Risk prevention of land flood: A cooperative game theory approach.

Abstract

Protection against flood risks becomes increasingly difficult for economic and hydrological reasons. Therefore, it is necessary to improve water retention throughout catchment with a more comprehensive approach. Strategies in the land use and measures that are designed to prevent flood risks involve land owners. So, justice issues appear. This paper studies the application of game theory through a cooperative game in order to contribute the resolution of possible agreements among owners and to establish cost / benefit criteria. It is a methodological contribution where land use management for flood retention is analyzed. Specifically, we concentrate on enhancing upstream water retention focusing on the role that forests have as natural water retention measures. This study shows a framework for allocating the compensations among participants based on cooperative game theory and taking into account a principle of stability. We show that it is possible to establish distribution rules that encourage stable payments among land owners. This contribution shows the suitability of this method as a flood risk management tool and as a guide to help decision-making. Compensations and benefits could be established to raise awareness and encourage land owners to cooperate