Guendling, John E.

English

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Journal of the Arkansas Academy of ScienceVolume 21 Article 191967Conspiracy and Power PoliticsJohn E. GuendlingArkansas Tech UniversityFollow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaasPart of the Political Theory CommonsThis article is available for use under the Creative Commons license: Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0). Users are able toread, download, copy, print, distribute, search, link to the full texts of these articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking priorpermission from the publisher or the author.This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Arkansas Academyof Science by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.Recommended CitationGuendling, John E. (1967) "Conspiracy and Power Politics," Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science: Vol. 21 , Article 19.Available at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/1994Arkansas Academy of Science Proceedings, Vol.21, 1967CONSPIRACY AND POWER POLITICSJohn E. GuendlingArkansas Polytechnic CollegeIshould like to examine some first-magnitude concepts of politicaltheory in their constellation about a key concept, conspiracy, for the sakeof illuminating an ideal of integral democracy.It should be recognized at the outset that the political conditionswhich foster tendencies to conspiracy require some distinction from thoseconditions in society which foster accusations of "conspiracy". To besure, an actual tendency to conspiracy furnishes occasion for the accusa-tion; but the absence of the tendency does not preclude the accusation.What seems to be required for an understanding of the disparityis a study of the dynamics of political behavior which attends less to thequalitative differences of ideology between the parties involved andmore to the quantitative disposition of their forces in the struggle forpower. The aim of such an approach should be to draw from theequilibrations of political forces in a society what might be calledgeneralizations upon the dialectic of power politics".The observations here essayed are, however, rather more pre-liminary, their value being construed mainly in terms of their suggestionof the fecundity for political theory of concepts ingredient in the ancienttradition of dialectical philosophy.The notions most men hold of "power" and "freedom" antecedentto political reflection bear witness to the efforts of every thing livingto procure for itself a state of well-being. Such a state may be definedas a favorable balance between intrinsically self-aggrandizing factorsand whatever extrinsic factors impose limitations on any thing's being.Power, accordingly, in its pre-political aspect, is simply the positive,self-integrating or substantive display of these intrinsic factors ofvitality, while freedom is the negative, dispersive or non-substantiveconception of the lack of obstacles to their operation. As positive andnegative sides of the same idea, both bespeak as common to everyorganic being a striving to master and reduce its immediate environ-ment to material upon which it can set its own characteristic form andby means of which it can magnify its substance unchecked by alienimpositions.Although the biological world is one which, at first glance, exhibitsuniversal conflict between unrestrained tendencies to self-aggrandize-ment, the ecologist, is able to recognize standing patterns of irresolutionconstitutive of so-called "balances" in nature.***94Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196795Conspiracy and Power PoliticsIt was among the Greek natural philosophers of the Sixth CenturyB.C. that generalized expression was first given to the idea that thecharacteristic ways in which the dynamic components of nature equili-brate their relations furnish paradigms for understanding the humansocial order. This insight, traceable to Anaximander of Miletus, wasexplicated in the thesis that justice and law exist first and foremost ina cosmic state and only secondarily in human society, where theyfurnish natural norms for human behavior. The assumption was thatthere is an inherent order in nature, a self-enclosed, self-regulatingsystem of due proportions in the give and take among things, whereasin human society, on the contrary, laws have been necessitated asconscious contrivances for securing justice by their regulation of sociallyconflicting claims.The theory of "cosmic justice" of Heraclitus of Ephesus mirrorsthe "state of nature" with metaphorical aptness: The world is madeup of "opposites" checking each other. Nothing gives check to itself.Cosmic justice is, accordingly, the principle of equilibration betweenall forces in being, monitoring their "strife" lest they overstep their"natural limits".I regard to the factions competing for power in any body politic,Greek thought discerned a system of checks and balances, recognizingin their operation but a special case of a natural, cosmic law. Themoral for mankind is expressed in an emphatic tendency in ancientpolitical theory, even among those thinkers who no longer standexplicitly within the tradition of dialectical philosophy, as, e.g., Aris-totle, Polybius and Cicero, to seek conscious compliance with such a law.It is within this theoretical context that I wish to affirm, as beingof contemporary relevance, certain political apercus, starting with thefollowing as a working definition of "justice": Justice is that idea! ofan accepted norm defining the limits and arbitrating the occasions ofconflict among competing parties within any system of power-relationsin accordance with a principle which seeks to secure maximal stabilityin the total system through maximal responsiveness to the shiftingbalance of power among the competing parties.?No individual, institution or movement in society has a naturaltendency to give check to itself: That is, if you will, a law of primitive,blind being.If, notwithstanding, any entity acknowledges limits to what itmay"lawfully"do, if it defers to any so-called "rights" of others or agreesto give them their "just due", or if it formally subscribes to a systemof moral or legal rules of "fair play" among competing "loyal"elements, it does so from a platform of acquired realism instructingits view of the possible.**95Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/1996Arkansas Academy of Science ProceedingsReciprocity, i.e., mutual toleration, interposes itself as a rule wherea division of power prevents unilateral rule: That is, as it were, alaw of nature, enlightened being.Where a tradition of mutual guarantees, tolerance of differencesand equality before the law governs the administration of justice,responsible majority and loyal minority share alike in a public consciencebinding them to common observances in the exercise of freedom. Inthe measure that these observances extend to all forces competing inthe society, it exemplifies the definition of an integral democracy.Under such a system the principle of checks and balances is no longersimply a fact of life but becomes an avowed value directing theseveral parties to common terms of constraint in their behavior.If, accordingly, justice be conceived as a principle specifying theterms of competition governing the political dialectic, it should be clearthat it will function effectively in this capacity only so long as all partiesstand truly "under" or "within" the dialectic, i.e., are unable tomanipulate the terms definitive of the conditions of competition totheir individual ends. Only so long may justice be said to be "impar-tial" in its dispensations.If, on the contrary, one faction is able to monopolize the positionsof power for any length of time, it reveals a resurgent primitivetendency to stand "above" the dialectic, i.e., to make itself master ofthe meaning of justice and arbiter of the mechanisms of arbitration.Old balances may then be drastically upset as the spectrum of permissi-ble allegiances shifts or contracts and hitherto "loyal" opposition groupsare "unmasked" and made to suffer the brunt of accusations of "con-spiracy", "counter-revolution", "subversion", etc.This is a tendency ever at work no matter who the parties orwhat the claims of the system. Lord Acton's observation on thetendency of power to corrupt and absolute power to corrupt absolutelymust count as a corollary to any dialectical theory of politics.But individuals and groups lag in their adjustments at times,failing to respond to new situations preemptorily in accord with thedictates of real — or machtpolitik, precisely because they do haveconsciences, private and public, which cannot overnight be remade.Accordingly, abuses of power develop slowly or quickly depending ona number of factors, including the nature or severity of the politicalimbalance, the length and strength of the imperiled constitutional tradi-tion (as the formal expression of the common consensus of justice), aswell as on characteristics peculiar to the contending factions themselves.But peculiar ideological characteristics, whether of the attackingor defending parties, I consider of least significance as genuine casualagents in the curtailment of political freedom, even though actionagainst a disfavored group generally follows upon accusations designedto establish a stereotype of disloyalty in terms of specific beliefs or96Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196797Conspiracy and Power Politicspractices — omitting from the bill of charges its real sin, namely, itsrelative inability to fight back in the terms of pure power politics.It may, indeed, be true for reasons at least partly doctrinal, thata Catholic majority in this country would infringe upon the liberties ofother groups more readily than a similar Quaker majority. To thisextent, the peculiar "aggressiveness" of Catholics and "peaceableness"of Quakers would be germane to understanding certain details of theusurpatory process. But the burden of my thesis diminishes the signifi-cance of such group differences before the fact that both groups, iflong able to escape the normal checks on power, would tend withcomparable avidity to meet harsh "justice" to their erstwhile loyalopposition.+The ideal of integral democracy can be approximately realizedonly where a hardy distrust prevails with respect to anyone's abilitylong to resist the abusive seductions of power, a distrust much inevidence among the founding fathers of the American constitutionalsystem. Its success is contingent on a continuing schooling in the basicmoral principle, the golden rule, of doing to others as you wouldhave them do to you. This principle is in radical opposition to thepower-political sophism of doing to others as they "actually" do toyou. For the latter readily results in a standard patterned upon aconceit as to the disparity between our own and our neighbor's be-havior,- it conveniently feeds our fancy of injury and threat, magnifyingtheir intolerability in nice proportion to the accumulation of powerwhereby we can "appropriately" requite them.The notion of "integral democracy" implies that whenever thereis a group in the policy which does not honor the common commitmentto justice the system is to that extent endangered in its integrity. Twoapproaches suggest themselves by way of remedy: (1) Invocation ofsanctions against the offending group, including, in the extreme case,proscription of its existence, and (2) employment of positive, system-identifying stimuli to encourage it to acceptance of the common com-mitment.Before discussing remedies, however, it is necessary to weigh theconsiderations which lend or deprive of credence the charge that agroup is breaking faith by resort to "conspiracy", "rebellion" or otherusurpations. To do so, one must examine the charge for its dialecticalsignificance, i.e., for what it means in terms of its tendency at thetime of imputation to affect the balance obtaining in a system ofpower-relations.Conspiracy implies dissimulation in the organization of an attemptto command the legal order by illegal means and is obviously a breachof the moral foundation of integral democracy. But it is not usuallythe weak who so conspire, though due allowance need be made fora quota of fools who cannot realistically assess the balance of power.**97Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/1998Arkansas Academy of Science ProceedingsRather, as a genera! rule, the weaker a group the greater its recognitionof the wisdom of a strict observance on its part of the canons ofreciprocity. To be weak and at the same time obnoxiously radical isto be doubly exposed, a tempting prey to those behind whose conspic-uous asseverations of patriotic devotion there lurks the primeval instinctfor leaping at the jugular.In the uncommon event that petty misguided groups conspire, asociety does well to exercise forebearance in letting the conspiracymature to a consciousness of its own futility, a state of mind affordingsome possibility of self-redemption. Only where conspiracy plainlyissues in overt action damaging to law-abiding interests does theurgency arise for punishment by the constituted authorities.But honesty should compel the conclusion that, more often, thedialectical significance of a charge that some numerically weak andodious group is conspiring lies in what it evidences about the accusersthemselves — bearing as it does the tell-tale mark of psychologicalprojection — unwittingly witnessing to their own conspiring to rig thesystem against a vulnerable adversary.It is by regarding the strong that we discover the usual conditionsfor conspiracy, as furnished by two contrasting possibilities: (1) Wherean out-group conspires against the government because the relationsof actual power are not accurately reflected in the legal distributionof power and the system does not provide or use is not easily madeof a commensurating mechanism of redress, and (2) where the govern-ment, i.e., the legal ruling-power, conspires against an out-groupbecause the former's actual power so exceeds its legal mandate as tomake feasible proceedings against that out-group through suspensionor revocation of its protections under the law.A usurpation, i.e., the consequence of a successful conspiracy, takesthe form either of revolution or despotism, accordingly as the conditionsunder (1) or (2) prevail."Revolution" implies drastic change, characteristically, but notnecessarily, attended by violence. What is dialectically significantabout a revolution is that its proponents justify it by reference to theexcesses of the government whose overthrow is sought, while pro-ponents of despotism justify their repressions in turn by reference tothe subversive nature of the excesses implicit in the undertakings ofthe opposition, excesses which render the latter "a clear and presentdanger" to the security of the state, i.e., an intolerable threat to theestablished balance of power.It is not necessary for threats to be real in order to play on them.For despotism constitutes an ingathering of power by methods whichnaturally tend to evoke one set of threats in order to invoke another.It is, indeed, from despotism's own excesses that its bugaboos derivemore than phantom power so as to congeal against its wishes a new,***98Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196799Conspiracy and Power Politicsalbeit now unconstitutional opposition which will endeavor to take itsdialectical measure.Any group conspires out of a certain sense of alienation fromhe existing order and its processes of justice. The weaker the grouphe greater the possibility that positive inducements and adjustmentscan be made to give it a sense of identification with the constitutionalgovernances of the system. The negative route, involving sanctions orjroscription, is dangerous to employ against even the weakest groupand constitutionally fatal, if not in fact futile, when employed againsta major faction in the society.The problem of abridging any group's legal right to operate isalways complicated by the fact that the group which spearheads theeffort to censure or suppress is not in the nature of the case a disinter-ested party in the cause of justice. As a consequence, the unsettlingeffect of the attendant displacements in power, he fears stimulated inhose groups having questionable "affinities" to the banned group but,above all, the witch-hunting spirit of inquiry engendered by resort tojroscription as a device in waging politics create a condition of crisisn the existing order which may well only be overcome by a despoticsacralization of institutional forms at the price of a departure of theiving spirit therefrom. That there is a pained awareness of theseendencies in some quarters of America today is due, in part at least,o the scarcely allayed ghost of McCarthyism.What is important, in summary, is that justice, as the definingcharacteristic of any legal order, pendulates between two natural limitsor usurpatory extremes, revolution and despotism. It is at its optimumor the greatest number of people when it returns, after minimal devia-ions, to a certain mean.Integral democracy, accordingly, represents a conscious attempt tooster this condition of equilibrium by supporting the existence of variousystem-stabilizing institutions at cross-power with one another anderving to dampen dialectical excess. As such, it is the political coun-erpart of an ethical conception, the golden rule, for the utility of theatter is construed as residing precisely in its social tendency as theprime agent for enforcement of a "golden mean".99Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/19

Conspiracy and Power Politics

UARK (University of Arkansas )

Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science Volume 21 Article 19 1967 Conspiracy and Power Politics John E. Guendling Arkansas Tech University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas  Part of the Political Theory Commons Recommended Citation Guendling, John E. (1967) "Conspiracy and Power Politics," Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science: Vol. 21 , Article 19. Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/19 This article is available for use under the Creative Commons license: Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0). Users are able to read, download, copy, print, distribute, search, link to the full texts of these articles, or use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu. 94Arkansas Academy of Science Proceedings, Vol.21, 1967CONSPIRACY AND POWER POLITICSJohn E. GuendlingArkansas Polytechnic CollegeIshould like to examine some first-magnitude concepts of politicaltheory in their constellation about a key concept, conspiracy, for the sakeof illuminating an ideal of integral democracy.It should be recognized at the outset that the political conditionswhich foster tendencies to conspiracy require some distinction from thoseconditions in society which foster accusations of "conspiracy". To besure, an actual tendency to conspiracy furnishes occasion for the accusa-tion; but the absence of the tendency does not preclude the accusation.What seems to be required for an understanding of the disparityis a study of the dynamics of political behavior which attends less to thequalitative differences of ideology between the parties involved andmore to the quantitative disposition of their forces in the struggle forpower. The aim of such an approach should be to draw from theequilibrations of political forces in a society what might be calledgeneralizations upon the dialectic of power politics".The observations here essayed are, however, rather more pre-liminary, their value being construed mainly in terms of their suggestionof the fecundity for political theory of concepts ingredient in the ancienttradition of dialectical philosophy.The notions most men hold of "power" and "freedom" antecedentto political reflection bear witness to the efforts of every thing livingto procure for itself a state of well-being. Such a state may be definedas a favorable balance between intrinsically self-aggrandizing factorsand whatever extrinsic factors impose limitations on any thing's being.Power, accordingly, in its pre-political aspect, is simply the positive,self-integrating or substantive display of these intrinsic factors ofvitality, while freedom is the negative, dispersive or non-substantiveconception of the lack of obstacles to their operation. As positive andnegative sides of the same idea, both bespeak as common to everyorganic being a striving to master and reduce its immediate environ-ment to material upon which it can set its own characteristic form andby means of which it can magnify its substance unchecked by alienimpositions.Although the biological world is one which, at first glance, exhibitsuniversal conflict between unrestrained tendencies to self-aggrandize-ment, the ecologist, is able to recognize standing patterns of irresolutionconstitutive of so-called "balances" in nature.***94Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196795Conspiracy and Power PoliticsIt was among the Greek natural philosophers of the Sixth CenturyB.C. that generalized expression was first given to the idea that thecharacteristic ways in which the dynamic components of nature equili-brate their relations furnish paradigms for understanding the humansocial order. This insight, traceable to Anaximander of Miletus, wasexplicated in the thesis that justice and law exist first and foremost ina cosmic state and only secondarily in human society, where theyfurnish natural norms for human behavior. The assumption was thatthere is an inherent order in nature, a self-enclosed, self-regulatingsystem of due proportions in the give and take among things, whereasin human society, on the contrary, laws have been necessitated asconscious contrivances for securing justice by their regulation of sociallyconflicting claims.The theory of "cosmic justice" of Heraclitus of Ephesus mirrorsthe "state of nature" with metaphorical aptness: The world is madeup of "opposites" checking each other. Nothing gives check to itself.Cosmic justice is, accordingly, the principle of equilibration betweenall forces in being, monitoring their "strife" lest they overstep their"natural limits".I regard to the factions competing for power in any body politic,Greek thought discerned a system of checks and balances, recognizingin their operation but a special case of a natural, cosmic law. Themoral for mankind is expressed in an emphatic tendency in ancientpolitical theory, even among those thinkers who no longer standexplicitly within the tradition of dialectical philosophy, as, e.g., Aris-totle, Polybius and Cicero, to seek conscious compliance with such a law.It is within this theoretical context that I wish to affirm, as beingof contemporary relevance, certain political apercus, starting with thefollowing as a working definition of "justice": Justice is that idea! ofan accepted norm defining the limits and arbitrating the occasions ofconflict among competing parties within any system of power-relationsin accordance with a principle which seeks to secure maximal stabilityin the total system through maximal responsiveness to the shiftingbalance of power among the competing parties.?No individual, institution or movement in society has a naturaltendency to give check to itself: That is, if you will, a law of primitive,blind being.If, notwithstanding, any entity acknowledges limits to what itmay"lawfully"do, if it defers to any so-called "rights" of others or agreesto give them their "just due", or if it formally subscribes to a systemof moral or legal rules of "fair play" among competing "loyal"elements, it does so from a platform of acquired realism instructingits view of the possible.**95Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/1996Arkansas Academy of Science ProceedingsReciprocity, i.e., mutual toleration, interposes itself as a rule wherea division of power prevents unilateral rule: That is, as it were, alaw of nature, enlightened being.Where a tradition of mutual guarantees, tolerance of differencesand equality before the law governs the administration of justice,responsible majority and loyal minority share alike in a public consciencebinding them to common observances in the exercise of freedom. Inthe measure that these observances extend to all forces competing inthe society, it exemplifies the definition of an integral democracy.Under such a system the principle of checks and balances is no longersimply a fact of life but becomes an avowed value directing theseveral parties to common terms of constraint in their behavior.If, accordingly, justice be conceived as a principle specifying theterms of competition governing the political dialectic, it should be clearthat it will function effectively in this capacity only so long as all partiesstand truly "under" or "within" the dialectic, i.e., are unable tomanipulate the terms definitive of the conditions of competition totheir individual ends. Only so long may justice be said to be "impar-tial" in its dispensations.If, on the contrary, one faction is able to monopolize the positionsof power for any length of time, it reveals a resurgent primitivetendency to stand "above" the dialectic, i.e., to make itself master ofthe meaning of justice and arbiter of the mechanisms of arbitration.Old balances may then be drastically upset as the spectrum of permissi-ble allegiances shifts or contracts and hitherto "loyal" opposition groupsare "unmasked" and made to suffer the brunt of accusations of "con-spiracy", "counter-revolution", "subversion", etc.This is a tendency ever at work no matter who the parties orwhat the claims of the system. Lord Acton's observation on thetendency of power to corrupt and absolute power to corrupt absolutelymust count as a corollary to any dialectical theory of politics.But individuals and groups lag in their adjustments at times,failing to respond to new situations preemptorily in accord with thedictates of real—or machtpolitik, precisely because they do haveconsciences, private and public, which cannot overnight be remade.Accordingly, abuses of power develop slowly or quickly depending ona number of factors, including the nature or severity of the politicalimbalance, the length and strength of the imperiled constitutional tradi-tion (as the formal expression of the common consensus of justice), aswell as on characteristics peculiar to the contending factions themselves.But peculiar ideological characteristics, whether of the attackingor defending parties, I consider of least significance as genuine casualagents in the curtailment of political freedom, even though actionagainst a disfavored group generally follows upon accusations designedto establish a stereotype of disloyalty in terms of specific beliefs or96Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196797Conspiracy and Power Politicspractices—omitting from the bill of charges its real sin, namely, itsrelative inability to fight back in the terms of pure power politics.It may, indeed, be true for reasons at least partly doctrinal, thata Catholic majority in this country would infringe upon the liberties ofother groups more readily than a similar Quaker majority. To thisextent, the peculiar "aggressiveness" of Catholics and "peaceableness"of Quakers would be germane to understanding certain details of theusurpatory process. But the burden of my thesis diminishes the signifi-cance of such group differences before the fact that both groups, iflong able to escape the normal checks on power, would tend withcomparable avidity to meet harsh "justice" to their erstwhile loyalopposition.+The ideal of integral democracy can be approximately realizedonly where a hardy distrust prevails with respect to anyone's abilitylong to resist the abusive seductions of power, a distrust much inevidence among the founding fathers of the American constitutionalsystem. Its success is contingent on a continuing schooling in the basicmoral principle, the golden rule, of doing to others as you wouldhave them do to you. This principle is in radical opposition to thepower-political sophism of doing to others as they "actually" do toyou. For the latter readily results in a standard patterned upon aconceit as to the disparity between our own and our neighbor's be-havior,- it conveniently feeds our fancy of injury and threat, magnifyingtheir intolerability in nice proportion to the accumulation of powerwhereby we can "appropriately" requite them.The notion of "integral democracy" implies that whenever thereis a group in the policy which does not honor the common commitmentto justice the system is to that extent endangered in its integrity. Twoapproaches suggest themselves by way of remedy: (1) Invocation ofsanctions against the offending group, including, in the extreme case,proscription of its existence, and (2) employment of positive, system-identifying stimuli to encourage it to acceptance of the common com-mitment.Before discussing remedies, however, it is necessary to weigh theconsiderations which lend or deprive of credence the charge that agroup is breaking faith by resort to "conspiracy", "rebellion" or otherusurpations. To do so, one must examine the charge for its dialecticalsignificance, i.e., for what it means in terms of its tendency at thetime of imputation to affect the balance obtaining in a system ofpower-relations.Conspiracy implies dissimulation in the organization of an attemptto command the legal order by illegal means and is obviously a breachof the moral foundation of integral democracy. But it is not usuallythe weak who so conspire, though due allowance need be made fora quota of fools who cannot realistically assess the balance of power.**97Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/1998Arkansas Academy of Science ProceedingsRather, as a genera! rule, the weaker a group the greater its recognitionof the wisdom of a strict observance on its part of the canons ofreciprocity. To be weak and at the same time obnoxiously radical isto be doubly exposed, a tempting prey to those behind whose conspic-uous asseverations of patriotic devotion there lurks the primeval instinctfor leaping at the jugular.In the uncommon event that petty misguided groups conspire, asociety does well to exercise forebearance in letting the conspiracymature to a consciousness of its own futility, a state of mind affordingsome possibility of self-redemption. Only where conspiracy plainlyissues in overt action damaging to law-abiding interests does theurgency arise for punishment by the constituted authorities.But honesty should compel the conclusion that, more often, thedialectical significance of a charge that some numerically weak andodious group is conspiring lies in what it evidences about the accusersthemselves— bearing as it does the tell-tale mark of psychologicalprojection—unwittingly witnessing to their own conspiring to rig thesystem against a vulnerable adversary.It is by regarding the strong that we discover the usual conditionsfor conspiracy, as furnished by two contrasting possibilities: (1) Wherean out-group conspires against the government because the relationsof actual power are not accurately reflected in the legal distributionof power and the system does not provide or use is not easily madeof a commensurating mechanism of redress, and (2) where the govern-ment, i.e., the legal ruling-power, conspires against an out-groupbecause the former's actual power so exceeds its legal mandate as tomake feasible proceedings against that out-group through suspensionor revocation of its protections under the law.A usurpation, i.e., the consequence of a successful conspiracy, takesthe form either of revolution or despotism, accordingly as the conditionsunder (1) or (2) prevail."Revolution" implies drastic change, characteristically, but notnecessarily, attended by violence. What is dialectically significantabout a revolution is that its proponents justify it by reference to theexcesses of the government whose overthrow is sought, while pro-ponents of despotism justify their repressions in turn by reference tothe subversive nature of the excesses implicit in the undertakings ofthe opposition, excesses which render the latter "a clear and presentdanger" to the security of the state, i.e., an intolerable threat to theestablished balance of power.It is not necessary for threats to be real in order to play on them.For despotism constitutes an ingathering of power by methods whichnaturally tend to evoke one set of threats in order to invoke another.It is, indeed, from despotism's own excesses that its bugaboos derivemore than phantom power so as to congeal against its wishes a new,***98Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 196799Conspiracy and Power Politicsalbeit now unconstitutional opposition which will endeavor to take itsdialectical measure.Any group conspires out of a certain sense of alienation fromhe existing order and its processes of justice. The weaker the grouphe greater the possibility that positive inducements and adjustmentscan be made to give it a sense of identification with the constitutionalgovernances of the system. The negative route, involving sanctions orjroscription, is dangerous to employ against even the weakest groupand constitutionally fatal, if not in fact futile, when employed againsta major faction in the society.The problem of abridging any group's legal right to operate isalways complicated by the fact that the group which spearheads theeffort to censure or suppress is not in the nature of the case a disinter-ested party in the cause of justice. As a consequence, the unsettlingeffect of the attendant displacements in power, he fears stimulated inhose groups having questionable "affinities" to the banned group but,above all, the witch-hunting spirit of inquiry engendered by resort tojroscription as a device in waging politics create a condition of crisisn the existing order which may well only be overcome by a despoticsacralization of institutional forms at the price of a departure of theiving spirit therefrom. That there is a pained awareness of theseendencies in some quarters of America today is due, in part at least,o the scarcely allayed ghost of McCarthyism.What is important, in summary, is that justice, as the definingcharacteristic of any legal order, pendulates between two natural limitsor usurpatory extremes, revolution and despotism. It is at its optimumor the greatest number of people when it returns, after minimal devia-ions, to a certain mean.Integral democracy, accordingly, represents a conscious attempt tooster this condition of equilibrium by supporting the existence of variousystem-stabilizing institutions at cross-power with one another anderving to dampen dialectical excess. As such, it is the political coun-erpart of an ethical conception, the golden rule, for the utility of theatter is construed as residing precisely in its social tendency as theprime agent for enforcement of a "golden mean".99Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 21 [1967], Art. 19https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol21/iss1/19

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