted of a narcoticsoffense in Texas. Martin, knowing nothing of McDonald, had therecords searched and discovered that he had been convicted by afederal court of a narcotic violation. He also corroborated the factthat McDonald operated an automobile agency on Van Ness Avenue,Martin proceeded to the automobile agency without a warrant,searched McDonald, and found marijuana on his person. McDonaldadmitted receiving the narcotic from Reeves. Without obtaining awarrant Martin then proceeded to the hotel where Reeves was stay-ing, gained entry into his room by a ruse, found marijuana, andarrested Reeves.1During Reeves' trial Martin testified that McDonald was not pro-secuted for possession of marijuana because of a search and seizureproblem. The court held that the prosecution had failed to sustainthe burden of showing proper justification for searching McDonald,and that therefore the evidence secured by the search was illegal.With the exclusion of this evidence there was insufficient corrobora-tion of the information received from the anonymous informer toconstitute reasonable cause to search or arrest. The search of Reeveswas therefore illegal, and, as a result, all the evidence obtained bythe search was inadmissible. People v. Reeves, 61 Cal. 2d 268, 391P.2d 393, 38 Cal. Rptr. 1, (1964).I Possession of marijuana is a violation of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530.[Vol. 2RECENT CASESSince the case of People v. Cahan2 illegally seized evidence hasbeen inadmissible in California.' If reasonable cause for search andseizure does not exist, the search and seizure are illegal, and all in-formation obtained as a result thereof is not admissible in evidence.This rule has caused considerable controversy and confusion as towhat constitutes reasonable or probable cause. The courts are inagreement only in that there is no exact formula for the determina-tion of reasonable cause, and that each case must be decided on itsown facts and circumstances.' In making this determination theapplicable test has been, "[Clonsidering all the information in thehands of the police, would a reasonable police officer 'Act on thatinformation or would a reasonable police officer seek further infor-mation before making the arrest and conducting the search." 5Information obtained from an informer may constitute groundsfor reasonable cause under certain conditions. Information from areliable informer can of itself constitute sufficient reasonable cause.6A reliable informer is one whose information has in the past led thepolice to valid suspects.' One who has not previously furnished suchinformation to the police cannot be considered reliable in the ab-sence of a pressing emergency, and his information alone cannot bea sufficient basis for a lawful search.' However, information ob-tained from an untested informer may constitute grounds for rea-sonable cause if evidence is presented to the court justifying theconclusion that reliance on the information was reasonable.'In the Reeves case several factors were considered in connectionwith the problem of reasonable cause. Justice Peters, speaking forthe majority, said that the use of ruse or trickery to persuade Reevesto open the door rendered the evidence obtained in the room inad-missible because no reasonable cause existed prior to the employmentof such ruse. The prosecution failed to sustain its burden of showing2 44 Cal. 2d 434, 283 P.2d 905 (1955).3 This is not a mere technical rule of evidence. It is required to give substance tothe rights conferred by the state and federal constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend.IV, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19, People v. Cahan, supra note 2.4 E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 412, 348 P.2d 577, 580 (1960).5 People v. Diggs, 161 Cal. App. 2d 167, 171, 326 P.2d 194, 196 (1958).6 People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal. 2d 330, 337, 341 P.2d 1, 4 (1959), 33 So. CAL. L.R v. 208 (1960), 7. U.C.L.A.L. REV. 524 (1960); People v. Boyles, 45 Cal. 2d652, 290 P.2d 535 (1955).7 People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 119, 128, 310 P.2d 162, 168 (1957).8 Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294 P.2d 36 (1956) ; People v. Amos,181 Cal. App. 2d 506, 5 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1960). This rule is not limited toanonymous informers. It is applicable to any person who has not gained the statusof a reliable informer. See note 26 infra for an example of an unreliable informerwhose identity was known to the police.9 Willson v. Superior Court, supra note 8, at 294, 294 P.2d at 38.19651SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEWVjustification for the search of McDonald."0 Hence, no reliance couldbe placed on it as a basis for Reeves' arrest and the search of hisroom.1 It is apparent that the court believed that the first link inthe chain of events, i.e., sufficient corroboration of the anonymousinformer, was too weak to support a finding of reasonable cause.Justice Peters formulated the necessary requirement for corrobora-tion of an untested informer in the following terms: "[W]hile it[the verification of names, addresses and records by the officer]amounted to corroboration of that same information given by theanonymous informer, it was not corroboration of the essential fact,as to whether the two named men were now violating the law."'"(Emphasis added.) The court found that the investigation by thepolice merely corroborated the fact that the informer knew thenames and addresses of the two men and that they had prior nar-cotic convictions. There was no corroboration of the alleged viola-tion of the law.Justice McComb, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Schauerconcurred, agreed that the information obtained from an anonymousinformer must be corroborated. He stated:Information from an anonymous source can be sufficient probablecause, however, if it is corroborated by other facts, sources, or cir-cumstances that would justify reliance on it. . . . Although nosingle fact may justify an arrest, a combination or concurrence offacts may well do so.13 (Emphasis added.)Moreover, the dissent disagreed with the majority's refusal to usethe statement of McDonald as a corroborative fact, and stated thatprobable cause... is not limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial onthe issue of guilt. The test is not whether the evidence upon whichan officer acts in making the arrest is sufficient to convict but onlywhether the person should stand trial. 14The dissent further stated that every fact supplied by the informer,with the exception of Reeves' possession of marijuana, had beenverified or corroborated, that the investigating officer had pre-exist-ing information from which to determine that part of the anony-mous information was reliable, and that McDonald's statement thathe received the narcotic from Reeves was more than a verificationof the information received from the anonymous informer; it was10 The burden was on the prosecution to show proper justification for the arrest andsearch of McDonald. People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 388 P.2d 665 (1964).1 61 Cal. 2d at 278, 391 P.2d at 397, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 5.12 Id. at 274, 391 P.2d at 396, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 4-5.'s Id. at 278, 391 P.2d at 399, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 7."4 Id. at 277, 391 P.2d at 399, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 7.[Vol. 2RECENT CASESindependent corroboration by another source. Therefore, the dissent-ing Justices believed that Inspector Martin acted with probable causewhen he searched McDonald and arrested Reeves.It is a function of the trial court to appraise and weigh the evi-dence on the issue of probable cause," and, therefore, the CaliforniaSupreme Court in the Reeves case must have found that a lack ofprobable cause existed either as a matter of law, or because no rea-sonable man could find otherwise. The court based its decision on afailure to corroborate the fact that the law was being violated.Reeves, therefore, holds that this requirement of corroboration mustbe met before the trial court may state that reasonable cause existsas a matter of law, or as a matter of fact. This requirement appearsto narrow the ground for reasonable cause set forth in Willson v.Superior Court wherein the court stated:[E]vidence must be presented to the court that would justify theconclusion that reliance on the information was reasonable ...In some cases the identity of, or past experience with, the informermay provide such evidence .. .and in others it may be suppliedby similar information from other sources or by the personal ob-servations of the police.'6 (Footnote omitted.)In People v. Fischer" the court stated that the officer must presentevidence to the court which would justify the conclusion that hisreliance on that information was reasonable. Also, in People v.Bates,8 Justice Peters, who spoke for the majority in Reeves, statedthe requirement more broadly as: "[T~he reliability of the inform-ant ... may be substantiated by the proven accuracy of the informa-tion given by the informant and which the officers from othersources know is accurate."' 9The Reeves decision establishes a new requirement, corroborationof the fact that the law is being violated. The majority also citedWillson with approval. That case, as well as those in which the in-formation from an unreliable informer was coupled with the defend-ant's furtive or suspicious conduct, is within the Reeves requirement.Such conduct supplies the necessary corroboration that a crime isbeing committed.20Is However, the findings of reasonableness by the trial court are respected only inso-far as they are consistent with constitutional guarantees. Ker v. California 374U.S. 23 (1963).:6 46 Cal. 2d at 294-95, 294 P.2d at 38.1' 49 Cal. 2d 442, 317 P.2d 967 (1957) (reliability of source of information notchallenged) (court's finding of reasonable cause to arrest not based solely oninformation given officer).lB 163 Cal. App. 2d 487, 330 P.2d 102 (1958).'19 Id. at 852, 330 P.2d at 105.20 See People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956); People v. Davis, 205Cal. App. 2d 517, 23 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1962); People v. Reyes, 206 Cal. App. 2d337, 23 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1962).1965]SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEWHowever, there are cases wherein probable cause was found toexist which may no longer meet the Reeves criterion. In People v.Prieto,"' a warrant was issued on the basis of information suppliedby an untested informer corroborated only by surveillance, priorburglary convictions, and suspicion of possession of narcotics. Therewas no corroboration of the fact that the law was being violated.The court stated that it could not rule that as a matter of law areasonable person confronted by the evidence would not be con-vinced that probable cause for a search did not exist, and that theevidence required submission of the issue to the jury. Justice Tob-riner reviewed facts which in other cases had been found sufficientto constitute probable cause. These additional corroborative circum-stances induded: observations of suspicious actions of the defend-ant, past activities, police surveillance or observation, prior convic-tion of the suspected offense, or prior addiction.2The Reeves decision appears to eliminate all but the first of theabove circumstances as sufficient corroborative facts. The majoritydismissed the pre-existing knowledge of Inspector Martin, his per-sonal contact with Reeves concerning narcotics, and the latter's priornarcotic record by stating that they were merely corroboration of thefact that the informer knew the men and was familiar with theirpast activities. The court failed to appraise this independent knowl-edge in conjunction with the statements of the informer in deter-mining whether or not the police acted reasonably. In light of thehabituating (though not addictive) characteristics of marijuana andthe well known recidivism of 'users,' was it unreasonable for Mar-tin, after receiving the anonymous phone call and making the in-vestigation, to believe that Reeves, a prior narcotic offender, wouldagain be in possession of marijuana? Granted, he could not havebeen absolutely certain that the law was being violated. Still, therewere sufficient facts present to allow the trial court to decide whetheror not probable cause existed. A prior conviction of a suspectedcrime involving narcotics is a strong indication that the individualnamed by an informer might be repeating those acts, and greaterweight should have been accorded this fact. These facts; i.e., theprior narcotic convictions of both men, the prior contact with Reeves21 191 Cal. App. 2d 62, 12 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1961). An anonymous woman informedthe police that if they checked a designated phone booth they would find a mari-juana cigarette. She called a second time to inquire if the cigarette did containmarijuana. When the police told her that it was in the process of being analyzed,she said she would call again. Upon her final call, after the police had deterninedthat the cigarette contained marijuana, she told them that they would find suchcigarettes in a tissue box in the defendant's bedroom. The police obtained a searchwarrant, proceeded to the defendant's home, and arrested him after discoveringthe marijuana in a Kleenex box.22 191 Cal. App. 2d at 69, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 581.[Vol. 2RECENT CASESconcerning narcotics, the habituating characteristics of narcotics, andthe recidivism of narcotic offenders should have been consideredcorroborative of the informant's statement that a crime was beingcommitted.2" The existence of probable cause should be evaluated inlights of what a reasonable police officer would do in the same orsimilar circumstances, and not what an appellate court would havedone.What further action could the police have taken in Reeves toobtain grounds for reasonable cause? All the information at theirdisposal had been verified except that the law was being violated.That fact could have been corroborated by a reliable informer oranother untested informer.2' Unfortunately, the police did not havethese additional sources. Since, "the magistrate must be satisfied that'there is probable cause to believe' that grounds for the searchexist,""= a warrant would not have been issued because the policecould not corroborate the fact that the law had been violated. Thealternative would have been to initiate a surveillance in the hopethat the conduct of the men would supply the necessary corrobora-tion. If the police had been fortunate, they might have obtainedthe required corroboration in this fashion. If not, the surveillancewould have either continued ad infinitum, or terminated without anarrest. The purpose of this survey of the practical aspects of theenforcement problem is to illustrate the difficulty that the Reevesrequirement presents.Fundamental principles of jurisprudence dictate that the individ-ual must be given protection against unreasonable police action. Itis not unreasonable to consider an untested informer an unreliablesource and hold that he cannot gain the status of a reliable informeruntil he has proven himself. Nor is it unreasonable to hold that theinformation obtained from an unreliable informer alone is an insuf-ficient basis for probable cause. But the court has overemphasized23 At this point it might be argued that anything less than the Reeves requirementwould lead to 'rousting" and the fabrication of non-existent informers by thepolice. But it is presumed that the police will carry out their official duties in anhonest manner and will not commit perjury. CA.. CoDE CV. PRoc. § 1963 (15),People v. Garnett, 148 Cal. App. 2d 280, 284, 306 P.2d 571, 574 (1957).24 People v. Weathers, 162 Cal. App. 2d 545, 328 P.2d 222 (1958).25 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1525, 1528, Arata v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 2d 767,773, 315 P.2d 473, 478 (1957).1965]SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[corroboration of untested (unreliable) informers.2 " It should notinsist upon standards of corroboration of untested informers whichunnecessarily impede law enforcement. The court should strike abalance between personal immunity from police interference andthe community's interest in efficient law enforcement. Justice wouldbe served by eliminating the Reeves requirement and adhering tothe requirements of the Willson, Fischer, and Bates cases. Reason-ableness should be a question of fact, and the trial courts should, inthe exercise of their sound discretion, determine the weight to beaccorded the information possessed by the officer at the time ofarrest.Armando L. Odorico26 E.g., in People v. Cedeno, 218 Cal. App. 2d 213, 32 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1963), aninformer met the police several times concerning persons allegedly dealing innarcotics. During one meeting she was escorted to the defendant's hotel by thepolice who gave her money and sent her into the hotel. She returned with onemarijuana dgarette, and gave it to the police. In another meeting she told thepolice that she had been up to the defendant's room, and that there was marijuanaall over the room. The defendant was arrested and at the trial the court held that,because the informer had not in the past given information leading to valid sus-pects, she was unreliable, and that the police failed to corroborate any facts. Itwas held that there was no reasonable cause to arrest. It would seem that this isone of the many examples of instances where the community has suffered in aneffort to overinsure that the informer's information was reliable.(Vol. 2

Searches and Seizures - Information Supplied by an Anonymous Informer Must Be Corroborated by Establishing that the Law Is Being Violated to Constitute a Basis for Probable Cause to Search or Arrest Without\u27a Warrant: Verification of Other Information Is Insufficient Corroboration. People v. Reeves (Cal. 1964)

https://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2501&context=sdlr

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

University of San Diego