Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek
Abstract
Aristotle put forward a number of arguments against contradictions being true, in
Metaphysics. However, many of them share a common flaw; the opponent in the debate
(a dialetheist) can accept both the conclusion, and its negation. My aim will be to
reformulate one argument, the Anscombe/Cresswell argument, to eliminate this flaw.
I do so by exploiting modern developments in dialethic theory. I turn the argument
into a non-question-begging reductio by exploiting the fact that a reductio can be to
absurdity but not contradiction, and can conclude in the rejection of what lead to it (in
this case, a contradiction). I also respond to a number of other objections to this argument,
exploring the possibility that there is a good argument that keeps to the spirit
of the original. I conclude that there is such an argument, but one that is only about
very specific contradictions
